Thursday, 24 July 2008

ROLE OF INFORMATION BLOCKADE ON ARMS DEPOT EXPLOSION AT KAGAN IN UZBEKISTAN

Published in Field Reports

By Erkin Akhmadov (7/24/2008 issue of the CACI Analyst)

On July 10, 2008, Kagan – a small town located just outside of Bukhara – was shattered by massive explosions at a military arms depot. National information agencies reported that the explosions, caused by fire at a missile and artillery ammunition depot, killed at least three people and wounded 21. In the rush to evacuate the civilian population, handling the consequences of the blast and providing necessary medical and humanitarian assistance, Uzbek authorities were very terse about giving out information about the tragic event.

On July 10, 2008, Kagan – a small town located just outside of Bukhara – was shattered by massive explosions at a military arms depot. National information agencies reported that the explosions, caused by fire at a missile and artillery ammunition depot, killed at least three people and wounded 21. In the rush to evacuate the civilian population, handling the consequences of the blast and providing necessary medical and humanitarian assistance, Uzbek authorities were very terse about giving out information about the tragic event. The inadequate reporting on the causes and consequences of the event left the whole nation as well as international mass media free to make assumptions and report rumors, leading to a situation of panic and alertness for several days after the event. A week after the blast, President Islam Karimov visited the town of Kagan to hold a Governmental commission session. The outcome of the session shed some light on details of the tragedy.

The Governmental commission on emergency situation in Kagan consists of government officials, including the National Security Service, Prosecutor General’s Office, Ministry of Defense, Ministry on Emergency Situations, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and other agencies. The Commission is mainly engaged with stabilizing the situation, providing necessary measures of security and assistance to the victims.

During the session of the Commission that was headed by President Islam Karimov, it was announced that the primary cause of the blast was that the ammunition depot, constructed during the Soviet period, “did not meet normative requirements defined for such facilities”. Thus, it was inferred that the Ministry of Defense “did not pay proper attention to the condition of the ammunition depot, the conditions of ammunition and explosives storage, did not maintain order and discipline at the proper level, and did not anticipate possible dangers.”

Military servicemen were unable to extinguish the fire that emerged at the facility, resulting in the explosions. The causes of the fire are still being investigated by the Prosecutor General’s Office, but as for now the Ministry of Defense states that the fire was “unconditioned”. By the same token, the Ministry of Internal Affairs adopted an explanation of “negligent use of fire and ammunition”. By now, it is clear that the Government ruled out blaming the event on a terrorist act.

As for the consequences of the blast, there are still several speculations. The first and foremost of them concerns the number of victims. Official governmental reports claim that three persons were killed and 21 injured. However, these numbers have met with doubt, considering the fact that the hospitals of Bukhara city were overloaded with patients from Kagan to such an extent that some of them had to be placed in other regional hospitals. Moreover, the reported presence of a large number of volunteer troops and conscripts at the base indicates that the officially provided numbers may be erroneous. Unofficial sources suggest more than twenty people were killed and more than sixty injured as a result of the blast.

Another subject of numerous speculations concerns the scale of damages suffered. Uzbek authorities claim that the town’s infrastructure was not affected and that the “Kagan event” was of a local character. Very different information was provided by local residents and non-governmental sources. Accordingly, the railway station was completely destroyed, the town hospital burnt down, dozens of civilian houses destroyed by fire. Based on reports from local non-governmental information agencies, the town is practically isolated from the rest of the world – there are no telephone communications, and the train running from Kagan to the capital Tashkent was disrupted. In fact, considering the large numbers of those evacuated from Kagan to Bukhara, it can be assumed that the physical damage resulting from the explosion are quite significant.

The scale of the “Kagan event” was not insignificant for residents of Bukhara, and Uzbekistan as a whole. Thus, it is unclear why the government of Uzbekistan chose not to provide the people with adequate information. The “Kagan event” can hardly be classified as a political event that could possibly undermine the incumbent regime. But when deprived of objective and efficient information from official authorities, people are inclined to create and believe in various rumors that will continually sustain panic. While a Bukhara regional Administration representative stated that “the fire at the depot is contained” and there are no reasons for further worries, there are persistent rumors circulating among citizens that there are more explosives left in the basement of the depot that could explode with a thermal shock wave of 75 degrees Celsius, and an effective casualty radius of fifty kilometers. This all is accompanied friendly Bukhara policemen suggesting residents to leave the city.

As citizens of Uzbekistan are quite used to limited access to sources of objective information, the management of the present situation in Kagan is not unique. However, the government’s information policy as tended to counter its likely aim of stabilizing the situation.
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