By Jacob Zenn

May 3rd, 2016, The CACI Analyst

For more than a decade after the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S., the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) was the “bogeyman” of Central Asian militancy. It was the most well-known militant group in Central Asia and abroad, even though it was in exile in Afghanistan and Pakistan under the protection of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Years of drone strikes and counter-insurgency operations failed to eliminate the IMU. Ironically, however, it was neither the U.S. nor coalition forces that destroyed the IMU. Rather, it was the Taliban who liquidated the IMU in late 2015 as punishment for its “betrayal” of the Taliban (and al-Qaeda) by pledging loyalty to Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, leader of the terrorist organization calling itself the Islamic State (ISIS). This will change the nature of the militant threat to Central Asia and force a reconsideration of Uzbekistan’s counter-extremism measures.

By Mirzohid Rahimov

April 19th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

Central Asian nations consider the development of alternative regional transport communications important aspects of their national economic and political strategy, and the republics have become active participants in various international projects to promote economic cooperation with different countries and regions of the world. The development of internal Central Asian communication networks in general, and Uzbekistan in particular, gives the possibility of extending not only national communications, but also broaden networks in Central Asia. The Angren-Pap rail project is very important for national connectivity and for increased international communication. Different international experiences in economic transformation are relevant for Central Asia’s regional connectivity.

By Stephen Blank 

March 15th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

For years, Moscow has fulminated against the Taliban as a terrorist force that represented a threat not only to Afghanistan’s security but also to Central Asia and even to Russia itself. Yet news surfaced in December that Russia is sharing intelligence with the Taliban and apparently has been in discussions with it since 2013. According to U.S. intelligence sources, these discussions have also been accompanied by weapons transfers. Thus, while Russia is constantly, along with Central Asian leaders, playing up the ISIS threat and selling weapons to the Afghan government, it also shares intelligence and possibly sells weapons to its Taliban adversaries. These contradictions expose some of the problems in Russia’s regional policies in Central Asia and in its approach to terrorism. 

By Richard Weitz

March 18th, 2016, The CACI Analyst

The states of Central Asia and the South Caucasus are in for a rough ride if recent Russian national security documents and speeches genuinely represent the Kremlin’s worldview. Not only do these texts veto their membership in NATO, but they exclude mutually profitable partnerships for these countries with the European Union and other Western institutions, constrain their domestic development, and encourage the suppression of civil liberties by warning of fictitious Western plots to change their regimes under the guise of democracy promotion and human rights.

By Erik Davtyan

March 8th, the CACI Analyst

On February 1-2, Georgia’s Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli paid an official visit to Armenia. During a meeting with her Armenian counterpart Seyran Ohanyan, the two defense ministers discussed issues pertaining to Armenian-Georgian relations as well as global and regional security issues. The parties also signed a military cooperation plan for 2016, prioritizing exchanges of experience, military education, professional training, and strategic planning as the main objectives of this year’s agreement. It is noteworthy that Armenia and Georgia have signed military cooperation plans annually since 2010.