Unofficial sources say Nursultan Nazarbayev took an apparently sudden decision to travel to Tashkent while on a tour of the city of Shymkent in the South Kazakhstan region, from where he was escorted to the Uzbek capital by car. What official sources state is that the unofficial private talks between Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev took place in the Uzbek President’s Durmen residence, and that the two leaders “discussed questions of bilateral relations and exchanged views on regional and international problems”. Nothing particular could be discerned at the briefing given in Islam Karimov’s residence immediately after the talks. “We had a very open and sincere talk. But right now I will not disclose any particular details”, said Islam Karimov. His Kazakh counterpart merely added that he had briefed the Uzbek President on his recent visit to the United States, and the two presidents discussed the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran, as well as the latest developments in CIS countries. Nazarbayev announced to journalists that the sides reached an agreement on creating cross-border trade zones and on training of military personnel.

However, persistent rumors circulating in Astana confirm that the principal topic of the talks in Tashkent centered on the situation in Kyrgyzstan, although the word “Kyrgyzstan” was not uttered at the briefing. Nazarbayev’s unscheduled trip to Tashkent came in the wake of Kyrgyz opposition demands for the immediate dismissal of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Prime Minister Feliks Kulov from their posts. Observers in Kazakhstan note that a day before Nazarbayev’s arrival in Tashkent, Uzbek police tightened up passport controls and other security measures in Tashkent and in the Ferghana valley. Some people in Tashkent were reportedly detained on the grounds that they carried passports with visas issued by the Kyrgyz Embassy.

Obviously, despite the outward business-as-usual attitude, both Karimov and Nazarbayev had good reasons to be seriously alarmed by the scale and chaotic nature of public protests in Bishkek. Any development of events which could lead to Bakiyev’s dismissal would be unwelcome for Astana and Tashkent. Bakiyev duly appreciated the helping hand extended by Islam Karimov to Bishkek after the devastating Tulip revolution of 2005. Tashkent tactfully announced that it would welcome any government in Bishkek supported by the Kyrgyz people, and demonstratively offered humanitarian aid to the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan.

But these friendly overtures were disturbed by the Andijan riots, when Uzbek authorities accused the Kyrgyz government for cooperating with “destructive forces” allegedly working against Uzbekistan from Kyrgyz territory. The thaw in bilateral relations set in only after Uzbekistan joined the Eurasian Economic Community and Kurmanbek Bakiyev paid his first visit to Tashkent last October, which was crowned by an agreement on non-visa travel for citizens of the two countries. The flexible Bakiyev, who long since dropped his pro-American rhetoric, is regarded as an irreplaceable substitute for Askar Akayev by both Nazarbayev and Karimov. They appear to fear that a chain reaction, triggered by public rioting in Bishkek and elsewhere in Kyrgyzstan, might set off similar disturbances in the tinderbox regions of South Kazakhstan and the Ferghana valley.

The last thing Bakiyev can wish for is to find himself in Askar Akayev’s shoes. In his current position, any assistance or pledge of support from Astana and Tashkent seems to be valuable for him. Reportedly, at the height of street actions staged by the unruly mob in Bishkek on November 7, Bakiyev had telephone talks with Nursultan Nazarbayev and Islam Karimov. The talks, according to official sources, focused on the upcoming summit meeting of CIS leaders and on regional economic integration.

Integration, in economic and political terms, remains wishful thinking in Central Asia. Despite the friendly gestures and talks on official level, the rift between the three countries is still perceptible. It seems Bakiyev pins too much hope on Kazakh investments into the Kyrgyz economy as a stabilizing factor. Paradoxically, as it may seem, Kazakh investments are flowing not to relatively stable Uzbekistan but to politically explosive and ungovernable regions of Kyrgyzstan like Batken, often targeted by the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. This is the case not only because business regulations and legal reforms in Uzbekistan are hopelessly imperfect. Kazakhstan is interested in restoring peace and stability in neighboring country. But pouring funds into the Kyrgyz black hole will make sense only if the government in Bishkek manages to regain popular support by raising living standards in troubled regions and, last but not least, keeps its promises of genuine institutional and democratic reforms. So far, Bakiyev did very little to convince his Uzbek and Kazakh counterparts that he may ensure stability in his country and ward off a revolution of any color in the region.