The Georgian government and some European officials view the recently signed Mistral deal between Russia and France as a potential threat to Georgia and to regional security.

Moscow crowned the lengthy negotiations on the procurement of the French warship Mistral by signing an intergovernmental agreement with Paris on January 25. Along with several Eastern European countries, Georgia considers the deal a threat to its national security and a security risk to the Black Sea region as a whole. The symbolic connotations of the agreement are even more significant from Tbilisi point of view. Whereas analysts in Moscow calculate the benefits that Russian-French military cooperation may bring, Georgia appraises disadvantages it may face in the post-contract period. 

Under the agreement, Moscow purchased four French Mistral warships, including two to be built in Russia with French support, capable of carrying around 16 helicopters, 13 battle tanks, a battalion-size landing force, a 69-bed hospital and facilities for a full command.  The purchase costs roughly € 1.37 billion according to Russian sources.

Such sophisticated naval equipment raises Georgian concerns over Russian ambitions. Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili termed the deal "very, very risky" during the Russian-French negotiations.

“I can only assure you that if we buy something, we will use weapons where we see fit,” the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin responded to a French journalist’s question one year ago on the possible usage of the Mistral against Georgia. Admiral Vysotsky, the Chief of Staff of the Russian Navy, stated more clearly that during the Georgian-Russian war in 2008, such a ship would have given Moscow the opportunity “to do in 40 minutes what we have done in 26 hours”. The Kremlin later changed its rhetoric, saying that the equipment already in Russian possession is quite enough to conduct any military operation on Georgian territory and that it does not need the Mistral for these purposes.

Analysts doubt that the deal will justify its cost in terms of pure military benefits. According to the Russian military doctrine, the naval forces operate as an auxiliary to the ground forces. Thus, the strengthening of ground force capabilities is still on the agenda and will draw additional expenses. In addition, the operation of the new warships will require importing fuel, lubricants, spare parts and ammunition resulting in additional costs for Russia. Moreover, due to the Mistral’s weak self-defense capacities, it will not be effective even in local conflicts unless accompanied by strong escort. The ship is also vulnerable to ice, as the units purchased by Russia were built for operations in the Mediterranean or the South Atlantic. Finally, operating the Mistral’s command and control software, one of the key benefits of the warship from a Russian perspective, require specially trained technical personnel.

Supporters of the deal, however, argue that it will prompt the transfer of advanced technology to Russia, increase the country’s overall defense capacities and intensify Moscow’s military ties with Paris.

The Georgian government insists that the Mistral purchase entails political, rather than military, benefits for Moscow. Consolidating its maritime supremacy in the Black Sea region will allow the Kremlin additional leverage with vulnerable non-NATO members. Even East European NATO members, such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and the Baltic states, express their concerns regarding the extension of the Russian Black Sea Fleet lease on Ukrainian territory and the implications of the Mistral deployment for the region in general and for Georgia in particular.

The Mistral deal significantly weakens Tbilisi’s prospects for achieving a Russian fulfillment of the 2008 ceasefire agreement brokered by France. The fact that the former mediator has decided to provide Russia with warships casts a symbolic shadow over Tbilisi’s diplomatic efforts. Recently, Georgia has made significant efforts to convince the West to term the conflict zones “occupied territories” and the continued presence of Russian troops on Georgian territory illegal.

Another disadvantage for Tbilisi is that the deal opens the door for other countries, such as Spain and the Netherlands, which are eager to launch their own sales to Russia. Tbilisi voices concerns that such sales will boost militarization in the region and thus exacerbate public insecurity.

Washington has expressed its discontent with the Mistral deal, saying that the U.S. is concerned not about the growth of Russia’s military potential but the connotations present beyond the agreement.

The intergovernmental agreement between Russia and France seemingly delivers an unpleasant massage to Georgia in the form of a wider gap within NATO between those who perceive Russia as a threat and those who believe it should be engaged through economic and military cooperation. Such a division may push Georgia, an aspiring member of NATO, to rethink its security strategy and seek military alliances with more circumscribed groups of states, who share Georgia’s threat perceptions.