Events in Kyrgyzstan, portrayed as “banditry and marauding” perpetrated by an unmanageable mob in the public speeches of top echelons officials of Kazakhstan, present a striking contrast to the thesis of step-by-step political reform favored by official Kazakh ideology. By all standards, the repetition of the Kyrgyz scenario in Kazakhstan is almost unthinkable. Even fierce critics of the regime admit that a number of factors strongly minimize, if not exclude altogether, the threat of a Kyrgyz-style uprising in Kazakhstan. These include the steady economic achievements of the last five years, relatively high wages and pensions, accelerated development of the business sector which fosters a middle class, and the political inertness of the rural population. The Kazakh establishment is well aware of its economic trump-card which will help stave off revolutionary moods in the masses.

Nevertheless, the Kyrgyz upheavals sent a shockwave among the ruling elite of Kazakhstan from the first hours of the wildfire-like developments. Authorities imposed a veritable information barrier, and important websites like centrasia.ru were effectively blocked. State-controlled media merely carried sketchy reports carefully filtered for the consumption of the audience. For example, the short statement made by Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in connection with Kyrgyz events reached the only two days later. Likewise, the report that the ousted president Askar Akayev fled his country came only forty eight hours after Italian television RAINews24 showed an image of a military helicopter taking off with presumably Kyrgyz president Akayev on board. Kazakh officials neither denied nor confirmed allegations that Akayev was hiding in Kazakhstan until a Russian news media disclosed that Kyrgyz president arrived to Moscow from Kazakhstan.

Apparently, Kazakh leaders believed that last-ditch efforts by Askar Akayev to retain his power could by some miracle reverse the course of dramatic events. The Foreign Ministry of Kazakhstan pinned its hope on “constructive dialogue” between the Kyrgyz opposition and the authorities. However incongruous it may seem in this circumstance, Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev in his interview to Kazakhstanskaya Pravda said that “Kazakhstan reaffirms its interest in rendering any assistance to Kyrgyzstan in case it is needed”.

Recovering from the blow delivered by the Kyrgyz uprising, Kazakh president Nursultan Nazarbayev told the Congress of entrepreneurs on March 25 that “riots” in Kyrgyzstan were triggered off by the extreme poverty of the population and the weakness of the authorities, and the serious blunder of Kyrgyz government to put political changes before the economic reforms. By stating thus, Nazarbayev gained propaganda scores on two points. First, he demonstrated to the outside world and his home audience that under his rule, Kazakhstan attained incontestable economic leadership in the region. Second, he suggested that his theory about the priority of economy over politics stood the test successfully in Kyrgyzstan.

He assumed this mentoring tone in his talks with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who arrived in Astana on March 31 for a short visit. The young Georgian leader flattered the ears of his Kazakh counterpart, lavishing praises of the economic achievements of Kazakhstan and posing as a humble disciple who came to Kazakhstan to learn the ways of economic and administrative management. In some way, Saakashvili disarmed the Kazakh opposition, stating that the Kyrgyz scenario or any other velvet revolution was ruled out in Kazakhstan because Kazakhs who enjoy higher income and solid social protection are preoccupied with economic reforms.

Nazarbayev showed his pragmatic approach, distancing itself from the hard-line and stubborn policy makers in the Kremlin and talking business with the leader of a new generation who came to power in the wake of a popular uprising. He promised Mikheil Saakashvili Kazakh investments to reconstruct Georgian seaports and delivery of natural gas. The agreement was reached on Kazakh oil shipments via Georgia’s Poti seaport to Romania’s Constanta. The new route should link Georgian Black sea terminals with the Aktau seaport on Kazakhstan’s Caspian coast.

Far more important than economic benefits are political gains for Kazakhstan. Georgia can pave the way for Kazakhstan in its efforts to join the World Trade Organization and foster closer ties with the European Union, NATO and other Western organizations. Nazarbayev realizes well that time has come to make the world believe in the sincerity of his commitment to radical political reforms. At the same time, the Georgian way of regime change would be the last thing Nazarbayev could wish for. He is still clinging to the idea of governing the democratic processes through a “pocket” parliament and his brain-child, the National Committee on Problems of Democracy, an inefficient structure not recognized by opposition. No one can tell in this state of balancing between the threat of popular revolutions and an authoritarian type of “democracy” what the political future holds in store for Kazakhstan.