President Obama announced a new plan for Afghanistan and Pakistan on March 27, 2009. In the Central Asian context, two aspects of the plan beg closer scrutiny: the increase in military and civilian presence in Afghanistan, and the creation of a Contact Group that invites NATO, the Central Asian states, the Gulf nations, Iran, Russia, India and China to participate in resolving the Afghanistan issue.

Analysts can be divided into two groups regarding their opinions and forecasts on the implications of the new plan. One group argues that the deployment of more American troops will cause a new wave of fighting and resistance from radical groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, which would become stronger and more organized. In other words, the increased military contingent is likely to escalate the conflict by pouring oil on the fire. The planned increase of American and other NATO soldiers on the Afghan-Pakistan border could scatter the radicals and drive them closer to Afghanistan’s borders with Central Asian states, which are relatively peaceful at the moment. A renewed concentration of the Taliban on the borders of Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, which in total share a border of 2,087 km with Afghanistan, would pose a threat of reanimating radical groups that have been mostly dormant since the Taliban lost control of Afghanistan. Another factor that threatens the security of Central Asia is the Taliban’s hardening grip over the Afghan-Pakistan border areas and intensified suicide attacks inside Pakistan, intended to damage the already weak Pakistani government with the ultimate purpose of overthrowing it.

Another group of analysts forecast that increased troop levels will eventually lead to the elimination of Taliban and al Qaeda extremists. Indeed, this could become the result of the proposed Contact Group for Afghanistan and Pakistan, if realized and successful. The invited participants are expected to work together and look for unified solutions. In theory, the initiative is a movement towards a new quality of relations between the East and West. In particular, the Central Asian states, whose role is usually underscored in stabilizing the situation in Afghanistan, were for the first time invited by high level Western players to participate in resolving the Afghanistan issue. Here, it is worth mentioning an initiative proposed by the Uzbek President one year ago, namely to revive the “6+2” Contact Group that was active until 2001. He invited NATO to join the group, thus turning it into a “6+3” Contact Group. The Group would be comprised of all six countries that have immediate borders with Afghanistan: Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran, Pakistan, and China plus the U.S. and Russia. This proposal received no response and no follow up activities, statements or actions were made on this proposal so far.  This lack of response by the international community may be the reason for Uzbekistan’s notable absence from a recent meeting on Afghanistan in The Hague. It will therefore be interesting to see how the development of a new Contact Group, proposed by the American President, will be received by the Uzbek leadership. The proposal for a new Contact Group recognized the potential of Afghanistan’s neighbors. If previously, NATO and the U.S. were solely relying on their military force to destroy the extremists, after seven years of single-minded efforts it appears the U.S. is ready for a more inclusive strategy.

As Uzbekistan chose its own strategy of socio-economic development, it developed its own way of dealing with the Afghanistan issue as well. After the Taliban government was ousted, Uzbekistan prioritized the development of Afghanistan’s economy instead of a military confrontation with extremism. The official stance has been that the 30 years of conflict in Afghanistan destroyed the socio-economic infrastructure and pauperized the population, creating an environment for recruiting new supporters of extremism. Uzbekistan has built 11 bridges that connect the south and north of Afghanistan. The delivery of electricity was resumed in 2002. Uzbekistan exports oil, ferrous metal, furniture, salt, non-alcoholic beverages and foodstuff to Afghanistan and imports fruits, nuts and olives from there. Uzbekistan and Afghanistan have held negotiations in the several areas. These include the reconstruction of an airport and power station in Mazar-i-Sharif; the building of an international Trans-Afghan corridor, including the first ever railroad in Afghanistan connecting Mazari-Sharif with the Hayraton checkpoint on the Uzbek-Afghan border. There is little doubt that Uzbekistan’s contribution to development across its borders has contributed to northern Afghanistan’s opium poppy-free status.  Considering Uzbekistan’s past experience in the reconstruction of infrastructure in Afghanistan, it could share its experience and contribute to upcoming projects to be launched in the framework of economic development. It is clear that rebuilding the destroyed infrastructure as well as initiating new projects is vital in both short-term and long-term strategies for solving the Afghanistan issue.