On February 16, a Russian-made MiG 31B interceptor jet fighter of the Kazakhstani Air Force crashed under unknown circumstances six kilometers north of Qaraghandy in Central Kazakhstan. The accident occurred when the crew was returning from a training flight and approaching the air base to land. The crew, Captain Denis Fedotov and co-pilot Andrei Leontiev, were killed without having the time to send a distress signal. Some residents in the area, who witnessed the crash, said the jet was flying too low on the approach, level with rooftops. But Vladimir Shatskov, chief of staff of the Central Military District and other military experts ruled out a pilot error or non-compliance with instructions, asserting that the pilots were qualified enough to avoid any fatal mistake. Defense minister Danial Akhmetov said the pilots displayed a great heroism refusing to eject and preventing the plane from crashing into residential areas. The crash site was immediately cordoned off by the military and investigators found the cockpit flight recorder, but days after the crash, experts still did not release any comprehensive accounts of the accident.

Technical failures of that kind are not rare in civil and military aviation of Kazakhstan, but the latest crash of Mig31B became a gossip item in military and journalistic circles that calls to question the much-lauded high level of modernization of Kazakhstan’s air force. Jet fighters of MiG31B type have been manufactured in Russia since 1979 and the Defense Ministry, one of the largest purchasers of Russian arms in CIS, has had a preference for the reliable and relatively low-priced MiGs. Most of these planes, put into combat service in 1998, are obsolete and spare parts are not available in Kazakhstan. Military experts say the Defense Ministry of Kazakhstan cannot provide adequate technical maintenance service for MiG fighters, and even lack properly equipped hangars to repair and maintain the planes.

Most of the pilots that operate the sophisticated MiG31B interceptor jets are trained in Russian flying schools and are enlisted in the Kazakh Air Force on a contract basis. They carry Russian passports and do not wish to receive Kazakh citizenship. Contract-based military service was introduced in Kazakhstan under former Defense minister Mukhtar Altynbayev as part of the military reform process. Military statistics indicate that 65 percent of current military officers in the Kazakhstani army consist of contracted servicemen. Some experts believe the introduction of contract military service, as opposed to obligatory enlistment, implies the recruitment of volunteers to serve in the army and therefore raises the defense capability and moral of military forces.

For Kazakhstan’s army, with barely 76,000 manpower outnumbered by the military force of most of its neighbors, contract military service seemed a dire necessity rather than a face-lifting reform. Even with steadily growing GDP and oil revenues, Kazakhstan cannot afford to feed a large but potentially unreliable army. Military officers on average receive 120,000 tenge per month, which is the highest salary level among Central Asian militaries.

Even so, military reform in Kazakhstan is inching forward very slowly. Despite the impressive military budget, the military is chronically short of funding. Officers of air squadrons deployed in Central Kazakhstan complain that pilots are inadequately trained for flying due to a shortage of aviation fuel and the high cost of training flights in new generation aircraft. Most of them cannot log the necessary flying hours to maintain their qualifications and skills.

Unfortunately, the problems of modernization of the Kazakhstani air forces and air defense system is tied to the Russian defense industry. Last December, a Kazakhstani military delegation headed by Colonel Serik Ismailov paid a visit to Russia’s Almaz arms manufacturing company to bargain for the new Favorit anti-aircraft missile launcher. The Russian company hoped to sell some of its new generation weapons to Kazakhstan, but the sides could not reach an agreement over the price of the equipment. The Kazakhstani military also requested the Almaz company for assistance in modifying the obsolete anti-aircraft installations that Kazakhstan inherited from the old Soviet stock, but was unable to get a positive response.

The controversial nature of military cooperation between Astana and Moscow stems from a lack of confidence and from mutual suspicion. On the one hand, the Russian military needs a strong Kazakhstani anti-aircraft defense system to protect its air space in the south, and the stated common defense goals within the Collective Security Treaty Organization commits Russia to render technical assistance to its military partner. At the same time, Russia is uncertain about future developments in the Caspian region and the role that Kazakhstan will play in case of a conflict over energy resources. For Kazakhstan’s military, the Kremlin, with its great-power rhetoric and constant muscle-flexing, is likewise unpredictable. But Kazakhstan, with no military industry of its own, is in need of Russian weapons, and poor partners, even strategic ones, cannot afford to be picky.