Wednesday, 22 September 2004

RUSSIA URGES KAZAKHSTAN TO FIGHT “INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM”

Published in Field Reports

By Marat Yermukanov (9/22/2004 issue of the CACI Analyst)

Kazakhstan’s ability to react promptly to everything which happens in Russia surprises observers and irritates homegrown nationalists. Speaking at the joint session of Parliament immediately after two simultaneous plane crashes in Russia, President Nursultan Nazarbayev on September 1 called on the power-wielding bodies and security services to heighten security measures. The day, by irony, coincided with the hostage taking in the small Russian town of Beslan, apparently perpetrated by Chechen and other terrorists.
Kazakhstan’s ability to react promptly to everything which happens in Russia surprises observers and irritates homegrown nationalists. Speaking at the joint session of Parliament immediately after two simultaneous plane crashes in Russia, President Nursultan Nazarbayev on September 1 called on the power-wielding bodies and security services to heighten security measures. The day, by irony, coincided with the hostage taking in the small Russian town of Beslan, apparently perpetrated by Chechen and other terrorists. Meetings of mourning for the victims in big enterprises, unanimous condemnations of hostage takers, and press accounts of these stage-managed acts of solidarity with Russia went off in the best traditions of Soviet propaganda campaigns.

Amid all these verbal wars against terrorists, the allegations of Russian prosecutor-general for the Southern Federal District Serghey Fridinski that among the hostage takers in Beslan were some Kazakhs produced a bombshell effect in the country. Under the pressure from media, the Kazakh Embassy in Moscow asked the Russian Foreign Ministry to confirm or reject this report. But the Russian officials remained silent for several days, during which speculations were circulating in the media in both countries. The National Security Service of Kazakhstan offered a weak denial of Russian allegations, putting up conflicting explanations for the Russian canard. First, Kazakh security offices stated that apparently there was a terrorist among hostage takers nick-named “Kazakh”, then they admitted the possible involvement of some Kazakhstan-born residents of Caucasus region in hostage taking.

It may be quite incidental that this diplomatic row set off on the eve of the Single Economic Space (SES) meeting and CIS summit in Astana on September 15-16. Although vital economic issues of tariff regulations, cross-border trade, and value added taxes stood high on the agenda of the SES meeting and 29 documents were approved for signing by July 1 next year, economic topics were overshadowed by security issues. Harping on the “international nature” of terrorism, President Putin of Russia called the leaders of Kazakhstan, Ukraine and Belarus to strengthen control and deepen collaboration between security bodies within SES countries, which to his view, is a precondition for free movement of citizens within the SES space. Putin’s intention to depict the Chechen war as a plot of international terrorists was echoed by Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov who reiterated in Astana that the CIS countries were to act together to fight terrorism. The topic of combating separatism prevailed also in bilateral talks of CIS leaders.

Clearly, Russia’s theory of international terrorism is not readily accepted by everyone. Even those nations who have suffer most from terrorist onslaughts treat the Kremlin’s bellicose rhetoric with mistrust. One of the reasons for that seems to be the inconsistent policy of Moscow in its geopolitical pursuits in Central Asia. Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov was quoted by Uzbek Television’s first channel as saying before his departure to Astana that Russia should choose between the Single Economic Space and the CIS. Azerbaijan also turned its back on Russia. Moscow’s recent threat to strike terrorists in any part of the globe put Kazakh nationalists on alert. At the same time, parroting the Kremlin’s militant phraseology, deputy chairman of the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan Vladimir Bozhko assured Parliament members that security forces were ready to handle terrorists in any CIS country. He also disclosed that since the hostage-taking drama in Moscow’s Nord-Ost music hall in October 2002, Kazakh security services were intensifying intelligence activities in countries which pose a potential threat of terrorism.

At least for two reasons, Kazakhstan falls short of Russian expectations of regional security collaboration. First, as Bozhko admitted, Kazakhstan lacks funding to set up new anti-terrorist units. Second, for all drum-beating and saber-rattling, Kazakhstan lacks a clearly defined terrorist enemy. Speaking at Parliament, President Nazarbaev warned of religious extremism, mainly referring to growing activities of western religious sects and hinted that the 1992 law on “Freedom of Faith and Religious Associations” should be revised to limit the activities of foreign missionaries and sects. But these sects are not banned by the Constitution. Even Hizb-ut-Tahrir members who distribute leaflets calling for the creation of a caliphate and protest against American air bases in Uzbekistan have never threatened to overthrow the Kazakh government. This does not mean Hizb-ut-Tahrir radicalism is not a threat, although its activists have not resorted to armed violence so far. But the methods used by Russian security forces against Chechen separatists are not acceptable for Kazakhstan. Almaty Academy of Law Professor Guriy Khan believes that to uproot terrorism, the state should first eradicate poverty. These arguments will hardly be heeded by the Kremlin, which prefers military muscle to economic or any other methods.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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