Kazakhstan’s official press this time diverted from the long-standing practice of previously announcing the visits of state leaders and did not write a word about Putin’s trip to Almaty prior to the event. The enigmatic Putin broadly outlined the purpose of his visit in a very furtive manner naming joint development of energy resources, bilateral cooperation within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Single Economic Space as the main issues of the agenda. Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev added little to these statements. Cutting short his two-day visit Vladimir Putin left Almaty as unexpectedly as he appeared. It was rumored that he was urgently called back home by Kremlin officials worried by widespread public unrests over pension issues in Russia. Surprisingly, Nazarbayev flew to Moscow at the beginning of the following week to sign the border delimitation agreement. Even this removal one of the major hurdles in bilateral relations provokes questions. Why was the border problem, the hardest knot to unravel at uneasy high level talks held alternatively in Russia and Kazakhstan without perceptible progress over the last five years, so easily settled within last two months? The disputed border area with rich gas deposits in Aktobe region (West Kazakhstan) have been an apple of discord between the neighbors up to the last moment. Only a year ago President Putin stepped on the raw by commenting publicly that “we have very serious border problems”. He did not differ much from its predecessor Boris Yeltsin in that he regarded Kazakhstan as the “underbelly of Russia” rather than an equal partner with an independent foreign policy. However, over the last few years Moscow remarkably toned down its imperial rhetoric and abandoned, at the official level at least, its territorial claims on five border regions of Kazakhstan in the North planned to be annexed to Russia by former Soviet President Nikita Khrushev. Many observers interpret this sudden change of mood in Moscow in the context of the Ukrainian orange revolution. Apparently the Ukrainian syndrome was mulled over at great length by the two leaders in an informal atmosphere at the alpine ski resort Shymbulak, inaccessible to journalists. Clearly, the threat of the orange revolution is the sole factor which can drive Astana and Moscow into each others arms. With presidential elections to be held next year, Nazarbayev faces increasingly tough problems in coping with the opposition. Last month the Supreme Court banned the main opposition party Democratic Choice of Kazakhstan. At the same time, under the pressure from opposition and international organizations, the state granted enhanced powers to parliament in nominating officials for key government posts. If presidential elections will repeat the Ukrianian scenario the main loser will probably be Putin and not Nazarbayev. Traditionally loyal to Moscow, Astana is seen as one of Russia’s last bastions in the CIS. In its current position, Russia cannot afford displaying its usual ‘big-brother’ ambitions in relations with Central Asian states. But for Kazakhstan the time has not come yet to turn its back on Moscow. On the contrary, welcoming Putin with open arms President Nazarbayev stressed that “we recognize Russia as our main partner”. This statement contradicts the official line of multi-vector diplomacy reiterated a few days prior to Putin’s visit to Astana by Kazakh Foreign Minister Kasymzhomart Tokayev who stated that Kazakhstan favors “multilateral and balanced politics” among China, Russia and the United States. Moscow’s major political setback in Ukraine has shattered all hopes of integrating Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan and Ukraine within the much-publicized Single Economic Space. At the moment Putin and Nazarbayev seem to be two leaders really worried about the fate of the Single Economic Space. Belarus, grappling with its own economic problems, is not in a position to provide a reliable hinterland for its Slavic kin Russia. Pledging alliance with Russia in words, Kazakhstan is in fact striving for more economic independence from Russia. Part of this drive was the construction of the railway linking Khromtau in West Kazakhstan with Altynsarino in the North, whose planned route earlier passed through Russia. The Aktobe region of Kazakhstan drastically reduced its electricity imports from Russia after the construction of a high-capacity power station. Last week the Kazakh government raised the question of banning imports of foreign-fabricated chocolates and sweets, without mentioning Russia specifically as the main exporter. All these signal a widening, however imperceptible, rift in Kazakh-Russian economic relations which threatens to project itself on political ties. In this situation the orange revolution paranoia may serve as a factor contributing to warm relations between Astana and Moscow at least before the forthcoming presidential elections in Kazakhstan.