The approach adopted by the Turkish government – setting resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as a precondition for normalizing its relations with Armenia – has not produced the expected result. Quite the contrary, such an approach induced Armenia’s government to adopt a more confrontational stance, which has been emphasized by President Serzh Sargsyan’s statements at various forums, including the UN General Assembly, about recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence as the only feasible solution, as well as by the big military parade in Yerevan on 21 September – Armenia’s Independence Day.

Several factors are allowing Sargsyan to use harsher rhetoric. The opposition Armenian National Congress (ANC) has been unable to gather enough support for persuading the government to call for early elections, and has even reduced its constituency by engaging in negotiations with the government. There is also a perception that despite all the militaristic rhetoric, Azerbaijan is not likely to launch a war in the near future. Besides the relatively balanced military capacities, the ambiguous economic situation in the West plays an important containment role. Large-scale fighting would threaten the hydrocarbon exports and cause a price hike, provoking a deeper decline of Western economies, so Ilham Aliyev’s government should be under strong pressure and is unlikely to start a war. Economic problems aside, neither the West nor Azerbaijan are interested in strengthening Russia and Iran economically or geopolitically, considering the current situation in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the situation in Syria, the tension between Israel and Turkey, and other factors.

French President Nicolas Sarkozy’s visits to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia in early October also reinforced Sargsyan’s determination. Sarkozy’s statements about a military solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict being unacceptable and about the genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire, as well as bringing such a special gift as a statue made by August Rodin to Armenia, have been viewed as an attempt to attract France’s Armenian minority and right-leaning voters opposed to Turkey’s EU membership, as the 2012 presidential elections are approaching. However, Sarkozy’s reception in Georgia can be taken as an indicator that France is preparing to engage with the South Caucasus more actively in the political and economic spheres. A more active involvement on the part of France could may useful for the Armenian government, as Vladimir Putin’s return to the Kremlin seems unavoidable. Increasing competition between France (and, indirectly, the EU) and Russia could arguably provide Yerevan with more room for maneuver. Putin’s enmity toward Georgia’s President Mikheil Saakashvili, supplemented by Georgia’s likely veto on Russia’s World Trade Organization membership, is likely to provoke new attempts on Russia’s part to engage in changing the government in Tbilisi. If so, Russia would be interested in maintaining the situation between Armenia and Azerbaijan stable, and in keeping the status quo in Nagorno-Karabakh. Such stability grants Russia a degree of control over Armenia and Azerbaijan, which is needed in order to maintain these states within the Russian orbit. At the same time, the increasing French involvement has the potential of counterbalancing the Russian influence in Armenia to some extent, thus reducing the risk of the worst-case scenario in the view of Armenian politicians – closer Russian-Turkish cooperation in the South Caucasus with the West staying aside.

The international situation is thus quite favorable for President Sargsyan. The question is whether he can manage to outmaneuver or marginalize the opposition and, most importantly, to keep the unity of the ruling coalition as the 2012 parliamentary elections are approaching. The ANC had strong popular support in early 2011, capitalizing on the Arab Spring as a source of inspiration. However, the ANC’s leader, Armenia’s first president Levon Ter-Petrossian, chose to refrain from any attempts to topple the government by increasing the intensity of mass protests and declared his intention to negotiate with Sargsyan about early elections. His stated reason for this was to maintain internal stability in order to reduce the risk of military action by Azerbaijan. As subsequent developments have shown, the approach resulted in some decrease of ANC’s constituency and a growth of political apathy in the country. The ANC keeps demanding early presidential elections, but only a few thousand of its staunchest followers still believe in that possibility.

Sargsyan’s ability to keep the coalition under control is questionable, as his predecessor Robert Kocharyan declared his intention to return to politics a few weeks ago, and representatives of the Prosperous Armenia party led by Gagik Tsarukyan, a wealthy proxy of Kocharyan’s, have been criticizing the performance of some officials close to Sargsyan. Deepening discontent within the ruling coalition may help to end the stagnation, or, as Armenian politicians prefer to call it, “stability”. It remains to be seen whether the competition between the incumbent and two former presidents will bring any benefits for Armenia’s citizens.