This is where Central Asia’s border problems are most visible. Although in the first half of October, negotiations between the Uzbek and Kyrgyz commissions on demarcation of the border came to an end, there is no end in sight for these problems. During the October meeting, the two countries submitted documents asserting their respective claim to disputed territories. A next meeting is supposed to bring the sides to a compromise after each commission has drawn its conclusions about the submitted documents. The head of Kyrgyzstan’s commission, Salamat Alamanov, said that Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan still have 50 disputed spots and that more than 1,000 km of the 1295 km border is still not demarcated.

A compromise between the two countries is badly needed. Unfortunately for Kyrgyzstan, it has does not only have problems with Uzbekistan. About 30 spots on the Kyrgz-Tajik border are also disputed. Vorukh, a big Tajik enclave in Batken, cuts Kyrgyz infrastructure in the province into yet more pieces.

These so strangely marked borders of Central Asian countries were inherited from the Soviet period, and they do not make much sense. The Uzbek enclave of Sokh, for example, is almost completely inhabited by ethnic Tajiks. And before Soivet times, the now Kyrgyz town of Osh was indivisible from other mainly Uzbek-inhabited areas. Causing more problems is the fact that inter-republican borders were of little importance in Soviet times. They were not properly demarcated, and existed only on the map. Sometimes the borders cut villages into two parts, and this did not pose a problem. Now it does.

After independence, commissions for border demarcation were established in the Central Asian states. Though many borders have been demarcated, they have not done much in subsequent years as regards the Ferghana valley and its enclaves. Rival commissions were unable to even decide which map should be used for demarcation: every country uses its own map, drawn in the most profitable way for itself. The question of border demarcation gained in importance after the armed incursions (via Batken) by the radical Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. Following this, Uzbekistan introduced a visa regime and established checkpoints along its borders. Kyrgyzstan responded by doing the same. After this, traveling in the region became difficult. Friends and relatives on the other side of the border became effectively separated. People in border areas do have permission to stay in the immediate border area of the neighboring country without a visa up to five days. But for longer stays, or trips to for example Tashkent, a visa is required that can only be received in far-away Bishkek.

Border guards seem to show little understanding of their task. The speed with which one can cross the border depends on the mood of the soldiers: sometimes they don’t look at documents at all, and sometimes it takes excruciatingly long. Sometimes they don’t understand what is written in documents, as they often don’t know the neighboring state’s language or even Russian, and hence mistakes are made. Some incidents are fatal for locals, as when soldiers mistake farmers (who let their cattle graze on the other side of the border) for terrorists or robbers and shoot them.

Sokh was believed to shelter members of the IMU during 1999-2001. The Uzbek authorities therefore mined the enclave (as well as other parts of the disputed Uzbek-Kyrgyz and Uzbek-Tajik border) to prevent the IMU from entering the main territory of Uzbekistan, despite protests by Kyrgyz authorities. Sokh was de-mined only after the almost complete destruction of the IMU during the U.S. campaign against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001. Nevertheless, even now people and livestock still occasionally become the victims of undiscovered and forgotten mines.

Extremists could still be around. The Vorukh enclave is believed to be full with armed extremists as well as drug smugglers. The region is inhabited by very religious people, who prefer not to speak with foreigners. Locals deny there is a problem with extremism. But the appearance of the village speaks volumes: there are several huge villas with satellite television, surprisingly mixed with the general poverty. And this in spite of an almost complete absence of opportunities to work and earn money. Trade is not developed in the region at all, and access to the village is difficult.

Many Kyrgyz experts think that Uzbekistan is on purpose avoiding a definite demarcation of the border. According to them, Uzbekistan does not want to risk losing control over natural resources in the area, such as water, gas and oil. (Much of the oil is currently turned into diesel by locals in self-made refineries along the dusty road around the enclaves, lying in beds next to the road and waiting for rare customers.)

But while it takes a long time for the Uzbek, Tajik and Kyrgyz commissions to come to a compromise over the demarcation of disputed territories, the people of the enclaves and of Batken are getting more and more isolated. For the end of October, a conference is scheduled about the problems in Batken and adjoining Tajik and Uzbek areas. But if history is of guidance, talks are unlikely to resolve much.