Karzai’s strategy of recruiting military commanders like Mohammad Atta has attracted criticism from detractors who argue that Kabul’s policy threatens to undermine the country’s efforts at reconciliation and disarmament.

But defenders counter by saying that despite Atta’s background as a heavily armed ally of the Panjshir elite – an implicit reference to the powerful mujahedin forces of the United Front (aka Northern Alliance) – Karzai was wise to bring Atta into the civilian structure at this time. They say the move allowed Karzai’s administration to avoid direct confrontation with heavily influential Tajik commanders. Some also note the apparent sidelining of longtime strongman Dostum, a powerful warlord who spent decades consolidating power in northern Afghanistan through kaleidoscopic alliances that changed depending on which way the political winds blew.

This decision followed by the re-appointment of dozens of high-level provisional officials last year including police chiefs for many provinces in northern Afghanistan was considered another clever tactic by Karzai to expand his authority in north. These steps seem already to work in his favor, since the recent parliamentary elections in September 2005 were marked by considerable success for Karzai’s supporters in northern Afghanistan.

But looking to the predominantly Pashtun southern Afghanistan, the picture is less heartening for the central government. Terror or insurgency violence and joint efforts to combat those fighters regularly claims hundreds of lives per month. Lawlessness hampers reconstruction and threatens to disaffect a public that expected more rapid progress in rebuilding the country after the Taliban regime was ousted.

So have central government policies gone wrong in this part of the country – which hosts President Karzai’s own hometown of Kandahar and the porous and disputed border with Pakistan?

For some, the answer to that question requires a hard look at neighboring Pakistan. Some local and central Afghan government officials have accused Pakistan of abetting Taliban fighters in their effort to destabilize the Afghan government. Both Karzai and his foreign minister, Rangin Dadfar Spanta, have repeatedly laid some responsibility for cross-border attacks at the feet of the Pakistani government or its agents. They accuse Islamabad of allowing insurgents to shelter, train, and rearm on Pakistani territory.

Pakistani officials have consistently rejected the accusations, but a war of words continues – despite bilateral meetings and the smiles accompanying the official handshakes.

A Kabul-based Afghan Turkmen journalist representing the Turkish Agency ‘IHA’, Nadir Turkmen, suggests that escalation might do more than just open historical conflicts. Tensions could be exploited by separatist groups in Pakistan, such as the Baluchis, who have long sought greater control over natural resources in southwestern Pakistan.

The relationship between Kabul and Baluchi separatists in the late 20th century has prompted some people to draw a link between the Baluchi insurgency and the Afghan government. Prof. Amanullah Jeddon of Pakistan’s Punjab University suggests Afghanistan might have an interest in fanning the flames of Baluchi separatism to counter alleged interference in Afghanistan by Pakistan.

Mohammad Najibullah’s administration (1986-92) and other Afghan governments are believed to have supported Baluchi demands, including calls for a greater share of the revenues from natural resources in gas-rich Baluchistan. Najibullah’s government also provided shelter to Baluchi leader Nawab Khair Bux Marri when that prominent Baluchi leader’s life was under threat from Pakistani security forces in the late 1980s.

Many Pakistani observers also indicate increasing Indian involvement, including the presence of a small number of Indian troops in the area close to the Pakistani border. These, according to Islamabad, may increase regional tension, given the bitter history of Indian-Pakistani relations.

So whereas President Karzai appears to have forcefully pursued a strategy of his own choosing in the north, the situation in the volatile south could depend more on regional strategies pursued by the respective governments. A prominent writer for the Pakistani daily The Nation, Dr. Haroon Hashemi, describes the area as a chessboard of international and other powerful influences, with each of those powers playing its own game.

The situation is compounded by security along the 1,700-kilometer border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Unlike its border regimes with neighbors to the north, Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan has historically been relatively open. Many locals travel across that international boundary without proper documentation, even at the many border checkpoints. Pakistani officials argue that it is not easy controlling a border that, in many cases, separates members of the same tribe or even the same family. Critics say such lax enforcement provides easy passage to insurgents or terrorists.

Ignoring the governments’ roles, residents of Afghan towns and villages near the Pakistani border might have little hope of any ‘new chapter’ for their region. Civilian life is under assault in the current situation, literally and figuratively. The insurgency and lawlessness keep potential foreign investors at bay, and often keep even small-scale reconstruction work by the international community from going forward.

Joint forces, combining international troops with soldiers from the nascent Afghan National Army, are working to combat security threats. Operation Mountain Thrust was launched in June, and marks the biggest offensive to have targeted Taliban elements since the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. The operation included 3,500 Afghan troops, along with 11,000 U.S. soldiers, 2,300 British troops and 2,200 Canadians. U.S. military spokesmen say the basic aim is to establish conditions that allow Afghan forces, government institutions, and humanitarian groups to move in and begin the real work. The operation promises to last well into the summer.