On March 30, Almazbek Atambaev, one of the leaders of the opposition, assumed the premiership, which indicated President Kurmanbek Bakiev’s willingness to make concessions: to build a coalitional government and review the much-criticized December 2006 constitution. However, the United Front and the coalition For Reforms refused to take up positions in the government, viewing it as a maneuver by the President and stressing its limited power to usher in constitutional reforms.

As President Bakiev’s March 23 address on the second anniversary of the “Tulip Revolution” proved to be increasingly disappointing, it reinforced the belief by the radical opposition that further talks were hopeless. However, Almazbek Atambaev, one of the opposition’s leaders, discerned the president’s openness for dialogue.

Becoming the third Prime Minister in two years, Almazbek Atambaev, the leader of the Social Democratic Party, referred to himself as a “bridge” between the government and the radical opposition. By promising to renew the government by 40 percent, Atambaev has already sacked three ministers: First Deputy Prime Minister Daniyar Usenov, Minister of Emergency Janysh Rustanbekov, and Minister of Health Shayloobek Niyazov. Although the dismissal of ministers with tarnished reputations, galvanized by public scandals, has contributed to some extent to alleviating public discontent, the new Prime Minister has little choice but to form a government largely on the basis of the previous one.

With like-minded cohorts, the new Prime Minister created a moderate opposition bloc, the coalition For United Kyrgyzstan, which underscoring negotiation means for the sake of “securing peace and integrity” of the state. It includes Edil Baysalov, the leader of the Coalition for Democracy and Civil Society, Parliamentarian Azimbek Beknazarov, former minister for Foreign Affairs Roza Otunbaeva, and Parliamentarian Dooronbek Sadyrbaev. They react to the “categorical and peremptory” statements of the United Front led by Felix Kulov, and the reluctance of the members of the coalition For Reforms to build a “cohesive position for negotiations.”

Nonetheless, the steps taken by Almazbek Atambaev, a high-profile opposition leader, towards the president rendered criticism as well. Atambaev, being on the frontline of the opposition during the November protests that resulted in the amended constitution empowering the parliament, was remembered for labeling the president as a “political corpse,” pointing to his failed reaction to the demands of the public. He was also widely exemplified for voluntarily resigning from his position as Minister of Industry, Trade, and Tourism on April 21, 2006, in protest against the family rule and upsurge of criminals on the political scene. However, observers point to Atambaev’s edgy viewpoint towards Felix Kulov, who was able to magnetize many opposition politicians around himself, despite his unbending support for the president while in power, that made him seek independent talks with the president.

It seems that Prime Minister Atambaev is unlikely to satisfy the demands of the opposition and defuse the political confrontation. Firstly, as the more radical opposition argues, the Prime Minister has no power to decide upon political issues, pointing to the President Bakiev’s power over the security forces, whereas the Prime Minister is solely responsible for economic matters. Secondly, the current government cannot be coalitional, since the opposition members from both the United Front and the movement For Reforms refused to take part in it, the reason for which was the belief that President Bakiev is giving up government seats in order to weaken the opposition and to prolong his time on power. Also, the argument goes that Atambaev’s support is weak, since he opted out from the movement For Reforms to negotiate with the president. “There, Atambaev represents only himself,” argues Felix Kulov.

On the other hand, Parliamentarian Omurbek Tekebaev, member of the United Front, who shared the chairmanship of the Movement For Reform with Atambaev, argues that the power of the new Prime Minister is tied to the opposition. He believes that the more pressing United Front the appears, the greater are the chances that Atambaev will have to force President Bakiev towards reforms. “If the mass protests in April are cancelled, the White House will not reckon with the new Prime Minister,” he contends.

The United Front insists that the coalition government should come along with early presidential elections, which should test the legitimacy of President Bakiev, and constitutional reforms. Its leader, Felix Kulov, has visited Moscow three times since he stepped down from the premiership. In his interview to a Russian news agency, he modestly hinted that these visits fortified his plans. As the cells representing the United Front prop up in different cities and rayons, supporters are attracted not only from among ordinary people, but also from local authorities.

The coalition For Reforms has already sent an “infallible” version of the November constitution to the president. If the president fails to consider it by April 5, the members of the coalition For Reforms say that they will have to join the United Front’s demand for early presidential elections at the mass protests, which should start on April 11. President Bakiev is also working on his version. Nevertheless, the latter’s attempt to hold a tight grip on centralized power is likely to be loosened this hot spring.