Wednesday, 16 November 2005

BADAKHSHAN: MORE POVERTY AFTER RUSSIAN WITHDRAWAL

Published in Field Reports

By Zoya Pylenko (11/16/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Apart from traveling by road, one can fly to Badakhshan, usually with a small, 17-seat Antonov AN-28 plane, which tries to find its way through the Pamir mountains because it can’t fly over all the summits. But in winter, when the mountains are shrouded in clouds, the road is the only option available. And the road to Badakhshan is narrow and very rarely asphalted.
Apart from traveling by road, one can fly to Badakhshan, usually with a small, 17-seat Antonov AN-28 plane, which tries to find its way through the Pamir mountains because it can’t fly over all the summits. But in winter, when the mountains are shrouded in clouds, the road is the only option available. And the road to Badakhshan is narrow and very rarely asphalted. Depending on weather, it can take up to 24 hours to get there from the capital, Dushanbe. But those who eventually arrive in Badakhshan will not only be impressed by the magnificent nature but also marked by the extreme poverty of the region.

Afghanistan is easily visible from Badakhshan. The border is the still small river Pyanzh (or Amu Darya) that locals can be seen crossing without hindrance. This didn’t use to be so easy. Until last year, Russian border guards protected Badakhshan’s border. But in 2004, Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmonov said it was time for Tajikistan to start defending its borders on its own, and he asked for the Russian border guards’ withdrawal. On 19 October 2005, an official ceremony was held to mark the completion of the handover, the process of which had started at the Tajik-Chinese border and finished in July 2005 at the western end of the Tajik-Afghan border.

Badakhshan was the first region the Russians left. The consequences of this are now visible. According to locals, the border is defended in a much weaker way now than under the Russians, who they say were more experienced than today’s border guards that are often young and badly trained conscripts from the Tajik army. And, when seeing locals cross the border, you think they might have a point. The US and EU are now giving Tajikistan (financial and training) support to help improve its control over the border. Some Russians advisers are still there as well.

However, apart from practice and experience, money is still lacking the Tajiks. Food and warm clothes for border guards (the winters are very cold in Badakhshan, where mountains rise as high as 7,000 meters) are often insufficient. According to an NGO worker in the regional capital Khorog, local organizations have taken “patronage” over different checkpoints, supporting the soldiers there with food whenever they can afford to.

Apparently insufficient protection of the Tajik-Afghan border, as in Badakhshan, is causing concern, mainly because of the booming drug industry in Afghanistan. Badakhshan is believed to be a major drug smuggling route from Afghanistan to Europe. According to officials, drug trafficking decreased after the Russians left the border. But the Badakhshanis have a different opinion, pointing to the rising number of expensive cars and villas in Khorog since the Russian withdrawal.

But even if a minority might really prosper from the drug trade, over-all the economic situation in Badakhshan has gotten worse. “We used to ask the Russians to help us by selling some of their food [rations] for half the price… Now we try to help hungry soldiers who go around the houses to ask for bread to eat,” says one woman in Khorog, adding, “Is it possible to defend the border while thinking about food?”

Not only the Tajik border guards but many others also experienced a change for the worse after the Russian withdrawal. Most people in places like Khorog try to survive by trading at local markets. Food is usually brought from Dushanbe and clothes from China. According to one of the women-traders at the bazaar of Khorog, “It’s much more difficult now to earn sufficient money to survive. The Tajiks [border guards] can’t afford to spend as much as the Russians did.” The wages for Tajik border guards are some $10, while wages under the Russians were up to $300. Quite a few Tajiks that were serving with the Russian border forces – getting the same salary as their Russian colleagues – left the army instead of continuing to serve in the Tajik border forces for a much smaller salary. Instead, they started small businesses.

One positive change for locals after the Russian withdrawal was the opening of the Tajik-Afghan border and the establishment of weekly Afghan-Tajik markets at the three border crossings near Khorog, Ishkashim and Darwaz. But this is not enough by far to neutralize the effect of the withdrawal of the Russians with their big pockets.

One of the most promising trades to help Badakhshan escape from poverty is tourism, which is already growing in the region. But Badakhshan is still a special border zone and nothing seems to be done yet to make access to the region less cumbersome or to diminish the many checkpoints in the region that hardly encourage tourists to venture out there.

In the meantime, the biggest benefactor of Badakhshan remains the Aga Khan Foundation, set up by the Aga Khan who is the spiritual head of the Ismaili Muslims that form a majority in Badakhshan. Thanks in large part to the AKF, a school, a university, and many roads were built in the region. It also supports the production and sale of traditional handicraft to tourists. However, this alone is not enough to end poverty in Badakhshan and develop the region. Many Badakhshanis – as other Tajiks – continue to migrate to Russia in search for work. With the current under-guarded border, it might also become increasingly attractive for them to turn to profitable drug smuggling.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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