The Russian Federal Migration Service (FMS) has recently announced its plan to reduce the quota for labor migrants coming to Russia from six million in 2007 to two million in 2008. In larger cities, the quota will decrease even more, with Moscow accepting six times fewer migrants in the coming year. However, even last year’s quota of six million proved to be insufficient, as the number of FMS-registered migrants exceeded seven million by the end of 2007. Unofficial figures of migrants are higher.

The FMS’s new policy comes ahead of the Russian presidential elections in spring 2008, with President Vladimir Putin responding to one of the biggest concerns for the Russian public – labor migrants from former Soviet states that continue to flood Russian cities.

In 2008, the FMS lists 14 categories of professions in demand in the Russian labor market to be filled by migrants, but the list excludes market merchants – a category usually occupied by natives of the South Caucasus and Central Asia. It seems that the FMS is trying to minimize encounters between the local population and foreign labor migrants by keeping the latter at remote construction sites and the agricultural sector.

The FMS’s policy responds to growing anti-migrant sentiments among the Russian population, especially in big cities. It also goes along with the platforms of all political parties currently represented in the Duma, as all promote greater national pride in a stronger Russia. Putin’s political party, United Russia, no longer hides its close ties with ultra-nationalist movements such as Nashi or Russkii proekt.

Discontent with foreign labor migrants in Russia is felt everywhere, from popular culture and contemporary literary works to ultra-right and ultra-left youth movements. In popular culture, the image of a Moldovan, Kyrgyz, or Tajik migrant is normally depicted as a middle-aged man with broken Russian, dirty clothes, and awkward behavior. Migrants are also often depicted as the major source of criminality in Russia. However, migrants themselves are often victims of brutal crimes committed by xenophobic movements.

The cut in the immigration quota will affect mostly Russia’s weaker neighboring states, which often have up to 10 percent of their work-age citizens residing in Russia – Moldova, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, as well as the South Caucasian states. The economies of all three countries considerably depend on remittances. Although Tajikistan is not among the poorest countries in the world, it is the fourth biggest recipient of remittances per capita, accounting for 37 percent of its GDP in 2006, according to the Economist data. The share of remittances in Kyrgyzstan and Moldova’s GDP in 2006 comprised some 32 percent.

Labor migration from these countries is impossible to prevent. Over the past decade, human labor migration obtained its own structure and organization. There are middlemen assisting migrants’ flows, and financial institutions providing security for transnational financial exchange. There are also people and businesses on both sides of the borders that vitally depend on labor migration. The business element in labor migration includes both legal investment projects and organized criminal networks. Decreasing immigration flows through lowering quotas is largely a populist policy, especially in a period when the Russian economy is in rapid growth.

Labor migration is a complex phenomenon in the post-Soviet space, and its implications remain understudied. What is clear, however, is the fact that migrants’ remittances boost the real estate market both in the importer and recipient countries. A cutback in migrant flows to Russia would clearly affect its local construction sector.

Migrants are likely to encounter tougher border checks and law enforcement control in Russia following the FMS’s reduced quotas. Indeed, it is also likely to boost corruption in Russia among agencies registering migrants and in the police. Crime rates among migrants are likely to increase as a result of their inability to receive legal registration, and therefore provoke more tensions between them and the local population. Altogether, the FMS will encounter a harder burden in maintaining its system of control of migrants inflows.

If the portion of labor migrants traveling to Russia decreases in the coming months, Kazakhstan is likely to become their first priority country. Kyrgyz migrants increasingly choose South Korea as another favorable destination. With that, Moscow and St. Petersburg remain a popular destination for students and young professionals from former Soviet states.

Along with extremist xenophobic movements, there are, of course, movements in Russia campaigning for the better treatment of labor migrants, and promoting a more positive public perception of foreigners. However, their voices are overshadowed by everday moderate or radical antagonism toward foreign workers on the part of the local population.

The last two decades have shown that in most parts of the world, both recipient and importer countries benefited from labor migration. Its rates increase or decrease depending on transnational economic development. As Russia’s economy strengthens and a middle class emerges, there will hopefully be more proponents of a balanced approach to foreign workforce.