Civil democratic control over the military forces is among the weakest in Tajikistan compared to other post-Soviet states. While a number of military reforms were implemented in the neighboring states, Tajikistan is still on the stage of constructing basic military legislation. The starting point for Tajikistan in terms of the formation of a military was different from other Central Asian countries. All post-Soviet military formations became the property of the 201st Motor Rifle division stationed in the country since many years and administered by Russia. The formation of the Tajik army since independence in 1991 can be divided into several phases. The time during 1993-1994 was a period of rapid registration of newly emerging armed formations within the Ministry of Defense. The first specialized battalions were created among former civilians who armed themselves at the beginning of the Tajik war. This was the first attempt to integrate armed formations into governmental troops. At that time, it was difficult to ascertain the precise quantity of active soldiers as there was a high degree of fluctuation of registered troops. A fundamental legislative base was established and a number of “umbrella” laws “On armed forces”, “On universal service”, “On defense” and “On rights and guarantees of military personnel and members of their families” were adopted.

In 1994-1997, as registration process had been completed, the Tajik government was able to take its first steps in military planning. In 1994 Emomali Rahmonov was elected the president and became the Commander-in-Chief of the national military. The Peace Accord of 1997 reintegrated the Popular Front of the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) and the governmental troops. As a result of recruitment of representatives from UTO into different governmental structures, control over the military was dispersed among power ministries and the president. After the peace agreement was formally achieved, many former soldiers wished to resign from the army, however it was difficult for the government to provide them with appropriate jobs. Four years of military operations made many former soldiers unable to compete in the job market. Although new legislation was introduced during the period after 1998 and institutionalization of the military continued, control over the military forces became more centralized. The number of UTO members in the government and the parliament decreased.

Data from international organizations indicates that state expenditure on the military amounts to ca. 4% of annual GDP. Local experts contend that during integration processes in the mid-1990s, the government was spending up to one third of the total state revenue on maintenance of the military, often incorporating funds from foreign aid. Such percentages can be compared with expenditures in Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, where military development and a firm command over the army provide stability for political elites.

Official statements count ca 20-22,000 troops. However, according to the civilian Deputy Defense Minister of Tajikistan, the real number of Tajik internal troops could reach 100,000 people, including mobile troops, militia and the tax service. Annual army conscription in Tajikistan remains at a level as if there were a constant threat of war, but the military lacks resources for development.

In the beginning of this year, according to President Rahmonov’s decree, the Presidential Guard will be transformed into a national guard. In reality, this change does not promise any structural reorganization. The current Defense Minister, General-colonel Sherali Khairulloyev has been holding his position for seven years. The Tajik parliament does not have access to reports on military finance or administration from power ministries. Moreover, the number of representatives from the UTO is well below the established quota. Annual military spending is determined without parliamentary consideration and the voice of civil society is insignificant. Independent media usually reports the perspective of military commanders who deny allegations of high corruption rates in security structures, widespread hazing and poor living conditions among soldiers.

The Tajik military, being considerably oversized, lacks potential for development. Unlike in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, no military industry is present in the country that would be able to provide independent domestic supply of ammunition. The country relies on foreign assistance and the army is bound to acquire all ammunition from abroad. Hence the army’s ability to fight independently is limited.

After the end of the civil war, the UTO had a greater access to the military, but the number of representatives from the opposition in the government and parliament has decreased over the years. Centralized control, oversized military and high reliance on external resources complicates the formation of mid- and long-term security strategies for the maintenance of internal stability. Large military expenditures are paid at the expense of investments into the social and private economic sectors. The Tajik military hence has a long way to meaningful reform.