By Farkhod Tolipov

On May 29, 2026, the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council convened in Astana, Kazakhstan, bringing together representatives of the five Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) member states and one observer state. Armenia was represented by its Deputy Prime Minister rather than the Prime Minister, while observer Uzbekistan was represented at the highest level by its President. Although the summit followed a largely routine agenda, discussions were overshadowed by speculation regarding Armenia’s potential withdrawal from the Union. In contrast, Uzbekistan maintained its traditionally supportive stance toward Eurasian integration. These developments suggest that the EAEU may have reached the limits of its current institutional composition and geopolitical configuration.

BACKGROUND:

The EAEU, established in 2015, succeeded the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC), which existed from 2001 to 2014. Both organizations were founded with the objective of creating an economic foundation for deeper integration among the former Soviet republics. They emerged within the broader framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), established in 1991 following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While the USSR consisted of 15 union republics, the CIS began with 12 member states and has since contracted to eight. The EAEC comprised six member states, whereas the EAEU currently includes five.

When the CIS was established, many experts and politicians described it as a framework for the “peaceful divorce” of the former Soviet republics. In retrospect, this assessment appears largely correct. Rather than promoting deeper integration, the CIS, the EAEC, and the EAEU have experienced gradual contraction and persistent disagreements. In the context of Russia’s war against Ukraine, Moscow has sought to preserve the remaining cohesion of this declining integration project. As part of these efforts, it introduced so-called informal meetings of EAEU heads of state. This is the backdrop for the May 2026 EAEU summit in Astana.

The EAEU summit in Astana coincided with Vladimir Putin’s second state visit to Kazakhstan. Observers focused less on the outcomes of the visit than on President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s remarks during the official welcoming ceremony. Tokayev described Russians and Kazakhs as brotherly nations sharing a common history, cultural traditions, and mentality. Such a warm reception for a leader conducting a war against Ukraine and widely criticized by the international community may negatively affect Kazakhstan’s international reputation.

While Armenia was represented by its Vice Prime Minister, the summit was attended by the presidents of the four other EAEU member states as well as Uzbekistan. The agenda was largely routine, focusing on logistics, digitalization, free trade, and artificial intelligence. Beyond these issues, the leaders of the four member states adopted a special statement concerning Armenia, expressing concern over its possible withdrawal from the EAEU and its aspirations for EU membership. The statement was delivered to the Armenian Vice Prime Minister, who reaffirmed his country’s intention to remain in the EAEU while safeguarding its national interests and respecting those of the other member states.

President Putin emphasized the incompatibility of simultaneous membership in the EAEU and the EU and warned Armenia of the economic consequences of leaving the EAEU. His remarks, resembling an ultimatum, amounted to a clear signal that Russia would reconsider existing trade and economic arrangements with Armenia should it withdraw from the Union. This position once again highlighted the predominantly Russia-centered nature of the EAEU, rather than a genuinely multilateral integration framework among equal members. In contrast, Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev reaffirmed that closer cooperation with the EAEU remains a key foreign policy priority for Uzbekistan.

IMPLICATIONS:

The EAEU summit in Astana took place in a complex geopolitical setting. Earlier, on May 15, Kazakhstan hosted an informal summit of the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) in Turkistan. Among other issues, OTS leaders discussed cooperation in artificial intelligence and digitalization, the same topics featured on the EAEU agenda. This overlap raises questions about the compatibility of integration initiatives pursued by the two organizations. It remains unclear how AI and digitalization strategies developed within the potentially competing frameworks of the OTS and the EAEU can coexist.

The summit was preceded by Donald Trump’s visit to China and Putin’s subsequent visit, both demonstrating renewed geopolitical activism. For Central Asian states, these events underscored the significance of the US–Russia–China geopolitical triangle, whose rivalry they observe with growing concern. Against this backdrop, the EAEU summit of “five minus one” member states appeared overshadowed by broader great-power competition.

The EAEU summit in Astana was also preceded by a series of high-profile diplomatic initiatives by Uzbekistan. In April, Saida Mirziyoyeva, Head of the Presidential Administration, visited Washington, D.C., for the launch of the American–Uzbek Business and Investment Council. On May18, she traveled to London, where she met British officials, international investors, and representatives of the London Stock Exchange following the IPO of the Uzbekistan National Investment Fund (UzNIF). On May 24, she visited New Delhi and held talks with U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio on trade and investment cooperation. These developments reflected Uzbekistan’s active engagement with Western partners in the weeks preceding the EAEU summit.

On April 15, President Mirziyoyev received a Russian delegation led by Sergey Kiriyenko, First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Presidential Administration and former head of Rosatom. According to official reports, the talks focused on implementing previously reached agreements and deepening the Uzbek–Russian strategic partnership and alliance. Against the backdrop of Uzbekistan’s intensive diplomatic engagement with Western partners, the EAEU summit in Astana appeared relatively modest and somewhat ad hoc. This reflected Russia’s preference for advancing its interests through bilateral relations rather than through the Union’s multilateral framework.

Rather than presenting itself as a dynamic and cohesive economic bloc, the EAEU revealed its geopolitical dimension. During the summit, Putin suggested that developments in Armenia could follow a trajectory similar to that of Ukraine. While such a scenario appears unlikely, this rhetoric may prove counterproductive. Russian pressure on Armenia is likely to deepen anti-Russian sentiment among Armenians and further strengthen the country’s orientation toward Europe.

For Central Asia, regional integration is challenged by Russia’s continuing geopolitical ambitions. While the EAEU has experienced contraction, regional cooperation in Central Asia is expanding, exemplified by Azerbaijan’s accession to the Community of Central Asia last year. Thus, while Armenia and Georgia seek closer integration with the EU, Azerbaijan strengthens its role within the Central Asian regional framework. In this evolving geopolitical environment, the OTS gains a new opportunity to emerge as a viable alternative to the EAEU.

CONCLUSIONS:

Zbigniew Brzezinski once predicted that the EAEU would struggle to survive beyond 10–20 years, arguing that its ideological foundation, Eurasianism, was both outdated and geopolitically unsustainable. This ideology has found limited resonance in Central Asia and other former Soviet republics. From this perspective, the EAEU masks a tacit divergence between its member states and an increasingly assertive Russia. 

The EAEU seems to have reached its peak in composition and geopolitical design. It becomes quite obvious that its makeup can be only five members or even less, and that the EAEU is losing its attractiveness. It looks like another “C5” (to use the Central Asian “C5+1” formula), however, it would become a “C5-1” if Armenia should withdraw, possibly returning to “C5” if Uzbekistan would join. This again underscores the geopolitical nature of the EAEU and the limited attractiveness of Eurasianism. Central Asia should take note of Russia’s ultimatum to Armenia and its increasingly belligerent posture toward former Soviet republics.

In November 2025, the 7th Consultative Meeting of Central Asian Heads of State was held in Tashkent, where participants agreed to transform the Consultative Meetings into the Community of Central Asia (CCA). Azerbaijan became a full member of the new organization. The 8th summit, expected to take place in Turkmenistan this year, will be the first meeting of the newly established Community. However, the membership of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in the EAEU, and Uzbekistan’s observer status, risk reducing the CCA to a largely symbolic project. As a result, the concept of the CCA remains vague, its institutional model underdeveloped, and its future trajectory uncertain.

AUTHOR’S BIO: 

Dr. Farkhod Tolipov holds a PhD in Political Science and is Director of the Research Institution “Knowledge Caravan”, Tashkent, Uzbekistan