By Emil A. Souleimanov and Huseyn Aliyev
February 26, 2018, the CACI Analyst
In 2017, protest activity has grown across the North Caucasus, just as in Russia’s other regions, as shown in a recent report by the Committee of Civil Initiatives (CCI). Socio-economic factors have shaped this trend throughout Russia’s regions, yet in the multi-ethnic North Caucasus these are coupled with a sense of nationalism-driven political discrimination and exclusion. On the eve of the forthcoming Football Championship in Russia, and as war-hardened veterans are returning from Syria to their homeland, this trend may contribute to a worsening security situation in Russia.
By Richard Weitz
February 22, 2018, the CACI Analyst
Preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has been a priority for Uzbek-U.S. and Kazak-U.S. relations for decades. Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are surrounded by nuclear weapons states and lie at the crossroads of potential WMD trafficking routes. As the U.S. struggles to keep North Korea and Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, deny WMDs from terrorists and other actors, and sustain a major security presence in Central Asia, partnering with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan against WMDs offers low-cost, high-yield opportunities.
By Uran Botobekov
February 16, 2018, the CACI Analyst
Terrorist groups from Central Asia reacted strongly to the statement by U.S. President Donald Trump on the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. The Uzbek, Uighur, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Kazakh jihadists, who are fighting in the Middle East and Afghanistan, issued several statements with threats against the U.S. Their statements appeared almost in unison with the pronouncements of the international terrorist groups al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and the Taliban, who are their ideological inspiration and direct patrons.
By Stephen Blank
January 25, 2018, the CACI Analyst
On December 5, 2017, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov announced that all the key issues regarding the delimitation of the Caspian Sea had been resolved and that a treaty was being prepared for heads of state to sign in 2018 in Astana. Yet less optimistic statements from the other parties, particularly Iran, suggest that Lavrov’s assessment was premature. If Russia and Iran can nevertheless reconcile their differences on the demarcation of the Caspian, this would have important strategic consequences not only for the littoral states, but also for the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East.
By Roger N. McDermott
November 17, 2017, the CACI Analyst
While much international attention has focused upon Russia’s joint strategic exercise with Belarus, Zapad 2017 in September, in its aftermath Moscow also staged important operational-strategic exercises on a wider scale across the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Not only was the geographical scope of these exercises greater than Zapad 2017, but their various vignettes and scenario details provide glimpses into Moscow’s planning and modelling of future conflict on its periphery.
The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.