The past week was underscored by such attacks: three to date and all unresolved with both sides blaming the other. On Sunday, the Ossetian separatist government issued a statement claiming ethnic Ossetian villages “came under heavy fire” from Georgian-controlled villages in the conflict zone and the Ossetians only returned fire. According to the de facto government’s interior minister, militants in the separatist republic are on orders not to “fire at the villages,” implying the attack was obviously the work of the Georgians. Tbilisi has refuted all allegations and claims the firing started from Tskhinvali, which is controlled by the separatists.

The timing of the escalating violence is intriguing. Two weeks ago, Georgia officially released information concerning a year-old case against an alleged uranium smuggling ring that operated through the porous borders that define the breakaway region between Georgia and Russia. South Ossetian de facto authorities were quick to deny that any uranium could have been transported through the region. However, according to Georgian officials, the suspect - a North Ossetian - traveled through the border between South Ossetia and North Ossetia to meet an undercover Georgian agent and sell the uranium. The U.S. government is also accusing the South Ossetian de facto authorities of allowing criminal activity to flourish: reportedly $42 million in counterfeit $100 bills have been found circulating in Los Angeles and other cities in America; authorities have allegedly tracked them down to a source in the Tskhinvali region.

Both accusations fit nicely with the Georgian government’s requests for international police and peacekeeping forces to be dispatched to the conflict zones, in spite of the fact that de facto authorities in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have refused to consider the option. On Monday, February 5, an official from the separatist government restated their demands to maintain the current, Russian-led format of peace negotiations. Speaking from Moscow, Dmitri Medoev decried the Georgian proposal and stressed that “Russia, as a major guarantor, cannot be excluded from the process. Russia is a major country in the Caucasus and Georgia has to take Russia’s position into consideration”.

Due to the increase in tensions, the first real acts of the new and other alternative government based in the conflict zone have gone relatively unnoticed. The second unrecognized government, widely believed to be supported by Tbilisi, announced on January 31 that it will initiate a program to support the development of small and medium size businesses. They have not announced any details to date, although their announcement coincided with a new program led by the central government to give villagers in Georgian controlled territories a one-time payment of $100.

President Mikheil Saakashvili has stated he will travel to the Didi Liakhvi and Patara Liakhvi gorges within the contested territory to deliver the payments himself. No date for the program was announced. Earlier in January the alternative government announced it would purchase all of the mandarins that Ossetian traders lost due to the ongoing Russian embargo on Georgia.

The ongoing violence in South Ossetia underscores the need for real policing in the area. While some Georgian officials accuse the separatist government of instigating the incidents itself, others maintain that the region is so uncontrolled that the de facto authorities in Tskhinvali are unable to maintain the rule of law in areas they control. Regardless of the cause, an international force with representative countries in addition to Russia could add a measure of calm and security to the region for the civilians living there.

While the president’s plan to give aid to the villagers in the poverty stricken territory is not inherently bad, it does not facilitate any long term gain for the people living in the conflict zone - or establish any long lasting roots for real trust between Tbilisi and ethnic Ossetians. The Georgian parliament has passed a law regarding restitution for both Ossetians and Georgians who lost property during the violence that led up to the conflict between Tbilisi and Tskhinvali in the early 1990s. The correct implementation of that plan in a timely manner would likely be a much more efficient mechanism to build trust.