Rustam Nazarov, the ex-director of DCA, was appointed first Deputy of the DCA. Mirzoyev was rather surprised by his dismissal. While assuring he was not going “to take up arms”, he argued that his dismissal was the result of intrigues by people surrounding Rakhmonov. This appointment stirred many questions in the Central Asian and Russian media, given Mirzoyev’s past and present links.

Ghaffor Mirzoyev, born in 1956 in Kulyab, is also known under the nickname “Sedoi” (grey haired), and was the closest ally of Rakhmonov during the events of 1997. Then, the presidential guards under Mirzoyev pushed out the forces of the infamous Makhmud Khudoiberdiev from Tajikistan. Mirzoyev was considered to be the closest ally of Rakhmonov.

Ghaffor Mirzoyev is a part of the “Parkhar” grouping of the Kulyab clan, whose leader is Makhmadsaid Ubaidulloev, Chairman of the Parliament (Majlisi Milli) and Mayor of Dushanbe. It is said in Dushanbe that there is a rivalry between Rakhmonov and Ubaidulloev for power. Ubaidulloev controls aluminum business and the distribution of foreign credit; his tolerant attitude towards drug trafficking has been alleged by numerous media outlets. Ubaidulloev is a powerful man with a tangible influence. Mirzoyev also has his share in the aluminum factory in Tursunzade.

Thus given the past and present links and influence, his appointment to the position of Director of the DCA is set to affect the future effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the DCA. There are several countervailing arguments as to why Mirzoyev was appointed to head the DCA. Firstly, it could show that Rakhmonov indeed is vulnerable to the opposition leaders, and does not want to escalate the deeper divide between him and Mirzoyev (who is supported by Ubaidulloev). And as leverage, Mirzoyev in fact controls over 3,000 devoted troops that could be used when necessary. In addition, there were reports that after his dismissal, Mirzoyev met several times with Mahmadruzi Iskandarov, who has grudge against Rakhmonov and also popular among opposition groups. Iskandarov is a Chairman of the opposition Democratic Party of Tajikistan. Iskandarov recently reminded Rakhmonov that according to the peace agreements of 1997 he cannot be reelected for one more seven year term. He was then dismissed from the position of Director of the state enterprise TajikGaz.

Secondly, Rakhmonov appointed Mirzoyev as a Director of the DCA and at the same time Tajikistan joined Interpol, in order to keep Mirzoyev in the light. The admission of Tajikistan to Interpol is crucial, since it will give leverage to Rakhmonov. If some of the opposition leaders make too much trouble, Rakhmonov could charge them with links to criminal activities (which indeed exist) and Interpol will grant Rakhmonov an additional leverage outside the country. Mirzoyev faces the choice of either taking his job seriously, working to stop drug trafficking, including that controlled by some of his close allies, or turning a blind eye on their activities and thus keeping good relations.

Thirdly, Deutsche Welle (DW) has implied that the change of the presidential guards was a result of agreements concluded between Rakhmonov and the Russians. According to the concluded agreement, accordingly, the presidential guards would be formed by the Russian federal border service, since the previous presidential guards (Kulyabis) had close links with the Islamic opposition, and strong links with the warlords of the Northern alliance. DW claims that this information was received by Iranian intelligence and passed on to Russian intelligence.

An additional factor that emerges from an analysis of recent reshuffles in the Tajik government, is that Rakhmonov is noticeably trying to surround himself increasingly by people from a specific district in the Kulyab region, Dangara, at the cost of other Kulyabis.

Another event is also important as a food for thought. In March, after almost one year of negotiations, Russia agreed within one year to transfer control over the Tajik-Afghan border to Tajikistan. Russian officials stated that Tajikistan put forward the conditions (e.g. writing off debts, paying for the optical station Okno) that were not acceptable to Russia. One such condition was that “in times of extraordinary situations, the President of Tajikistan can command the 201 Motor Rifle Division and to use it for the protection of national interests.” Thus the Russian withdrawal of border guards further weakens the position of Rakhmonov, and could be the result of wise PR campaign by the sides interested in border transparency and an unwillingness to share profits ripped from the drug trafficking – but also the desire of Tajikistan to receive investments from Western donors.