Wednesday, 22 February 2006

GEORGIA’S GAS CRISIS ENDS; IMPLICATIONS REMAIN

Published in Field Reports

By Kakha Jibladze (2/22/2006 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Regardless of who was ultimately responsible for the damage – Russia maintains it was terrorists while Georgia is unconvinced – millions of Georgians suffered through record cold temperatures without gas or electricity for over a week. In Tbilisi, where natural gas is normally supplied, citizens waited in line for hours to fill plastic containers with fuel.

The Georgian government took several steps to provide for the population quickly.

Regardless of who was ultimately responsible for the damage – Russia maintains it was terrorists while Georgia is unconvinced – millions of Georgians suffered through record cold temperatures without gas or electricity for over a week. In Tbilisi, where natural gas is normally supplied, citizens waited in line for hours to fill plastic containers with fuel.

The Georgian government took several steps to provide for the population quickly. It immediately imported 310 tons of kerosene fuel to ease the demand. According to Giorgi Arveladze, the Head of the presidential administration, 110 tons were sold at $0.33, while the rest were priced normally at $0.77. The government also sought out alternative sources of energy. On January 30, Georgia began receiving natural gas from Iran via Azerbaijan. According to statements from Nika Gelauri, the energy minister, the agreement with Tehran is flexible and depends on the amount of gas Georgia receives from Russia.

Other measures were also taken, some with reported Russian assistance. Despite repeated delays to repair the damaged pipeline, Russia allegedly did take some actions to help relieve the situation. According to Vladimir Chkhikvishvili, the Russian ambassador to Georgia, the natural gas Georgia received from Azerbaijan was organized by Russia. He also noted that Russian investments repaired and renovated the gas turbine electricity generator that was opened outside of Tbilisi on January 23. However, reported problems with a compressor station on the Russian side of the Russian-Azerbaijani border on January 24 decreased the amount of gas Azerbaijan received from Russia, and therefore the amount that Georgia received from Azerbaijan.

Regardless of Russian assurances it was working hard to fix the problem, the crisis took its toll on Georgian-Russian relations. After Georgian officials publicly blamed Moscow for the gas disruption, political dialogue was reduced to name calling and threats. “There is no reason for panic. Our enemies want to trigger panic, but we should not allow this to happen... I am absolutely sure that these were not accidental [blasts]. It impossible for these to be accidental when there were simultaneous explosions of two gas pipelines and a power line. It is a deliberate provocation,” Speaker of Parliament Nino Burjanadze said according to Georgian media sources on January 22.

The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement on January 23, calling Georgia’s statements ‘hysteria,’ and noting “if Tbilisi has once and for all decided to worsen relations with Russia, [the Georgian authorities] probably also estimated all the possible consequences of this policy.”

Later that week the gas and electricity supply was cut off to the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi and the Tbilisi offices of Russian Gazexport. The Georgian Embassy in Moscow was soon without either gas or power due to ‘technical problems’ in Russia.

Georgian officials used the crisis as a stepping stone to bring the troubled relations between the two countries to international attention. According to reports in the Russian newspaper Kommersant, Saakashvili used a recent trip to Germany to highlight Georgia’s problems with Russia, calling the country a ‘malicious and experienced enemy.’

With the energy crisis as background, the increased calls from Tbilisi to end the Russian peacekeeping missions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia have added more tension to the strained diplomatic relations. A car accident on February 1 between a Russian military truck and a Georgian car dissolved into scandal with even Irakli Okruashvili, the minister of defense, weighing in on the issue.

The continued deterioration of Georgian-Russian relations is nothing new. Neither Moscow nor Tbilisi has made a real effort since the diplomatic victory to remove Russian bases from Georgian soil last May. Regardless of the degree of finger pointing or the factual basis of accusations, it is in the best interest of both countries to find a common ground to improve relations and work together. If neither administration can take steps to mend the bruised relationship, the cycle of crisis and backlash will continue indefinitely and the region will remain unstable.

Read 2521 times

Visit also

silkroad

AFPC

isdp

turkeyanalyst

Staff Publications

Screen Shot 2023-05-08 at 10.32.15 AMSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, U.S. Policy in Central Asia through Central Asian Eyes, May 2023.


Analysis Svante E. Cornell, "Promise and Peril in the Caucasus," AFPC Insights, March 30, 2023.

Oped S. Frederick Starr, Putin's War In Ukraine and the Crimean War), 19fourtyfive, January 2, 2023

Oped S. Frederick Starr, Russia Needs Its Own Charles de Gaulle,  Foreign Policy, July 21, 2022.

2206-StarrSilk Road Paper S. Frederick Starr, Rethinking Greater Central Asia: American and Western Stakes in the Region and How to Advance Them, June 2022 

Oped Svante E. Cornell & Albert Barro, With referendum, Kazakh President pushes for reforms, Euractiv, June 3, 2022.

Oped Svante E. Cornell Russia's Southern Neighbors Take a Stand, The Hill, May 6, 2022.

Silk Road Paper Johan Engvall, Between Bandits and Bureaucrats: 30 Years of Parliamentary Development in Kyrgyzstan, January 2022.  

Oped Svante E. Cornell, No, The War in Ukraine is not about NATO, The Hill, March 9, 2022.

Analysis Svante E. Cornell, Kazakhstan’s Crisis Calls for a Central Asia Policy Reboot, The National Interest, January 34, 2022.

StronguniquecoverBook S. Frederick Starr and Svante E. Cornell, Strong and Unique: Three Decades of U.S.-Kazakhstan Partnership, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, December 2021.  

Silk Road Paper Svante E. Cornell, S. Frederick Starr & Albert Barro, Political and Economic Reforms in Kazakhstan Under President Tokayev, November 2021.

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

Newsletter

Sign up for upcoming events, latest news and articles from the CACI Analyst

Newsletter