Wednesday, 30 November 2005

ASHGABAT, NOVEMBER 25, 2002: WHO LOST, WHO WON?

Published in Field Reports

By Muhammad Tahir (11/30/2005 issue of the CACI Analyst)

But unusually, Niyazov this time faced an unprecedented situation on the highway named after him. Usually there is no traffic on the highway – not only because of strict security measures, but also because of the early hour. But this day was different: not only did he see traffic on the road, there were also two trucks heading towards his car and a short time later he saw people firing at him.
But unusually, Niyazov this time faced an unprecedented situation on the highway named after him. Usually there is no traffic on the highway – not only because of strict security measures, but also because of the early hour. But this day was different: not only did he see traffic on the road, there were also two trucks heading towards his car and a short time later he saw people firing at him.

Niyazov’s car seemed fully prepared for such an unexpected situation. Instead of stopping, it accelerated, leaving behind all who were later named terrorists. After three years since this incident happened, no one still knows exactly how many lives were lost or how many were injured in the incident. Whether or not the news of incident were accurate, the events of that day led to the start of a new chapter of repression in an already repressive state.

Many experts, including opposition leader Boris Shikhmuradov in an interview shortly after this incident, accused the government of staging this drama. According to them, Niyazov himself wanted a basis for the further repressive measures, which he initiated shortly after the incident. Explaining why Niyazov would need to do this, another opposition leader in exile, Nurmukhmad Khanamov on November 25, 2005, said that ‘opposition groups were planing to stage a nationwide protest against the Turkmen regime. Niyazov was informed about this just before the demonstrations and he had to block it before it happened’.

Other experts, including Iranian analyst Farhad Javadi, say this could make sense, The government could handle demonstrations on the streets, and security forces could even imprison all protesters, but such a reaction would draw the attention of the international community. This incident provided Niyazov with the cover that he needed to take any kind of action he liked. ‘Because the fight against terrorism has been at the top of the world agenda since September 11, there was little chance of a world reaction against Niyazov’s move,’ said Mr. Javadi.

The possible actions of the government and its direction was became clearer a few minutes after the incident, when Niyazov appeared live on Turkmen TV. He described the act as an act of terrorism and accused the exiled opposition of staging it in order to take over power. Operations began against all citizens who may have had foreign connections; relatives and friends of opposition leaders especially were chosen as the first victims of this crackdown. Many of them were arrested and jailed for a number of years, their property was confiscated, and many others were forced into internal exile, without proper investigation. After the November 25 incident, a decree on ‘Enemies of the State’ was introduced for the first time in this country and was later used as a pretext for action against people who disagreed with the policies of the current regime.

Starting from November 25, 2002, restrictions against the activities of foreign NGOs increased, the press turned up its engine of propaganda for the president’s personality cult. Human rights abuses became routine, an exit visa system was introduced and getting entry visas to Turkmenistan became almost impossible.

Three years after this incident, due to the lack of an independent investigation, still no-one know exactly what happened on 25 November 2002. According to Dr Mehmet Seyfettin Erol of the Central Asian Strategic Studies Center of Turkey, whatever happened that day, President Niyazov took advantage of it to take full control of Turkmen soil. Today, wherever there is any terrorist attack, Niyazov is one of the first leaders to send a message of condolence to the leader of the victims’ country. He does not neglect to mention 25 November, saying ‘we know the pain of terrorist attacks’.

Many believe that Niyazov initially managed to benefit from this incident, but when Niyazov continued to reject international investigations, even requests for permission to meet with detainees, these advantages turned against him. Today Turkmenistan is on the list of the worst of the worst offenders in every international report. In the Report of Freedom House for 2004 as well as 2005, Turkmenistan is listed as one of the five most repressive countries in the world.

Other organizations, such as the International Crisis Group, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, also express deep concern over the country, especially the deteriorating situation following the events of November 25. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s special reporter, Professor Emmanuel Decaux, recently reported in detail the concerns about the situation in the country.

On November 21, 2005, a resolution adopted by the UN General Assembly’s Social and Humanitarian Committee by a vote of 70 to 38 with 58 abstentions, accused Turkmen authorities of restricting freedom of thought, assembly, conscience and religion. It was the third resolution of its kind since the so-called assassination attempt on the President in Turkmenistan.

In spite of its huge underground resources of gas and oil, as a result of repression, Turkmenistan is today one of the most isolated countries in the world. The number of countries who want to be seen in line with the Turkmen regime is getting smaller, as shown by the number of world leaders who have visited Turkmenistan in recent years. In 2005 Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko was the only leader to pay an official visit to Turkmenistan.

Niyazov has made only one trip abroad in the entire year, which was, as usual, to Russia. According to western experts, in spite of this international isolation, there is no significant threat against the power of the current President. The nations whose voices are raised in support of democracy are busy with their own problems and the Turkmen opposition has lost all internal support.

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The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is a biweekly publication of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, a Joint Transatlantic Research and Policy Center affiliated with the American Foreign Policy Council, Washington DC., and the Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm. For 15 years, the Analyst has brought cutting edge analysis of the region geared toward a practitioner audience.

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