Wednesday, 03 June 2009

RESETTLEMENT FOR THE ROGUN DAM RESERVOIR BEGINS IN TAJIKISTAN

Published in Field Reports

By Alexander Sodiqov (6/3/2009 issue of the CACI Analyst)

In late May 2009, Tajik authorities resettled the first 232 families from three villages in the projected inundation zone of the massive Rogun Dam. These more than one thousand people from Nurobod District in the rocky Rasht Valley were relocated to Dangara District, a cotton growing area in southern Tajikistan. The resettlers neither had an opportunity to stay in their native area nor could they choose where to move.

In late May 2009, Tajik authorities resettled the first 232 families from three villages in the projected inundation zone of the massive Rogun Dam. These more than one thousand people from Nurobod District in the rocky Rasht Valley were relocated to Dangara District, a cotton growing area in southern Tajikistan. The resettlers neither had an opportunity to stay in their native area nor could they choose where to move. Despite serious opposition from downstream Uzbekistan and an inability to find investors to complete the US$3.2 billion dam project, Dushanbe is determined to continue the resettlement and begin filling up the Rogun reservoir as early as in December 2009.

While the Tajik authorities press ahead with the construction of the Rogun Dam, they should be aware of possible social, economic and security implications of a rushed resettlement. Tajik political analyst Holmamad Samiev suggests that the relocation of people from one region to another, particularly amidst the economic downturn, is a very sensitive issue in a country that experienced a civil war with a strong interregional component. According to the scholar, there is little doubt in the country about the economic and political importance of the completion of the Rogun Dam. However, without a coordinated and effective resettlement policy based on the needs of the affected populations, the construction of the dam might lead to dire consequences.

The major reason for caution is the role that popular dissatisfaction with the resettlement component of the Rogun Dam project played in the events leading up to the civil war in Tajikistan in 1992-1997. Soviet planners widely used forced resettlement schemes to provide labor-intensive cotton production in southern Tajikistan with workers from mountainous regions. The majority of resettlers came from the Rasht Valley (also known as Gharm). In most cases, displacement and forced migration led to serious social and economic impoverishment as well as adverse health effects. The opening up of the Soviet system in the late 1980s enabled Gharmi communities to oppose involuntary resettlement schemes. The debate around the Rogun Dam project, which required the displacement of some 30,000 people across the Rasht Valley served as a focal point for the political mobilization of the Gharmi people. Grievances generated by the experience of forced resettlement and popular resistance to displacement contributed greatly to the confrontation between the governing elites and underprivileged Gharmi communities, ultimately leading to civil war in Tajikistan.

Kiyomiddin, an activist of the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) in Gharm who asked not to disclose his surname, suggested that in initiating the current resettlement scheme the Tajik government has ignored “the lessons of the early 1990s”. According to him, following the war Gharmis were effectively marginalized from the political process. Therefore, the governing elites decided to implement resettlement without even consulting the affected communities. “The Government is moving more than one thousand Gharmis to live with Kulyabi communities in Dangara,” said Kiyomiddin. “Fifteen years ago these people were killing each other. They have not forgotten old hatreds… This is very dangerous”.

Today, resettlement is very likely to leave the displaced communities worse off economically and socially than they used to be prior to the move. First, resettlers have lost access to a familiar natural resource base and will face difficulties in getting used to a new environment with a drastically different climate and resource base. Second, although the move was planned far in advance, very little has been done to prepare the resettlement area. The village of Chorsada, which has accommodated the first wave of resettlers, resembles a spontaneous refugee camp rather than an organized settlement. People live in tents and wait for construction materials promised by the authorities to begin building their new houses. The village does not have a reliable water supply. Mustafo Muazzamov, head of NGO Nihol working with the resettled, said most people in the village are very pessimistic about their future. “They do not know whether they will be able to build new houses by winter. They also do not know where they will work. Most of these people will not be able or willing to work on the cotton fields.”

Much will now depend on the ability of Tajik authorities to assist resettled people in reconstructing their livelihoods. This ability is limited by the economic impasse the country finds itself in. The global economic downturn has had a strong impact on Tajikistan through declining remittances and falling prices for its key exports, cotton and aluminum. In addition, the country’s resources have been strained by natural disasters. Torrential rain in the spring caused floods and mud flows which have displaced over 15,000 people across the country, destroyed more than 3,600 houses and damaged 14,000 hectares of agricultural land. In this situation, Tajik authorities have little other option than to leave the resettled to tend for themselves. However, such inaction might further alienate the resettled and make them seek justice from radical religious groups and underground political movements.
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