In the past six months, Askar Akaev has appeared increasingly to look for support in Russia, as the number of bilateral visits has increased. Recently, the Bishkek-based Kyrgyz-Russian University was named after Russian ex-president Boris Yeltsin, and last year the turn came to a mountain peak. Often, representatives of the Kyrgyz presidential administration speaki in adulating terms about Russia, declaring that “Russia is given by God and without it Kyrgyzstan could not exist”.
Russia is capitalizing on Anatoly Chubais’ strategy of economic imperialism, intended to establish hegemony over the region. Thus, at the recent meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization held in Kyrgyzstan, Russia decided not to accelerate trade liberalization with China, given that Russia’s position in Central Asia is still too weak to compete. Yeltsin, this year as he did last year, during visit to Kyrgyzstan declared the necessity for U.S. Aircraft to leave the territory of Kyrgyz Republic. President Akaev supported this statement, but soon enough announced that Kyrgyzstan “will never become a scene of rivalry between two great nations, but a scene of cooperation”. It seems the Kremlin has a different point of view.
The western forces of the Antiterrorist Coalition deployed at the Ganci Air Base significantly contributes to the state treasury, and for the personal wealth of the presidential family, by buying fuel and paying landing fees. Moreover, the U.S. air force base has become a lighthouse, making the region more secure for Western investors, a fact Akaev could not refute.
Kyrgyzstan is more similar to Georgia than to Azerbaijan or Kazakhstan. It has no oil resources, and is heavily dependent on external support. Even though the Constitutional Court or any other authority could potentially provide the opportunity for Askar Akaev to extend his ruling term, the pitfalls should he do that are many. If the U.S. would beging reconsidering the effectiveness of poverty reduction programs in Kyrgyzstan, it would have to retreat from most of the projects under way.
Even though Akaev could orchestrate an electoral victory through various means, this would not automatically mean his rule would be long. If western aid would stop or be curtailed and if the Paris Club would not write off external debts (as poverty levels have actually not been reduced as forecasted), then the Kyrgyz Republic would run a severe risk of admitting economic default. Demands of society to the state are at risk of leading to social tensions, with the possibility of open conflict at a larger scale than the Aksy events of 2002. Could Akaev remain in power then?
The pro-governmental party “Alga Kyrgyzstan”, Alga for short, remains akin to the Communist Party of the USSR, using administrative resources to recruit reluctant new members. Alga accomplishes these tasks very efficiently, but it has not received public trust.
The Civic Union for Fair Elections represents the first officially registered political union between regional groups of the North and South of Kyrgyzstan. Its alliance with the “For People’s Power” party lead by the opposition candidate for the presidency, Kurmanbek Bakiev, provides an opportunity to be competitive with the ruling elite in the forthcoming elections.
In this quagmire, one possibility for Akaev is to promote a successor for the presidential elections. Yet the problem is that there is no real candidate within his ‘family’.