On 20 March, the European Council endorsed the ‘Eastern Partnership’ (EaP) initiative in Brussels, and called for all necessary preparations to be made for the Eastern Partnership launching summit with the partner countries on 7 May 2009. The European Council also issued a Declaration on the Eastern Partnership, which is basically a short abstract of the Commission’s Communication, issued last December. The simple fact that the Council accepted the Commission’s proposals without major changes is a significant success for those EU countries backing the proposal, especially Poland, Sweden and the Czech EU presidency.

The European Council also decided about the financial background of the ‘Eastern Partnership’. In spite of French reluctance to approve the originally planned 600 million Euros, fearing the EaP might undermine the financing of the Union for the Mediterranean, the European Council agreed to provide the 600 million for the Commission to increase its financial aid to the six former Soviet states targeted by the Eastern Partnership, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine.

“Our dream has come true, we have been able to adopt the Eastern Partnership,” said Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg after the Summit. Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski welcomed the decision, claiming the 600 million was the “absolute minimum” to help stabilize the Eastern neighbors of the EU.

Prior to the European Council, on 16 March, EU foreign ministers had decided to maintain the suspension of the travel ban against Belarus President Alexander Lukashenko, but it is still doubtful whether Lukashenko will be invited to the May Summit in Prague, where the EU leaders and the Eastern partners will sign a Joint Declaration on EaP, as an official launch of the project. "That will depend on the behavior of Mr Lukashenko and the Belarus government in the coming weeks, but Belarus should be in the Eastern Partnership," Schwarzenberg said about the Belarusian participation.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov claimed on Saturday in Brussels, right after the Summit, that the EU was seeking its own sphere of influence. “We are accused of trying to have spheres of influence. What is the ‘Eastern Partnership’? Is it a sphere of influence, including Belarus?” He also accused the Czech EU Presidency and the European Commission of blackmailing Belarus by adopting sanctions if Minsk recognizes the independence of the Georgian breakaway regions South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Lavrov said: “When my good friend Karel Schwarzenberg publicly says that if Belarus recognizes Abkhazia and South Ossetia it could forget about “Eastern Partnership”, is it blackmail or is it democracy at work? After those kind of statements, we have questions. Is it about pulling countries (away) from the decisions that they are supposed to take freely?”

Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt answered these allegations, stating that “the Eastern Partnership is not about spheres of influence. The difference is that these countries themselves opted to join.” Bildt added that the EU's position on Georgia is not ‘blackmail’ but “is about upholding the principles of the EU and international law, which Russia should also be respecting”.

Georgian Minister for Reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili also expressed his opinion to the EU Observer that “Mr. Lavrov just confirmed that whatever choices Eastern European countries make, be it NATO or EU, they are not acceptable to Russia. Moscow continues to see the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these countries as an attempt to leave its sphere of influence. The fact that Russia sees the Eastern Partnership as a zero-sum game proves wrong those who believe that giving up NATO aspirations would solve the problems with Moscow. Appeasing Russia will not work.” His strong comments could hardly be surprising – the Russian invasion last August made reinforced ties to NATO and the EU all the more critical in the eyes of the Georgian government.

Minsk is unlikely to recognize South Ossetia and Abkhazia until the official ‘Eastern Partnership’ Summit in May, in Prague, hoping that it could use the increased Western engagement as a bargaining chip in the negotiations with Moscow to gain financial and economic benefits. However, it is not too likely Minsk could develop an overtly pro-Western foreign policy in the long run, due to its deep economic, cultural and political integration with Russia, and also because of the nature of its anti-democratic political system, which is at odds with the European democratic standards.

Nevertheless, if Minsk recognizes the independence of the Georgian breakaway regions, it could definitely cause serious turmoil within the multilateral framework of the EaP initiative. Such a hostile step would hardly be acceptable for Tbilisi, which could hamper any activity connected to ‘Eastern Partnership’, out of displeasure with such a Belarusian decision. In light of the importance of Georgia and Azerbaijan as an alternative gas and oil import route from the Caspian Region, their active participation is paramount in the ‘Eastern Partnership’.

Whether cooperation between the EU and the six involved Eastern European countries will prove fruitful or whether internal political disagreement will ruin the effectiveness of the ambitious initiative is an open question, but at the moment it seems that the Hungarian presidency in 2011 will be busy organizing the second Eastern Partnership Summit, which is supposed to take place every second year at the level of the heads of states.