Wednesday, 15 July 2009

UZBEKISTAN AND THE CSTO: WHY NOT COLLECTIVE FIRST RESPONSE FORCES?

Published in Field Reports

By Erkin Akhmadov (7/15/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On July 2 2009, the legislative chamber of Uzbekistan – Oliy Majlis – discussed the results of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Council’s session held in Moscow on June 14. One of the key issues discussed at the session was the creation of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) under the CSTO. The President of Uzbekistan did not attend the session in June.

On July 2 2009, the legislative chamber of Uzbekistan – Oliy Majlis – discussed the results of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Council’s session held in Moscow on June 14. One of the key issues discussed at the session was the creation of Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) under the CSTO. The President of Uzbekistan did not attend the session in June. However, he promised to consider the issue and provide an answer later. In fact, Islam Karimov did not support the idea from the very beginning. The Oliy Majlis fully supported the President’s position, providing several sound arguments explaining Uzbekistan’s position. It seems that there are several good reasons to withhold participation in the CRRF, however, none of the other member states of the CSTO save Belarus had similar or other problems with the project. In light of Uzbekistan’s changing attitude towards one of the major actors in the CSTO, Russia, and to the organization per se, the last Uzbek decision once again raises issues of the state’s effective participation in the organization that deals with the issues of security in the CIS.

The decision to form the CRRF was adopted at the special session of the Collective Security Council on February 4, 2009, by the heads of the CSTO member states. Among  the main goals of the CRRF is strengthening security in the CSTO member states in light of existing or potential security threats such as terrorism, extremism and drug trafficking, prevention and elimination of emergency situations as well as effective participation of the CSTO in preserving international peace and security. All these issues are of immediate concern to Uzbekistan, as it has always been a target for all kinds of security threats. That could make its decision to reject the project seem unexpected.

In fact, the Treaty on the Creation of the Collective First Response Forces was the only document that was not signed by the Uzbek delegation at the summit in June. Then, the position of Uzbekistan stated that the CRRF should be used only for countering external threats and security challenges to the CSTO members. The parliament representative explained that Uzbekistan takes the assumption that each member state of the CSTO is capable of resolving its internal conflicts without help from outside. Thus, the CRRF should not become a tool for solving disputed issues, either within the framework of the CSTO or in the larger CIS region. Specifically, Uzbekistan is concerned with certain “frozen” conflicts in the CIS, and fears even the hypothetical use of the CRRF for “resolving” those.

Another key issue of discontent concerns the decision-making procedure. Uzbekistan insists that in accordance with article 12 of the CSTO Charter, all decisions of the organization – except for procedural ones – should be based on the principle of consensus. However, some of the member states proposed that the decision to use the CRRF should be adopted upon agreement between the parties for which the present treaty entered into force.

Uzbekistan’s first major concern about the possible use of the CRRF for resolving internal conflicts among or within the organization’s members has little rationale, as it was outlined that these forces cannot be used as military forces in the CIS or CSTO countries for the resolution of conflict that would arise within or between these states. The second concern – about the decision-making procedure, seems more reasonable, as it may indeed go against the norms of the CSTO Charter. Nonetheless, the other states may still argue that it is fair, as they would bear the costs of creating and sustaining the forces, and that the right to decide how, when, and where these forces would operate should be their “privilege”.

Uzbekistan’s decision concerning the creation of the CRRF once again underlined its slack participation in the CSTO. Moreover, it once again emphasized Uzbekistan’s anti-integration attitude. Parliament deputies noted that among other problems, creating the CRRF would touch upon the most important elements of each state’s sovereignty – the whole block of national legislation that regulates security issues. Thus, Uzbekistan proposed that the CSTO members can send troops that are part of the CRRF and allow foreign troops on its territory only if this does not contradict its national legislation. In other words, Uzbekistan is well aware of the powers that may be lost upon the creation of common military forces and therefore by refusing membership, it supposedly preserves its own sovereignty.

An important question remains – is sovereignty that important in the face of the kind of security threats which the CRRF are designed to counter? Past experience shows that in such moments the CIS states, and especially the states of Central Asia, have tended to unite against the common threat or enemy. Therefore, the present position of Uzbekistan on the creation of the CRRF suggests either that the state has developed strong enough military might to deal with such problems alone, or that even more paramount issues are at stake.
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