The recent visit of the joint delegation of intellectuals of Azerbaijan and Armenia to the capitals of both countries and to the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic may mark a turn in Azerbaijan’s tactics into a more flexible approach. If this policy is continued, it may have good impact for decreasing tension among the participants of the conflict and make the search for compromises easier.

On July 28, a joint delegation including five Armenians and five Azerbaijanis, led by the ambassadors of Armenia and Azerbaijan to Russia, Armen Smbatian and Polad Bul-bul Oglu, made a joint trip to Stepanakert, Yerevan and Baku to meet, respectively, the president of the unrecognized Nagorno Karabakh Republic, Arkady Ghukasian, the presidents of Armenia Robert Kocharian and of Azerbaiajn, Ilham Aliyev. It was reported that the move was initiated by the two ambassadors shortly after the latest unsuccessful summit between Kocharian and Aliyev in St. Petersburg on June 9. However, this trip marked a sharp turn in Azerbaijan’s policy towards the Armenian counterparts in the conflict. Since the start of the conflict in late 1980s, Azerbaijan has cut land communications with Armenia, and in 1993, Turkey also closed its border with Armenia as a sign of solidarity with Azerbaijan. A cease-fire was established in May 1994, but efforts to find a political solution to the conflict have so far failed. During these years, official Baku has increasingly restricted the possibilities of contacts between officials and ordinary citizens of Armenia and Azerbaijan, seeing this as another way to exert pressure on the enemy. This policy has sometimes caused international incidents (for example, the NATO command cancelled its Partnership For Peace exercises in Baku in September 2004 as Azerbaijan did not let the Armenian delegation enter the country). Few dissident Azerbaijanis agree to meet Armenians (especially those living in Nagorno Karabakh), and these meetings often take place in third countries. In contrast, both Armenia and the authorities of Nagorno Karabakh call for the activation of contacts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis, seeing them as a means to decrease mutual tension, enhance public trust, and make possible concessions easier. This stance has been supported by all international mediators but rejected by Azerbaijan.

When an Azerbaijani ambassador calls his Armenian colleague a “friend,” this implies a possible radical change in Azerbaijan’s policy towards Armenia and Armenians. What was even less expected was the contact of the Azerbaijani delegation with the de facto leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh, who were usually presented as criminals in Baku. The slogans heard from both sides we of the order that the two sides are “doomed to coexistence on this land by God and history”, as one of the Azerbaijani members of the delegation observed.

It remains to be seen if Azerbaijan will be consistent in its decision to lift the ban on the contacts with Armenia and Armenians. It appears that the administration is under pressure from both the opposition and some of its supporters. And, if continued, will the contacts with representatives and inhabitants of Nagorno Karabakh continue? The official argument for such contacts is that they are citizens of Azerbaijan, but on the other hand, the fear on the Azerbaijani side is that such contacts could be taken as a de facto recognition of the current authorities of the region, which Azerbaijan has constantly opposed. This somewhat distinguishes Azerbaijan’s stance from that of other conflicting parties in the former USSR, as contacts between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali, Tbilisi and Sukhumi, and  Chishinau and Tiraspol are less complicated.

Even if continued, these contacts will not, of course, mean any immediate changes in the political position of the sides concerning the central issue of the conflict, the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. These positions are, as before, mutually exclusive: full independence sought by Nagorno-Karabakh against the region being an inseparable part of Azerbaijan, as claimed by Baku.

If continued, the contacts between Armenians and Azerbaijanis will most likely address issues not directly linked to the Karabakh conflict. They may be dedicated to cultural problems, such as architectural monuments on each other’s side; or environmental issues, such as forest fires or water disputes. Contacts along the border settlements for de-mining or other purposes are also not excluded. The possibility of participation of government officials in such contacts is also an open question. Progress in economy-related issues is unlikely, as are possible initiatives to de-block some parts of borders or communications. Azerbaijan would hardly make such steps, and, on the other hand, Armenia has deeply modified its economy, and does not need most of the communications whose discontinuation heavily hit it 15-18 years ago. A possible exception is the railroad link with the Nakhichevan Republic, as it would give Armenia access to Iranian railroads. On the other hand, Azerbaijan could also reap benefits from some joint economic projects. For example, Armenia could supply power to its border regions which are power-deficient, but again, such developments are highly unlikely in the foreseeable future.

Importantly, the contacts, if held regularly, may result in  a significant decrease in enmity, which may bring such fruits as defusing the situation along the border line, where dozens of soldiers from both sides are killed yearly by snipers, and a more tolerant attitude to the opposite party in public opinion. This would no doubt improve the atmosphere in the region in general and, as a result, create improved chances for finding a political solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.