Kyrgyzstan's decision on February 20 to shut down the Manas airbase left the NATO coalition scrambling to find alternative routes to deliver supplies and fuel to its forces in Afghanistan. The closure of the airbase—scheduled for late August 2009— comes at a critical point in NATO’s operations in Afghanistan. In February, President Obama pledged to boost the level of the U.S. troops there from slightly over 30,000 to 47,000 by the end of the year.

Built by American engineers in December 2001, the airbase, located at the Manas international airport, has been crucial for NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan. It gained added prominence after 2005, when Uzbekistan closed an airbase used by ISAF and, most recently, after the Taliban stepped up the raids on NATO logistic terminals near the Afghan-Pakistani border. According to the Afghan Press agency, last December alone, Taliban insurgents torched over 300 containers and trucks in Peshawar, Pakistan, containing food and oil for ISAF. The total damage to NATO was estimated at billions of dollars.

Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, cited Washington’s unwillingness to increase the rent payment as a primary reason for his government’s decision to close the base at Manas. He also noted lingering public discontent with the unresolved case of a Kyrgyz truck driver shot and killed by an American serviceman in 2006.

Ironically, there may be an upside to NATO’s setback in Kyrgyzstan as the alliance’s leadership began considering alternative supply routes available in Central Asia and beyond. More options may mean greater flexibility, less dependence on political moods in each particular country and, ultimately, higher effectiveness of NATO’s anti-Taliban operations.

Some of the suggested transit nations, such as Iran, appear untenable due to the political controversy involved. Others, including NATO’s Baltic members Latvia and Estonia, are eager to help but may involve complex logistics due to their distance from the battlefield. Yet other options, such as those involving Russia, may require political fine-tuning in Washington. At the NATO summit in Bucharest, Romania in April 2008, Russia’s permanent representative to the alliance, Dmitri Rogozin, offered to have American non-military equipment and non-lethal supplies flown over Russian territory. (Russia already provides this service for German and French troops stationed in Afghanistan.) In an interview with the Moscow daily, Kommersant, on December 3, 2008, Rogozin noted that NATO’s six-month negotiations with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan were successfully completed the day before, and the so-called “northern route” involving the three countries could become operational in early 2009. Kazakh and Uzbek authorities have also reportedly agreed to provide railway transportation through their territories.

The Russian offer is viewed with suspicion in Washington given Moscow’s regional ambitions. Pro-western analysts in both Russia and Kyrgyzstan blamed Moscow for invoking financial aid to the Kyrgyz government to pressure it into closing the base. The Kremlin has denied any connection to the decision on Manas, although it has repeatedly voiced concern about NATO's growing influence in ex-Soviet republics. Russia continues to maintain what it calls a "permanent" military base at Kant, Kyrgyzstan, as part of Russia’s Collective Security Treaty with Kyrgyzstan and five other CIS nations. The base underwent significant infrastructural improvements and was reinforced with more advanced military equipment between 2006 and 2008.

Likewise, Washington's past record with President Karimov of Uzbekistan has been spotty. On February 17, Karimov met with the Commander of the U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, during the latter’s scarcely covered visit to Uzbekistan. IWPR speculates that Patraeus might have sought Karimov’s permission for the American ISAF contingent to use the Termez airport in southern Uzbekistan, currently utilized by German troops en route to Afghanistan.

Karimov may now be willing to accommodate the U.S. for a hefty compensation but his promises should be taken with a grain of salt. In 2005, the Uzbek leader evicted American forces from the airbase in Karshi-Khanabad following the State Department’s criticism of Karimov's brutal suppression of riots in Andijan. Future military cooperation with Karimov's regime, if it occurs, will require careful diplomacy on Washington's part, and discussions about human rights abuses are likely to jeopardize such cooperation once again. Washington may have to offer Uzbekistan some carefully crafted economic and political incentives to push it to improve its human rights practices.

Another route currently contemplated at NATO circumvents Russia entirely and is valued for that very reason. It originates at the Georgian Black Sea ports with subsequent ground transportation across Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea and, over Turkmenistan's border, into Afghanistan.

Interestingly, Russian officials may already be positioning themselves to influence the negotiations between the North Atlantic alliance and Azerbaijan. On February 26, Baku was visited by the chief of Russian President's administration, Sergey Naryshkin who, among his other functions, is in charge of enhancing economic ties between the two countries. The Azerbaijani news agency AzerTaj also reported on February 26 that Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov would make a trip to Baku on March 11-12 to discuss a broad range of unspecified regional issues. Considering the importance Russia attaches to the security of its southernmost frontiers, Azerbaijan's possible role alongside the NATO troops in fighting Taliban narco-trafficking, religious extremism and terrorism is likely to be discussed.

Analysts speculate that, outside the Central Asia region, the U.S. may approach Turkey where the NATO forces have maintained the Incirlik airbase near the Mediterranean Sea since 1954. In 2001-2003, NATO used Incirlik as a main hub to refuel aircraft and transport troops and humanitarian relief during the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan.

Each of these routes raises a plethora of logistical, security, and political issues. As negotiations with potential host and transit countries are quietly underway, it is not easy to predict which options NATO will ultimately pursue, as most of them will entail tough decisions and political maneuvering on all sides. Washington and NATO, specifically, will need to give a renewed thought to the pros and cons and the gives and takes of a military cooperation with the nations of this volatile region.