After reports that Russians (seen as controlling South Ossetian authorities) were bringing arms and military equipment into Tskhinvali region, events escalated into a pre-conflict situation. As evidence that Russia was assisting Ossetians, Georgian police and peacekeepers detained Russian vehicles carrying unguided helicopter missiles into Tskhinvali. The response was rapid. Ossetian security forces detained 50 Georgian police protecting Vanati village, took them to Tskhinvali, and paraded them in front of cameras. Conflict zone residents began to evacuate children, while most men and women stayed to protect villages. That evening Ossetians entered Georgian territory and began shooting. A military stand-off ensued and Ossetian forces began digging trenches in strategically-located territories surrounding Georgian villages in Patara Liakhvi (Prisi, Eredvi, and Vanati), Didi Liakhvi (Tamarasheni), and Proni Gorge (Avnevi) as well as Nikozi (just outside the conflict zone). To see the situation “with [my] own eyes”, Georgian peacekeepers brought me to Prisi and Nikozi to observe the digging.

The center of the stand-off is above Eredvi, where two diversion roads were recently created to link Eredvi with Didi Liakhvi, bypassing Tskhinvali. Ossetians destroyed the first road when they entered Georgian territory. It is now guarded by Russian peacekeepers. If the second route is won by Ossetians, or controlled by Russians, Didi Liakhvi will be dependent on Russians and Ossetians. If Eredvi is taken, Georgians in both Didi and Patara Liakhvi will become entirely isolated. Thus, Georgians are defending the diversion route and Eredvi to prevent Ossetians from capturing Georgian conflict zone villages. Meanwhile, conflict zone residents endure Ossetians nightly shooting into Georgian territory, with Georgians responding in defense. A total of nine Georgian civilians and troops have been wounded, and one killed, to date. Georgian officials report that Ossetian authorities will not confirm the number of casualties on their side.

Observers who predicted a third Georgian Rose Revolution now ask, “What went wrong?” First, Georgian authorities pushed Eduard Kokoev, president of the self-declared South Ossetian republic, into a corner. Recognizing that Georgia’s aim was to regain Ossetian territory and to oust him, his best option was to turn Georgia’s peaceful initiatives into a conflict situation. Moreover, rather than winning Ossetian support, Georgia’s efforts scared Ossetians—as did Ossetian authorities who reportedly threatened Ossetians if they accepted any Georgian assistance or attended events. Second, when Georgian authorities confiscated Russian vehicles, they directly provoked Russia. The next day, Ossetians began firing on Georgian troops. Now, Georgians explain they are in the midst of a conflict with Russia—not with Ossetians.

Ossetians note that Sandra Roelofs’ visit, preceded by a build-up of interior ministry troops, reminded them of how the first Georgian-Ossetian conflict got started. They fear that Georgian troops, carrying banners of peace, will once again march into Tskhinvali. The prevalence of Georgian security forces in the area is seen as a confirmation of this fear. Moreover, Ergneti market—the main source of income for Tskhinvali authorities as well as conflict zone residents, was destroyed. With nightly shootings and no market, both Georgians and Ossetians complain that that their families will have difficulty surviving until there is a political solution to “the second conflict.” Although Ossetians admire Saakashvili, they do not view Georgia’s efforts to support Ossetians as sincere. They stress, “South Ossetia is not Ajara. The same efforts will not work.”

The most important barrier to Georgia’s success, however, is both economic and political. Russia finances Ossetian pensions (ranging from $100 to $150 per month compared to Georgia’s $9), security forces, and government wages. Russian passports and residency documents provide Ossetians with free movement in and out of Russia and allow them to buy Russian products for Ergneti market. Because Russia provides Ossetians with a higher living standard than Georgia can offer, Ossetians are concerned that Georgian reunification will mean impoverishment. One woman exclaimed, “If Georgia provided for its own citizens first—and not just in the conflict zone—then Ossetians would trust the new government…. Saakashvili should have started with serious economic development programs for Georgians, and not just with offers of flour and fertilizer and small pensions to Ossetians.” Moreover, many Ossetians are proud of close relations with Russia and would only welcome Georgia if Russia stopped supporting Ossetians.

Meanwhile, Georgians point out that as long as Russia controls Ossetian authorities and have peacekeepers regulating the conflict zone there will be no peaceful settlement. One Georgian peacekeeper explained: “It is clear that the Ossetians are creating defensive positions and preparing for war. I called the senior Russian observer about the digging of trenches, and they are taking no measures to stop this action. Russians claim they are in charge of the situation, but they are doing nothing.” Moreover, many question Russia’s objectivity as long as Russian flags and posters of Putin are prevalent in Tskhinvali and Ossetians actively strive to unite with Russia.

Rather than a third Rose Revolution, Georgia now confronts the potential of a full-scale conflict. Security forces and officials are defending Georgian conflict zone villages from a potential Ossetian bombardment. Georgian-Ossetian relations have been damaged in the process. While it has finally become clear to authorities that a revolution is not underway, it is unclear if the Georgian authorities have the experience and knowledge to negotiate a political settlement to the present crisis. Hopes hinge on negotiations at a diplomatic level and particularly on the support of the international community. Meanwhile, the fate of conflict zone residents hangs on a thread.