Wednesday, 14 December 2005

KAZAKHSTAN AFTER ELECTIONS: WHAT IS IN STORE FOR THE OPPOSITION?

Published in Field Reports

By Marat Yermukanov (12/14/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Many factors contributed to the resounding election success of Nursultan Nazarbayev, not least his ability to win support for his election campaign even from the most impoverished strata of Kazakh society. Significantly, he reaped his highest support in the predominantly Russian-populated North Kazakhstan region (95.6%), but even in the economically backward Kyzylorda region, home base of his main opponent Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, voters’ support for him was quite impressive.
Many factors contributed to the resounding election success of Nursultan Nazarbayev, not least his ability to win support for his election campaign even from the most impoverished strata of Kazakh society. Significantly, he reaped his highest support in the predominantly Russian-populated North Kazakhstan region (95.6%), but even in the economically backward Kyzylorda region, home base of his main opponent Zharmakhan Tuyakbay, voters’ support for him was quite impressive. During his extensive pre-election tours of the regions he addressed, in a convincing way, the most thorny problems of battling poverty and raising the living standards of the people. However insignificant, the $22 pension rise decreed this year and the 32% boost in civil servants’ salaries won him significant popularity and public confidence. In the political field, he successfully averted criticism over the lack of democracy by promises of political reform, including the decentralization of the government and elections of local governing bodies, enhancing civic liberties broadly outlined in his address to parliament on September 1 this year. A massive propaganda campaign coupled with half-hearted democratic efforts and partial social benefits for the poor had its effect. Not surprisingly, just before elections, former opponents of the regime left the opposition camp in droves. The main rivals of Nazarbayev, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay and Alikhan Baimenov, had nothing substantial to pledge to the electorate and their election programs sounded much like empty promises. Opposition forces were hopelessly weakened by the dramatic split within the ranks of the Ak Zhol and Communist party of Kazakhstan.

In contrast to his rivals, the President received a massive publicity boost from the Peoples’ Coalition of Kazakhstan, composed by six pro-presidential parties by his daughter Dariga Nazarbayeva, the leader of Asar (Together) party in September. The Peoples’ Coalition of Kazakhstan, transformed into a Democratic Union of Kazakhstan shortly after the elections, will apparently back Nazarbayev in implementing his promised political reforms and consolidate his position. Dariga Nazarbayeva, in her public speeches, reiterated the need to give more powers to local legislative bodies and make regional governors accountable before the people. Her views, to some extent, clash with the conservative vision of her father who never concealed his intention to reinforce presidential power and excluded any possibility of parliamentary rule in Kazakhstan. Even long before the presidential election, some analysts were speculating that Dariga Nazarbayeva is likely to succeed her father. In a recent interview with journalists, Dariga Nazarbayeva evaded the answer to the question saying that it was up to her father to name his successor.

But for the time being, the re-elected president will have enough to deal with his opponents who refused to accept the preliminary results of the election. While Alikhan Baimenov cited “countless violations of the election law and frauds”, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay declared the election illegitimate on the grounds that authorities allegedly intimidated people into voting for Nazarbayev and obstructed the election campaigns of the For Fair Kazakhstan opposition block and appealed to the Prosecutor General’s Office. He threatened to rally up to 10,000 of his supporters for protest demonstrations if his demands are ignored by election authorities. The chairman of the Central Election Commission Onalsyn Zhumabekov, in his turn, voiced his disagreement with the critical assessment of the election results by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and in an interview to the national Khabar television channel accused the organization of taking a lopsided view of the election. Onalsyn Zhumabekov pointed out that the dispute was caused by inaccurate translation from English of the press release distributed by OSCE after the election. Similar mild protests were expressed also by foreign minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in an interview to Russian Interfax news agency.

For many international observers, the opposition’s protests after the election is nothing more than a storm in a teacup. Regardless, the re-election of president Nazarbayev is a fait accompli. It is hard to expect that the Central Election Commission would reconsider voting results. Nazarbayev will probably feel a moral obligation to thank the West, the United States above all, for his re-election. It also obliges him to display a commitment to genuine political reforms. In his public appearances after the election he called opposition leaders to cooperate “in a constructive manner” for the benefit of all people. He even offered to form a coalition government with political parties, which sounds bold and hardly conceivable in current tense situation. A coalition government may turn into a double-edged weapon in the hands of the current regime. On the one hand, it may help tame the most vociferous leaders of the opposition by granting them government posts, but on the other, if opposition members are incorporated into the government, their activities may spin out of control. However, Zharmakhan Tuyakbay rejected the idea of cooperation with the ruling elite.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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