After successfully gaining political power in Georgia without bloodshed as well as reinforcing Georgian control over the Adjara region, ousting its leader Aslan Abashidze, there is no secret that the next item on the President’s wish list is taking control over South Ossetia. The question is, will it be as easy? And maybe most importantly, will it be without bloodshed? In recent months, Georgia has been following a “good cop-bad cop” routine: Georgian authorities effectively closed down the Ergneti market, a major smuggling hub; demanded Georgian checkpoints at the Roki tunnel as well as sent the first lady to meet with children in Georgian villages in the area. Meanwhile, Georgian authorities are attempting to pay pensions and distribute food and fertilizers in the region. Tensions grew as the negotiations in Moscow collapsed and tit for tat hostage taking of Georgian and Ossetian policemen took place. Both the ousting of Shevardnadze and Abashidze came with great popular support. With the support from the U.S. and Russia, respectively, disappearing, both realised their demise.

Yet the feelings amongst the Tskhinvali public are less well known, although few believe that a Georgian pension of less than 12 dollars a month will be enough to win their trust after more than twelve years of conflict and stalemate.

The Ossetians know that to go to university in Telavi or Tbilisi, take a job in a local administration outside South Ossetia or become a teacher within the Georgian state system, you need Georgian language skills, skills that many Ossetians are lacking. Moreover, due to the tense history with the Georgians, they are reluctant to gain those skills. This is a real concern amongst the Ossetian community, and with language being a strong part of post-soviet identity, it is also a sensitive one that needs to be addressed in a sensitive way. Unfortunately, sensitiveness has yet not been the trademark of the statements of President Saakashvili.

However, when overlooking the antagonistic rhetoric, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the events of the last few weeks could also be the death rattle of those on the Ossetian side that have economic interests in maintaining the status quo. With the Ergneti market closed (or at least disintegrated into smaller entities) and the demands of Georgian checkpoints at the Roki tunnel, the Georgian side is not aiming their aggression at villagers. This is a noticeable shift of strategy from the Georgian side which previously happily increased ethnic tension both in words and actions. With the Georgian ministry of interior largely without the political clout and economic interests it once had in the conflict zone, there is now a real window of opportunity to come to a constructive solution to a conflict long passed its “sell by”-date.

Russia’s involvement and economic interests in maintaining the conflict should of course not be underestimated. Members of the international community (although anonymous) increasingly believe that a deal between Putin and Saakashvili has been brokered. Natural components of such a deal would be the status of Abkhazia and Russia maintaining control of military bases in Georgia. One thing seems clear, especially in the light of President Putin’s speech on July 12 that “Russia needs to stop its imperialistic tendencies”. In Georgia, this has largely been interpreted as intended for the Georgian audience, where Russia’s interference in the South Caucasus and military support led to the de facto independence albeit isolation of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. South Ossetia is evidently not number one on the Russian wishlist, and will be sacrificed. The question is how and when.