Wednesday, 23 March 2005

A ‘TULIP’ REVOLUTION DEVELOPS IN KYRGYZSTAN?

Published in Field Reports

By Maral Madi (3/23/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

As a result of the two rounds of parliamentary elections, the pro-government parties Alga Kyrgyzstan, Adilet and the Democratic Party of Women and Youth secured a total of 25 out of 75 available seats, and the rest were mainly distributed among pro-presidential independents, including businessmen. As the opposition got about five places, 90% of the new parliament will be pro-presidential. President Askar Akaev’s daughter and one son are represented there.
As a result of the two rounds of parliamentary elections, the pro-government parties Alga Kyrgyzstan, Adilet and the Democratic Party of Women and Youth secured a total of 25 out of 75 available seats, and the rest were mainly distributed among pro-presidential independents, including businessmen. As the opposition got about five places, 90% of the new parliament will be pro-presidential. President Askar Akaev’s daughter and one son are represented there.

During the past rounds of elections, unprecedented pressure was put on students and state officials to vote for a designated candidate. As mentioned above, most media outlets are controlled by the ‘family’, especially by Adil’ Toigoinbaev, son-in-law of the president and husband of Bermet Akaeva, a newly elected parliamentarian. While in Kyrgyzstan, one finds no other information nor does one hear the views of the opposition, since state-controlled TV stations strongly promoted the pro-presidential candidates. In Osh, the gathering of large amounts of people in front of the state administration building was not even mentioned in a single news item in the Kyrgyz state media, indicating a complete blackout. Attempts to reach opposition or even neutral websites were futile, as these were blocked. After the Moya stolitsa newspaper issued an article with a list of immovable property owned by the Akaev family, all their issues were bought out or confiscated; as a result the volunteers were passing the papers around for free on the streets.

Of the main opposition leaders, only three were elected to parliament. Roza Otunbaeva and Dooronbek Sadyrbaev (Ata-Jurt party) were barred from contesting seats. Kurmanbek Bakiev (Ata-Jurt) lost his electoral district. Adakhan Madumarov (Ata-Jurt) first was reported to have lost but the Central Election Commission reviewed the case and declared him the winner after he gathered 20,000 people to support him. Finally, Omurbek Tekebaev (Ata-Meken) and Azimbek Beknazarov (People’s Movement of Kyrgyzstan) got elected.

One noticeable fact is that most opposition leaders are from the south, which has been deprived of any substantial decision-making role in the northern-dominated parliament in Soviet and post-Soviet times alike. However, the artificially accentuated North-South difference is very handy for the president, as it allow the use of divide-and-rule tactics. It is crucial to note that the waves of protests have been rocking the whole of Kyrgyzstan. They first started in Kochkor, a very northern stronghold and even spread to Talas, the birthplace of First Lady Mairam Akaeva and the Issyk-Kul region, also in the North.

On March 10, opposition groups established the Coordinating council of People’s unity in order to send their message across by organizing a kurultai (congress). On March 15, there were large scale gatherings in Alai and Uzgen, where Adakhan Madumarov and Marat Sultonov’s supporters occupied the administration buildings.

The building of the Jalalabad administration was held by the opposition groups from March 4, and the one in Osh from March 18. State officials initially stated that no force would be used, but after realizing that the state was losing control over its southern regions, groups of OMON (special purpose police forces) were deployed on March 19 in order to regain the state administration buildings. There is no reliable information on how many people died or were wounded during the clashes. The only reliable information is that buildings were stormed by OMON and soldiers from MoI who arrived from Bishkek, and no local forces were participating in the storming of buildings.

Both state administration buildings in Osh and Jalal-Abad were taken back by the opposition. A crowd of thousands of people burnt down the building of the Ministry of Interior in Jalalabad, and occupied the airports in order to preclude the landing of planes with military reinforcements. A mutiny among Ministry of Interior forces was reported. In Jalalabad. In Osh, besides taking full control of the airport and the state administration building, demonstrators destroyed the Mayor’s office. On March 21, opposition forces blocked a group of 96 soldiers of the elite Kalkan forces in Osh airport.

In lieu of an official reaction, presidential spokesperson Abdil Segizbaev has repeatedly talked about the purported infiltration of extremist or terrorist groups. These statements are not coincidental, given two crucial facts: firstly, there are not enough military forces to control the situation; and secondly, on March 15, President Akaev ratified an agreement between the government of Kyrgyzstan and the CIS Anti-terrorist center (ATC) on the conditions outlining the presence of the ATC branch on the territory of Kyrgyzstan. Rhetoric used by the president’s office can be viewed as an attempt to present the ongoing events as extremist and terrorist actions, which could legitimize the deployment of CIS troops to stabilize the situation. Segizbaev also tried to brand these events as a coup planned by “criminal elements connected to the drug mafia…struggling to gain power”. This latest branding could also be used to mobilize either the anti-terrorist center of the CIS or even the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.

In Russia, meanwhile, voices calling for intervention are increasingly loud. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the actions of the opposition “lead to the escalation of the situation and negatively affect the political situation in general and should be criticized” and asked the OSCE not to agitate the situation. Members of the Duma Rogozin and Margelov stated that Russia needs to interfere in Kyrgyzstan’s affairs and to take action against the opposition. Vladimir Zhirinovsky stated that “it is necessary to take strong measures in order not to let Akaev be deposed, otherwise Russia will lose Central Asia, and later Armenia and Azerbaijan” and called to use military forces to suppress the demonstrations. The pro-government Russian channel one started covering events in Kyrgyzstan only after an official statement of the Kremlin. Judging from the scarcity and carefulness of official Moscow’s reaction, it can be assumed that Moscow does not really know what to do in Kyrgyzstan, understanding perhaps that the demise of Akaev’s regime is just a matter of time. It seems that Akaev has so far not succeeded in demanding the deployment of CIS troops under the pretence of activization of “extremist or even terrorist forces”.

The Government has exaggerated the threat of ethnic clashes, and the activities of extremist and terrorist organizations. One of the opposition leaders, Anvar Artykov, is the self-appointed head of the popular government of the Osh region, and an ethnic Uzbek, which is a positive development. Opposition forces are now planning to hold a Kurultai in Bishkek. While military forces are more organized and stronger in the capital, they are still not enough to peacefully withstand thousands of demonstrators.

Even if the Kyrgyz tulip revolution fails to take place now, it is likely to resurface again in the nearest future and in a more pronounced and violent way. The developments will depend greatly on whether the opposition groups will be able to mobilize the citizens of Bishkek. The stakes are running high, considering that there is little possibility for dialogue after President Akaev on March 22 stated that elections were free of fraud and that the new parliament will start working, ignoring the demands of the opposition to cancel the results.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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