By Jacob Zenn
April 19, 2017, the CACI Analyst
Since the August 30, 2016 car bombing in front of the Chinese embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, concerns have increased about Central Asians carrying out attacks in their homelands after they leave the war in Syria. A growing number of Central Asians in Syria, especially in the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), are becoming dissatisfied with al-Qaeda because it is limiting external operations, while the terrorist organization known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is actively promoting attacks abroad. Moreover, a number of TIP fighters disagree with the Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate's re-branding to appear "less al-Qaeda-like" and "more Syrian." ISIS is eager to see defected TIP members in its ranks, which could enable these fighters to target Central Asian or Chinese interests abroad in the name of ISIS.
By Emil Aslan Souleimanov
September 25th, 2015, The CACI Analyst
Russia’s recent military engagement in Syria and calls for the establishment of an international coalition against the terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State (ISIS) has produced renewed interest in Moscow’s policies toward the jihadist quasi-state. Against this background, while many have speculated about Moscow’s true intentions in the Middle East, relatively little attention has been paid to Moscow’s interests in Central Asia and the Caucasus in the context of its increasingly vocal rhetoric of fighting ISIS. Moscow is actively utilizing the risks and threats stemming from the ISIS to boost its clout in the near and far abroad.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.