In November, Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, proposed an official amnesty plan that now seems to have been adopted by the Afghan government: those ordinary Taliban who lay down their arms and pledge allegiance to the Karzai government will not be punished.

The U.S. lead in seeking a deal with the Taliban has been interpreted as a desire to finally end the lingering insurgency in Afghanistan so that they can fully concentrate on the problems in Iraq. And the Americans are pushing ahead. On January 16th, 81 Taliban prisoners were released from U.S. custody in Afghanistan. Officials described this as the first phase of reconciliation with the insurgents. “One category of Taliban want to come back… and the government is providing them [with] the opportunity,” said Chief Justice Fazal Hadi Shinwari at the occasion. Shinwari also claimed the U.S. had agreed to release the remaining 400 Taliban prisoners in Afghanistan.

But are there really Taliban eager to “come back”? Analysts inside and outside the country believe that soon, a batch of Taliban may indeed lay down their weapons. But this may not succeed in ending the insurgency. “Ninety-five percent of the Taliban are still with Omar,” says Pakistani journalist and Afghanistan expert, Rahimullah Yousafzai. And not only is Omar excluded from the proposed amnesty – he does not even want to reach any agreement with the new Afghan authorities. In a statement released on January 20th, Mullah Omar denied negotiations between the Taliban and Afghan and U.S. officials were being conducted. “The U.S. and Afghan authorities… are trying to deceive the people of Afghanistan,” he said.

Mullah Omar had a point when he said that Kabul has failed to mention any influential Taliban figures willing to cross lines. Rumors abound that one of two former Taliban foreign ministers, Mullah Mohammad Ghous Akhund and Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, would be heading a future “democratic” Taliban-style party. But neither man is part of the Taliban any longer; neither was ever very influential within the movement; and even then, neither is yet working with Karzai. Talks about a Taliban party might well be, therefore, “wishful thinking” on the part of the government, says Yousafzai.

Accommodation without Omar seems impossible. But including Omar – were he interested – in the process would create huge problems with the Northern Alliance (NA). Already, the movement that was an important ally for the U.S. to topple the Taliban regime in November 2001, feels it has lost political influence. In the new cabinet formed in December, the NA lost most important portfolios they had held in the interim administration. And an amnesty for the Taliban would probably make them unhappier still. An unsatisfied NA could create serious problems. Thanks to the drug trade, many militia commanders – not excluding some of the NA – have generated considerable riches: taxes from drugs are now the main source of income for militias. They could use this income to pursue their own agenda, opposing Kabul’s.

The amnesty proposal for the Taliban might create more problems than it would solve: it would hardly end the insurgency while it would create additional problems with the NA. Capturing Mullah Omar might after all be easier than accommodating him.