By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On February 22, 2025, during a meeting with Uzbekistan'ss Prime Minister Abdullah Aripov, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, representing the Taliban, called for Uzbek investment in repairing crucial infrastructure, including the Mazar-e-Sharif–Herat railway and the second Salang tunnel. These projects are seen as vital for improving communication and trade between Central and South Asia. Baradar reaffirmed the Taliban's commitment to regional stability and enhancing economic relations, while Uzbekistan expressed support for deepening cooperation and advancing joint initiatives. The Taliban's diplomacy in Central Asia is increasingly focused on economic cooperation, prioritizing infrastructure development and trade expansion.

BACKGROUND: Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) entered Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries aligned with the US by providing military support, road access, and airspace. Initially, these countries opposed the Taliban, backing anti-Taliban movements. However, over time, as the Taliban adapted their strategy and reduced their overt support for Central Asian militant groups, some regional countries shifted to a more neutral stance on Afghanistan.

During the Doha peace process, delegates from Central Asian countries held several meetings with the Taliban negotiating team, laying the groundwork for post-U.S. withdrawal relations. When American forces withdrew in August 2021, the Taliban regained control, creating security concerns for neighboring Central Asian states. This shift in power forced regional actors to reassess their approach, balancing security risks with economic and geopolitical interests.

Despite these concerns, most of Central Asian countries kept their embassies open in Kabul and initiated political and economic engagement with the Taliban. For its part, the Taliban, facing a financial crisis due to sanctions, frozen assets, reduced foreign aid, a water crisis, and a lack of international recognition, pursued an economic-oriented foreign policy. This included announcing expanding transportation infrastructure, such as the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor (1,468 km), approved in May 2023, and the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, set to connect Central Asia to South Asia in 2024.

IMPLICATIONS: The Taliban’s return to power has significantly reshaped regional geopolitics and economic ties. With the US withdrawal creating a power vacuum, regional actors have sought to strengthen their positions. The Taliban, in turn, have sought new partnerships to break their political and economic isolation.

As Central Asian nations engage with the Taliban while remaining wary of potential instability, they have also strengthened ties with other powers like China and Russia. This shifting landscape raises critical questions about Afghanistan's evolving role in the region, particularly in terms of security cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, and border management.

Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian country to host a Taliban delegation, receiving Acting Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in Termez in September 2021. Both sides signed a security and trade protocol, exchanged diplomats, and expanded economic relations. On April 13, 2023, Uzbekistan hosted the 4th meeting of Afghanistan’s neighboring foreign ministers in Samarkand to discuss the Afghan situation.

As the Russia-Ukraine war disrupts trade, Uzbekistan—where three of its eight transit corridors depend on Russia—has accelerated efforts to find alternative routes. In August 2024, the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss trade and investment projects, resulting in 35 MoUs worth $2.5 billion. Trade between the two countries reached $860 million. Additionally, Uzbekistan has played a key role in infrastructure development, co-signing a trilateral agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 2023 for the Trans-Afghan Railway, linking Mazar-e-Sharif to Pakistan’s ports, with a projected cost of $6 billion.

In February 2025, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar led a high-ranking Taliban delegation to Uzbekistan to deepen economic, trade, and transport cooperation. Tashkent also committed to completing the "Khalqlaar Bazar" border market and providing Afghan citizens with a 15-day visa-free regime.

As for Kazakhstan, Afghanistan's top wheat, flour, and edible oil supplier, it maintained its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban’s takeover. Both sides exchanged ambassadors, strengthening diplomatic ties. Since 2023, three business forums in Astana, Almaty, and Kabul have facilitated agreements worth $1.5 billion. In April 2024, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul for an Afghanistan-Kazakhstan business forum, exploring investment in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical industries. Bilateral trade grew to $700 million in 9 months of  2024, a 14% increase from 2023, with projections reaching $3 billion in five years.

Kazakhstan also joined Turkmenistan’s initiative to build a logistics hub in Herat and expressed interest in the Trans-Afghan Railway, initially agreed upon by the Taliban, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan in 2021, to access South Asian and Gulf markets.

Historically neutral, Turkmenistan has maintained close ties with the Taliban since the 1990s. It remains a major oil and gas supplier to Afghanistan, with trade valued at over $500 million. Turkmen investments in Afghanistan exceed $1.5 billion, including infrastructure projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. In 2024, top Taliban officials met Turkmen leaders to resume work on TAPI, sign MoUs worth $200 million, and explore oil and gas transit routes linking Russia to South Asia via Afghanistan. Additionally, the two sides signed a $7 million agreement for three railway projects in September 2024.

With a 1,360 km border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan was initially the most vocal opponent of the Taliban, demanding an inclusive government with ethnic and gender representation. Anti-Taliban figures gathered in Tajikistan, drawing criticism from Kabul. However, economic cooperation persisted, with Tajikistan continuing electricity exports and opening five joint border markets in September 2023. The Jalaluddin Mohammad Balkhi-Sher Khan Port railway project, first signed in 2019, resumed, enhancing connectivity with Central Asia. Trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan reached $120 million in 2024. A recent unofficial meeting between top Tajik security officials and the Taliban signaled a thaw in relations.

Concerned about the rights of the Afghan Kyrgyz minority in the Pamir region, Kyrgyzstan established early contacts with the Taliban. In September 2021, Deputy Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with the Taliban Foreign Minister. Trade and transit discussions continued, with Kyrgyzstan serving as a transit route for Afghan goods to China and playing a key role in the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project.

In September 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet Chairman Akylbek Japarov met with Taliban representatives, expressing interest in expanding trade, transportation, energy, and agriculture cooperation. Some Afghan Kyrgyz, facing economic hardship and limited educational opportunities, have requested relocation to Kyrgyzstan. In response, the Taliban recently established the “Pamir” district for the Kyrgyz ethnic minority.

CONCLUSIONS: To better understand the Taliban’s role in Central Asia, it’s crucial to examine their balancing act between China and Russia, two regional powers with different interests. While China seeks stability in Afghanistan to secure trade routes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and prevent extremism near Xinjiang, Russia focuses on managing the security risks spilling over into its Central Asian sphere. The Taliban, in turn, is strategically leveraging its position as a buffer state, engaging both countries diplomatically while positioning itself as a key player in regional security.

Since retaking power, the Taliban have pursued economic diplomacy, reassuring Central Asian neighbors of border security and promoting trade expansion. This shift has redirected Afghanistan’s trade partnerships from Pakistan toward Central Asia and Russia. The Taliban have leveraged Afghanistan’s geographic position to sign infrastructure MoUs, including railways and transit corridors, inviting regional investment in large-scale projects.

Central Asian states are balancing their engagement with Afghanistan while securing their interests. However, ongoing security risks, potential shifts in Taliban leadership, and external geopolitical pressures could alter the region’s engagement strategy. Future developments, such as increased intelligence cooperation or shifts in global economic alignments, may further impact Afghanistan’s regional role.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. She writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, and Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. He writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.  

By Nargiza Umarova

In recent years, the Taliban government has successfully garnered the support of most Central Asian countries for the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure. Notably, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have demonstrated significant engagement in this endeavor, with each country advancing its own railway project traversing Afghanistan to reach the borders of Pakistan. These routes are expected to compete with one another, a dynamic that is anticipated to enhance their profitability through the implementation of flexible tariff policies aimed at maintaining sufficient cargo flow. The establishment of trans-Afghan rail corridors holds strategic significance not only for fostering connectivity between Central and South Asia but also for advancing Iran’s aspirations to develop efficient transportation links with China via Afghanistan—a goal that the Taliban government has expressed its willingness to support.

Photo by Pahari Sahib

BACKGROUND: In May 2023, Afghan authorities approved the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor project, which spans 1,468 kilometers. A year later, plans were announced for the construction of the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, signaling the intention to extend the Kandahar route to Pakistan. Turkmenistan promptly capitalized on this development by proposing an alternative version of the Trans-Afghan Corridor, extending along the Torghundi-Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boldak route.

Subsequently, Kazakhstan joined the project at the invitation of Ashgabat, and in September 2024, the foundation was laid for a 22-kilometer railway line connecting the border station of Torghundi to Sanobar. This section will serve as the initial segment of the Torghundi-Herat transport corridor.

The Turkmen version of the trans-Afghan railway is regarded as an alternative to the Kabul Corridor (the Termez-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar railway), although the latter route is significantly shorter. Competition between the western route (originating from Turkmenistan's border) and the eastern route (originating from Uzbekistan's border) appears inevitable. However, this competition is expected to yield positive outcomes, particularly through the reduction of transportation costs resulting from the launch of additional trade routes through Afghanistan. This cost efficiency is a critical factor driving the interest of external stakeholders in the development of trans-Afghan transport infrastructure.

The establishment of the Torghundi-Spin Boldak international transport corridor holds particular importance for Tehran, which intends to develop a railway link with Afghanistan through the border town of Zaranj.

Since 2020, as part of the broader development of Iran's deep-sea port of Chabahar, construction has been underway on the Chabahar-Zahedan railway. This railway is planned to extend further into Afghanistan, reaching the provinces of Nimroz and Kandahar. Recently, Afghan authorities announced the completion of engineering surveys for the construction of the Zaranj-Kandahar railway. This integrated infrastructure will provide Iran with an additional avenue to access Afghanistan, while also establishing a direct connection to Herat—one of Afghanistan's largest and most strategically significant cities.

Tehran’s long-term strategic vision positions Herat as a pivotal hub for transit routes connecting Western, Central, and Eastern Asia. This perspective stems from the concept of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor, commonly referred to as the "Five Nation Road." Iran has already initiated the practical implementation of this vision through the construction of the Khaf-Herat railway, which is scheduled to become operational in 2025. Once completed, the route will extend to Kashgar in China via Central Asia, covering an approximate distance of 2,000 kilometers.

IMPLICATIONS: Iran has consistently encouraged Afghan authorities to collaborate with their Central Asian partners in advancing the railway corridor connecting Khaf to Kashgar.

In 2017, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan reached an agreement to construct the Mazar-i-Sharif-Sheberghan-Maimana-Herat railway. Integrating this new route with the Khaf-Herat railway would enable Uzbekistan to establish an alternative transit corridor to Iran, Turkey, and the Gulf countries, bypassing Turkmenistan. Additionally, this development would have a substantial impact on the implementation of the Five Nation Transit Route, as the Khaf-Herat-Mazar-i-Sharif railway constitutes a critical segment of the Afghan portion of this corridor. From Mazar-i-Sharif, transportation links would only need to be extended to Sherkhan Bandar in Kunduz province to connect with Tajikistan's border.

However, in 2018, Tashkent introduced a new trans-Afghan railway project toward Pakistan, known as the Kabul Corridor, effectively placing the implementation of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat route on hold. This decision was likely influenced by the recognition that the railway to Herat could undermine Uzbekistan’s transit interests. By prioritizing the Kabul Corridor, Uzbekistan sought to secure its role in servicing freight flows from China, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to Iran, Turkey, and Europe.

Despite these developments, progress on the China-Kyrgyzstan-Tajikistan-Afghanistan-Iran railway corridor continued. In 2019, Afghanistan and Tajikistan signed an agreement to construct the Jaloliddini Balkhi (Kolkhozobod)-Panji Poyon-Sherkhan Bandar railway. To finance the feasibility study for this project, Dushanbe sought assistance from prominent international donor organizations, including the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank.

At that time, establishing a railway connection between Afghanistan and Tajikistan was also pivotal for the development of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan (TAT) transport corridor, initiated in 2013. This corridor extends from the Tajik border into northern Afghanistan, passing through the cities of Kunduz, Khulm, Mazar-i-Sharif, Sheberghan, and Andkhoy. At the Akina checkpoint, the railway crosses into Turkmenistan, from where it can connect to the Caspian Sea. This route aligns with the concept of reviving the ancient Lapis Lazuli Corridor, which aims to provide Afghanistan with direct access to European markets via the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, and Turkey.

In 2016, Turkmenistan completed the first stage of the TAT railway, spanning the Atamurat (Kerki)-Ymamnazar-Akina route. By early 2021, the Akina-Andkhoy railway line also became operational. However, the abrupt change of power in Afghanistan during the summer of 2021 led to the suspension of work on these projects. This pause stemmed from uncertainty regarding the Taliban government's approach to relations with neighboring countries and its foreign policy on transport communications. Yet contrary to initial expectations, the new leadership in Afghanistan adopted a notably more pragmatic stance on these matters.

The Taliban have reactivated nearly all regional and interregional transport projects. Announcements have been made regarding the planned launch of the Andkhoy-Sheberghan and Sheberghan-Mazar-i-Sharif railway lines in the coming years, as well as the construction of the Mazar-i-Sharif-Herat railway. These initiatives aim to bridge critical gaps in major trade corridors, including the TAT and the Five Nation Railway Route.

Notably, even Tajikistan, despite its tough stance toward the Afghan government, has become more active in advancing trans-Afghan transport initiatives. In July 2024, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Transport and the Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) signed a protocol to develop a feasibility study for a 51-kilometer Jaloliddini Balkhi-Panji Poyon railway, which will connect to Afghanistan via the Sherkhan Bandar checkpoint. As previously mentioned, this railway will form part of the TAT.

Integration into such international transport corridors will offer Tajikistan a strategic advantage on southern transit routes. However, the modernization of existing infrastructure and the construction of new railways demand significant financial resources, which Dushanbe struggles to provide. Tajikistan relies heavily on China for foreign investment. Beijing has a vested interest in developing fast and efficient transportation routes to access emerging markets in South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe.

If the Taliban succeed in persuading Tajikistan to collaborate on developing trade routes to China, this could significantly reshape Central Asia's transport architecture while enhancing Afghanistan's strategic importance as a regional transit hub. Iran would also benefit from a direct connection to China that bypasses Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

For Tashkent, however, this development could present a serious challenge given the resolve of its neighbors to complete the TAT. 

CONCLUSIONS: The proactive efforts of the Taliban government in developing international transport links has heightened the interest of most Central Asian states (with the exception of Tajikistan) in strengthening trade and economic ties with Kabul. This includes the potential implementation of joint investment projects, such as the construction of railways, gas pipelines, and power lines, which could foster regional connectivity and economic growth.

External major powers are also eager to capitalize on these transformations, but their interference in establishing trans-Afghan transport infrastructure could have adverse consequences for Central Asia.

Iran’s ambitions to establish a transport corridor to China via Afghanistan pose the potential to alter the balance of power within the regional transit system. Such a development would bolster the positions of Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are currently in a transport deadlock and reliance on Uzbekistan for access to global markets.

The development of new trade routes through Afghanistan represents a positive trend that will inevitably influence Central Asia due to the region’s geographical proximity. This shift offers regional states the opportunity to enhance their transit and trade capacities, albeit accompanied by increased competition. To mitigate the risks of intense rivalries, the Central Asian republics must reconcile their interests in light of Afghanistan’s growing significance as a transit hub and formulate a coordinated strategy to advance interregional transport corridors, ensuring equitable benefits across the region.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Nargiza Umarova is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Advanced International Studies (IAIS), University of World Economy and Diplomacy (UWED) and an analyst at the Non-governmental Research Institution  “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan.

Her research activities are focused on studying developments in Central Asia, trends in regional integration and the influence of big powers on this process. She also explores the current policy of Uzbekistan on the creation and development of international transport corridors. She can be reached at This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .

S. Frederick Starr

July 12, 2024

Since the U.S.'s abrupt departure from Afghanistan, the Taliban government has opened exten- sive contacts with China, Russia, Pakistan, Turkey, and the Gulf States and some have elevated their ties to the ambassadorial level. No region has more at stake in Afghanistan's evolution than Central Asia and none follow developments there more closely. The U.S. should expand its C5+1 ties with Central Asia to include the sharing of information and discussion of policy choices re- garding Afghanistan. Europe and other friendly powers should do likewise.

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By Sudha Ramachandran

December 5, 2023

Pakistan has issued an ultimatum to illegal migrants to leave the country or face detention and deportation. It says that national security concerns underlie its decision; it alleged that Afghan migrants carried out most of the suicide attacks in Pakistan over the past year. However, its forcible deportation of migrants is unlikely to secure it from terror attacks as deportees could turn their anger against Pakistan. A rise in militant recruitment and attacks can be expected. Pakistan’s attempt to secure itself by driving out migrants will deepen its insecurity.

By Sudha Ramachandran

July 5, 2023

Recent violent clashes between Iranian and Taliban border guards brought to the fore the festering dispute over the sharing of the waters of the transboundary Helmand River. The clashes occurred amid an escalation of tensions and led to a heated exchange of threatening rhetoric between the two sides. The Helmand’s water is vital to both Iran and Afghanistan and the sharing of this resource evokes strong emotions on both sides of the border. The regimes in both countries regularly engage in muscle flexing on this issue in order to rally the masses behind them. Under the current circumstances, there is little likelihood of a resolution of the dispute.