Wednesday, 01 December 2004

PLANNING THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE ROSE REVOLUTION IN SOUTH OSSETIA

Published in Field Reports

By Theresa Freese (12/1/2004 issue of the CACI Analyst)

“Mate Kobaladze, aged 56, died on Wednesday,” told Guram Vakhtangashvili, parliamentary representative of the Georgian population in the Liakhvi Gorges. “He went to the beginning of the diversion road, above Eredvi, to gather wood and hit a trip wire. He lost too much blood and died.
“Mate Kobaladze, aged 56, died on Wednesday,” told Guram Vakhtangashvili, parliamentary representative of the Georgian population in the Liakhvi Gorges. “He went to the beginning of the diversion road, above Eredvi, to gather wood and hit a trip wire. He lost too much blood and died.” Three individuals were lightly injured before him when running into rastiashkas (trip wires tied to grenades).

“If you can get hit in your own yard, you can get hit anywhere,” Kekhvi residents complained. They pointed out that a local resident and two children were similarly injured in orchards over the past week. “The biggest problems are now in Didi Liakhvi,” Guram stressed, enumerating local problems associated with the conflict. “Eldar Kakhniashvili is probably dead. He was 20 years old.”

“Eleven days were spent searching for him in the hills,” elaborated Gela Zoziashvili, deputy governor of the region. “His family realized he was missing when the cows came home and he did not. In protest, his relatives and the local population blocked the road [linking Tskhinvali to Russia]. They told us to take measures to return their son—no matter what condition he was in. In response, Ossetians blocked the road [to Tskhinvali]. Nine Ossetians and 18 Georgians were detained by both sides. On the first day of the search, a cameraman and journalist were lightly injured when they triggered a trip wire while cleaning their shoes.”

Didi Liakhvi is a strategic center to the conflict: South Ossetia will never be complete as long as Georgian villagers (approximately 8,000) reside there under Georgian jurisdiction, while it provides Georgia with a lever against Ossetians. It is a landlocked territory surrounded by hills from which, Georgians claim, Ossetians fire regularly on Georgian villages in an attempt to scare the population into leaving. Residents cannot pass freely to Georgia proper unless they can use Tskhinvali road. A diversion route, bypassing Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, crosses mountainous terrain and may be inaccessible once winter progresses. Meanwhile, Tskhinvali residents must cross Didi Liakhvi to reach South Ossetia’s northern territories and Russia. Ossetians, too, have a bypass route—Dzari road, which is reportedly well-defended by armed positions and embanked by minefields. But it is unpaved and will be difficult to use during winter months.

“We know what they want—to tear this part out of Georgia,” Gela declared. Disappearances, landmines, and detention are not the only problems residents face. “Every day there is some kind of tension.” Guram noted. He alleged that along the road to Vanati, at Dmenisi, the largest Ossetian village in Patara Liakhvi, Ossetians take 20 to 30 lari from vehicles carrying wood back from the hills. Russian peacekeepers at the Vanati checkpoint ask for five. “They won’t allow vehicles to pass unless drivers pay.” Wood cutters explain that on top of this they pay 20 lari to Georgian officials to have the right to gather wood.

Reportedly, not only Ossetians are collecting fines. One man whose car could not get through explained to Marat Kulakhmetov, commander of the joint peacekeeping forces, “One of the Russian soldiers told me to stop my engine. He pointed his automatic weapon at me and said, ‘Georgians are also taking 500 rubles from Ossetians, so turn off your engine.’”

A conflict of interest between following local legislation and surviving the winter complicates the situation. Ossetians claim that Georgians are destroying the woods as they clear entire patches of trees for winter fuel. Georgians explain they do so only because they are too afraid to venture deeper into the woods. Ossetians do not want to allow Georgian wood traders to pass Vanati checkpoint.

“I’m not letting traders through,” explained Valeri Kokoev, an Ossetian member of parliament representing Patara Liakhvi. “Because this is a conflict zone, locals receive a discount on cutting wood,” he explained. “They can sell the wood for higher prices elsewhere,” Kulakhmetov added. Nodar countered that it is impossible to distinguish between a trader and a villager gathering wood for the winter. Moreover, both sides contest where Georgian territory ends and Ossetian territory begins. Cases of beating or detention largely occur when crossing Ossetian territory.

Daily shooting merely increases the tension. “We don’t pay attention to automatic weapons,” Ramaz explained. “We hear this every night. It is the shelling that scares us. Three nights ago there was shelling from 12 to 5 am. Guja Gagnidze’s house was hit by fragments. There were no injuries or deaths this time.” “Sometimes we just want to throw our hands up and leave,” one woman whose house was hit over the summer declared. “But what can we do?”

Demilitarization of South Ossetia—meant to de-escalate the crisis—is now underway, in accordance with a 5 November Sochi agreement. Peacekeepers are replacing Ossetian positions above Tamarasheni, while Georgian trenches around Tamarasheni Secondary School are being destroyed. However, both sides interpret demilitarization differently. The first phase envisions replacing illegal positions with joint peacekeeping forces and closing trenches. What should be done with arms, minefields, heavy military equipment, troop deployment, the de facto Ossetian defense ministry, and “police” (both sides claim armed civilians pose as policemen) remains unclear. Joint Control Commission meetings in Vladikavkaz over the next few days should define this concept further.

Guram was skeptical, calling demilitarization “a bluff.” He believes that Ossetians will never remove arms from Tskhinvali or Ossetian villages. “The defense ministry, special forces, the local population—they all are armed,” he explained. Georgians believe that demilitarization is “unrealistic” as long as weapons remain in Ossetian territories, noting that once the local Georgian population is disarmed and troops removed the Ossetians can immediately enter their villages.

Addressing the humanitarian concerns, Guram explained, “We plan to give two tons of coal to each family. It should be enough for the winter. Flour and oil is being delivered to the entire Liakhvi Gorge population through CARITAS.” Meanwhile, this week the government began to repair the most damaged houses or to reimburse residents with cash.

Didi Liakhvi residents now report that Ossetians are afraid that 23 November will find Georgians storming Tskhinvali. “The Ossetians are scared and panicking,” Ramaz noted. “Six buses with children already left for Orjonikidze [Vladikavkaz].”

“[President Saakashvili] has said that by the anniversary of the Rose Revolution we will be in Tskhinvali,” Guram explained. “On the same date in 1989, under Gamsakhurdia’s government, approximately 40,000 Georgians tried to enter Tskhinvali to hold a meeting. The Russians stopped them at Ergneti.” The armed conflict soon followed.

Meanwhile, Russia is financing a new road, reportedly at a cost of $3 million, from Tskhinvali, through Didi Liakhvi, and on to the Russian border at Roki tunnel. Some observers fear the Ossetians, or Russians, can claim the territory is theirs once the road is finished. Locals do not seem to mind. “Villagers are happy,” Ramaz explained. “A good road is important.” However, many actually believe the UN is fixing the road.

“I can’t understand when our legislation will be active in Tskhinvali,” Ramaz concluded. “The longer this situation continues, the worse it is. It’s time to say this is ours and this is yours. There is no Ossetian territory, there is only Georgian territory. “It was better under Shevardnadze,” one local authority concluded. “At least then we had peace.”

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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