By Ambassador David Dondua

Georgia’s democratic backslide has shocked observers at home and abroad. Once a “beacon of democracy” and a frontrunner of European integration, the country has lost its standing within the European democratic family in a remarkably short time. While this shift may appear sudden, it reflects deeper vulnerabilities—lessons that matter not only for Georgia but also for other small states navigating similar geopolitical crossroads.

BACKGROUND:

The rapid erosion of Georgia’s democratic and pro-Western trajectory cannot be explained by a single decision, policy, or political figure. Rather, it is the result of a complex combination of factors. At the most general level, it reflects the success of a long-term Russian hybrid and cognitive operation against Georgian society, an operation that ultimately proved much more effective than the 2008 military invasion.

As a result of the August 2008 Russo-Georgian war, Russia occupied only 20 per cent of Georgia’s territory. In the decade that followed, however, Moscow achieved something far more consequential. Through sustained political influence, economic leverage, disinformation, and elite capture, it gradually penetrated Georgia’s state institutions. Government, parliament, the presidential administration, courts, security services, police, armed forces, and the foreign service all became vulnerable to influence. Most importantly, Russia succeeded in distracting the country from its European integration trajectory and sowing mistrust toward democratic reforms and Western aspirations. Strategically, this amounted to the cognitive occupation of the entire state.

Blaming this reversal solely on Russian hybrid attacks, the pro-Russian stance of the ruling Georgian Dream government, or the role of the de facto ruler, billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, would be too simple. The reality is more complex. Among the many political, social, and institutional factors that shaped Georgia’s vulnerability, one has remained largely unrecognized, rarely discussed, and almost entirely absent from public debate.

In the late 1980s, as the collapse of the Soviet Union became inevitable, Georgian society engaged in intense debates about the future of the independent state. Constitutional arrangements, models of governance, economic systems, currency, and even sporting affiliations were openly discussed. One issue, however, was never truly debated: the foreign policy orientation of independent Georgia.

On this question, there appeared to be complete consensus. Becoming part of the West was treated as self-evident—almost sacred. It was widely perceived as the fulfilment of centuries-long aspirations to align Georgia with Europe. No alternatives were discussed, not because they were examined and rejected, but because few dared to articulate them. In a diverse, multi-ethnic society that had lived under Russian rule for more than two centuries, it is unlikely that such alternatives were entirely absent. Yet for the next three decades, this unchallenged consensus shaped both Georgia’s foreign and domestic policy.

IMPLICATIONS: 

From today’s perspective, this unquestioned consensus appears to have been a missed opportunity for deeper and informed societal consolidation. This observation should not be misunderstood as questioning Georgia’s European choice. The author firmly believes that the European path was and remains the right choice for Georgia. Yet accepting this choice without deep public reasoning, open discussion, or even heated debate left society ill-prepared to fully understand and defend it.

Georgian society is often characterized by emotional radicalism, reinforced by a lack of democratic traditions. This leaves limited space for critical reflection. As a result, key aspects of EU and NATO integration were rarely discussed in a fact-based and accessible way. Public support, therefore, remained largely emotional rather than knowledge-based.

This gap became visible whenever misinformation spread. Claims that EU regulations would ban or severely restrict traditional agricultural products, force the uprooting of vineyards—widely perceived as an attack on Georgia’s cultural heritage—or exclude most of local goods from European markets due to strict quality standards repeatedly triggered public outrage. Such narratives exposed how shallow public understanding often was, despite consistently high levels of declared support for European integration.

Insufficient effort was made to explain to citizens that compromise is inherent in joining any international organisation. Government officials and even NGOs promoting the EU and NATO integration often avoided discussing trade-offs and long-term costs. Citizens were rarely told that today’s difficulties are frequently the price of tomorrow’s benefits—choices that can only be made consciously by an informed society.

Following the adoption of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), the state should have launched a large-scale educational effort to demonstrate how this instrument could be applied in practice, particularly for small entrepreneurs and rural communities. While some initiatives were undertaken, largely with donor support, they were insufficient. For many citizens, European integration remained an abstract promise rather than a lived experience.

A fundamental contradiction of Georgia’s post-independence politics is that all Georgian governments over the past three and a half decades have claimed to be pro-Western and have promised the population a European democratic future, including NATO membership. Even the current ruling party, Georgian Dream, publicly declared the same until recently. Yet in practice, the actions of all those governments, without exception, have often fallen short of democratic standards, at times even sharply contradicting them. 

Against this backdrop, today, the ruling party has deliberately cast Europe as a convenient scapegoat for almost all of the country’s past and current difficulties, whether stemming from poor governance, institutional weaknesses, corruption, reform costs, or external developments beyond Georgia’s control. Georgian Dream has transformed ordinary challenges into a political weapon to erode public trust in democratic reforms and derail the country’s European path.

As noted above, in every election, including the watershed 2012 vote, virtually all political actors pledged a European future to voters; even marginal candidates openly backed or courted by the Kremlin used pro-Western rhetoric. Unlike in Ukraine, Moldova, or Armenia, where societies were exposed to competing geopolitical visions and, over time, could observe different policy orientations, compare outcomes, and distinguish between credible and non-credible strategic paths, Georgian voters were never offered a genuine choice. They were offered reassurance that the European path was uncontested and secure. This monopoly of a single geopolitical orientation meant that alternatives were neither seriously articulated nor openly debated. Paradoxically, the absence of pluralism later became a vulnerability: because the European choice was never collectively debated and consciously affirmed, it failed to generate a strong sense of public ownership.

Today, pro-Russian actors exploit this gap by asking: “Who decided that Georgia must choose Europe?” The ruling Georgian Dream has increasingly reinforced this narrative by claiming that the European course was imposed on Georgia by some phantom foreign forces. 

At the same time, fully replacing Europe with Russia remains politically tricky in the short term, given prevailing public attitudes. Instead, the government has sought to cultivate the idea of “state neutrality” as an ostensibly safer alternative to Western integration, one that promises stability while allowing Georgians to preserve their traditions, identity, and way of life without external pressure. Packaged in this way, neutrality appears as a return to normalcy and sovereignty. Such a narrative can gain traction precisely because the European path was never thoroughly debated, internalised, and embraced on the basis of knowledge.

In reality, however, neutrality functions as a transitional narrative rather than a genuine option. Given Georgia’s geography, security environment and economic dependencies, let alone historical experience, neutrality is simply not workable. In practice, abandoning Western integration is the fastest route to renewed subordination to Russia and the gradual erosion of Georgian statehood.

CONCLUSIONS: Georgia’s democratic and geopolitical setback is not the result of abandoning Europe overnight. It is the consequence of failing to cultivate deep understanding, ownership, and resilience around the European choice over three decades. Strategic orientations cannot survive on consensus alone; they require constant explanation, public debate, and civic education.

For years, Georgia proudly cited overwhelming public support for European integration. Yet emotional endorsement without understanding is fragile. A society that genuinely comprehends how Western institutions function and what integration realistically entails is far more resilient to manipulation. In retrospect, 50 or even 40 per cent of firm, knowledge-based support would have been more durable than 80 per cent of symbolic approval. This underscores that the key to Georgia’s recovery lies not in numbers alone but in cultivating genuine understanding and ownership among citizens.

This moment, however, is not irreversible. What was insufficiently addressed in the past can still be corrected. Periods of crisis often force societies to replace inherited assumptions with conscious choices. Continued engagement by Georgia’s Western partners is therefore essential—not less, but more focused on education, communication, and societal resilience.

Europe has not disappeared from Georgia’s collective identity. If reinforced through knowledge rather than slogans, it can still serve as the foundation for democratic recovery and a sustainable return to the European path.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Ambassador David Dondua is a diplomat and political analyst. He serves as Chairman of the EU Awareness Centre, a Brussels-based think tank focused on European integration, democratic resilience, and countering hybrid threats in Eastern Europe and the South Caucasus.

By Emil Avdaliani

The EU’s deepening engagement with Tajikistan through the Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (ECPA) aligns with Brussels’ broader economic and political outreach toward Central Asia. This strategy represents another phase in the Union’s increasingly active policy toward the region. The EU’s interest is driven by the Central Asia’s significance amid intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China over control of supply chains critical for battery and electric vehicle production. A further factor strengthening EU–Central Asia relations is the regional states’ pursuit of multi-alignment. Wary of dependence on either Russia or China, the Central Asian governments seek partnerships with other major powers.

                                                                     Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: On July 18, the European Union and Tajikistan initialed the EPCA. This accord will replace the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement that has been in place since 2010, establishing a legal framework to advance reforms in Tajikistan. The EPCA corresponds closely with the EU’s strategic priorities in Central Asia, which call for a more reinvigorated approach to the strategically significant region. It also seeks to establish a basis for future relations, reflecting emerging economic and political conditions on the ground. Brussels and Dushanbe foresee cooperation in trade as well as in human rights, sustainable development, education, energy, and related areas.

Similarly, in July the two parties discussed the present state of cooperation and prospects for launching new joint projects in mechanical engineering, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and the food industry. Additional areas include the mining sector, with particular focus on the extraction and processing of critical raw materials. Officials from Tajikistan and the EU also considered Dushanbe’s potential participation in the EU Global Gateway initiative, designed to promote sustainable infrastructure and reinforce strategic linkages across Eurasia.

The EPCA builds upon already established cooperation across multiple sectors. For example, during the past five years, 500 Tajik students have studied in Europe through EU funding. The Union has financed projects in the healthcare sector and promotes digital transformation, including initiatives to expand digital access via satellite technology. The EU also contributes to the development and modernization of green energy production in Tajikistan. With European support, the Nurek, Sebzor, and Kayrakkum hydroelectric power station projects are under implementation, and Brussels is assisting the establishment of infrastructure to transmit electricity to South Asia through the CASA-1000 transmission line.

IMPLICATIONS: The EPCA was concluded after several years of bilateral negotiations, a timeframe regarded as relatively brief for agreements of this nature. The EU remains committed to serving as a partner in Tajikistan’s future development and seeks to broaden cooperation across a range of key sectors, from education to investments in critical infrastructure.

Tajikistan is particularly interested in attracting additional European investments and technologies for the construction of the Rogun hydroelectric power station and the modernization of the Nurek facility. Moreover, Dushanbe seeks to advance the implementation of a “green” economy, a topic addressed in discussions between President Emomali Rahmon and the President of the Council of the European Union, António Costa. Tajikistan has articulated ambitious plans to transform the country into a significant producer of green energy. In June, the leadership announced that by 2037 the country would generate electricity exclusively from renewable sources. Although perhaps unrealistic, these plans underscore Dushanbe’s rising aspirations.

The EU’s intensified engagement with Tajikistan corresponds to Brussels’ broader involvement in Central Asia. The summit convened by the EU with the five Central Asian states in Samarkand earlier this year represented a significant development in bilateral relations. Under the Global Gateway program, the EU announced a €12 billion investment package for Central Asian countries, including €3 billion for transport, €2.5 billion for critical minerals, and allocations for other sectors. Initiated in 2023, the EU–Central Asia summits have become central to bilateral ties, reflecting the region’s increasing significance for Brussels following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine.

The Russian invasion altered Eurasian connectivity, elevating the importance of Central Asian routes for both China and the EU. As part of the Middle Corridor, Central Asia is integrated into the EU’s Global Gateway initiative, designed to advance sustainable and interconnected infrastructure projects worldwide.

Tajikistan places particular value on connectivity opportunities arising from the EU’s engagement with Central Asia. Historically, the country has remained peripheral to major transit routes, with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan assuming more central roles in linking China with global markets. Recently, however, Dushanbe has sought to capitalize on evolving Eurasian connectivity. Central Asia’s interaction with Afghanistan constitutes one potential avenue, but given Tajikistan’s cautious stance toward Afghanistan, the country is instead considering transit routes through Iran. Relations between Tehran and Dushanbe have improved in recent months, and Tajikistan is now actively pursuing the use of Iranian ports to gain access to India and the Gulf region.

Another transregional project pursued by Tajikistan is the Middle Corridor. In June, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade announced that Dushanbe is actively cooperating with Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and other partners on agreements providing mutual discounts on rail transportation to facilitate trade flows. This activism is not confined to Tajikistan but reflects a broader trend observable in the conduct of other regional states, including even the most closed one, Turkmenistan.

For the EU, Tajikistan holds particular importance in light of Brussels’ growing focus on securing rare earth resources, which are vital for multiple industries where competition with China has intensified. Estimates suggest that the country possesses approximately 800 mineral deposits containing critical materials demanded in global technological production. In late 2024, Tajikistan announced the discovery of 15 new major deposits of rare earths. In July of this year, authorities further reported the identification of rare earth metals—niobium and tantalum—in the Rasht Valley. Tajikistan also possesses considerable hydropower potential, with its 13,000 glaciers accounting for 68 percent of Central Asia’s water resources.

CONCLUSIONS: The EU’s engagement with Central Asia, and Tajikistan in particular, demonstrates that the Union has adopted an increasingly geopolitical orientation toward the region. To compete effectively with China, Russia, the U.S., and other powers, Brussels must shift its focus from rhetorical emphasis on human rights and democracy promotion to more tangible measures, including investment in critical sectors of cooperation with Central Asian states. The EU is regarded as a reliable partner owing to its adherence to high environmental standards in investment and the long-term benefits derived from them. While Central Asian states anticipate deeper EU involvement, they also acknowledge the constraints of bilateral cooperation. Geographic remoteness and underdeveloped infrastructure remain significant obstacles. Furthermore, the EU allocates fewer financial resources to the region than Russia, and particularly China, while its bureaucracy, unlike China’s, is less adaptable to the needs of individual Central Asian states.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.

By David Bujiashvili and Tomáš Baranec

In a resolution on July 9, 2025, the European Parliament called for a review of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement (AA) and its Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), citing Georgia’s continued violations of the Agreement’s core principles. The resolution warned that persistent backsliding on democratic values could lead to the suspension of Georgia’s economic and trade benefits. Accordingly, the Parliament urged the European Commission and the Council to assess Georgia’s compliance with these standards and consider suspending the visa-free regime in case democratic norms are not respected.

BACKGROUND: The signing of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement in 2014, establishing a comprehensive framework for deeper political association and economic integration was a culmination of a systematic rapprochement between Tbilisi and Brussels. The AA encompasses cooperation in democratic governance, justice, human rights, energy, environmental policy and other sectoral areas. A key component of the agreement is the DCFTA granting Georgian goods duty-free access to the EU’s Single Market.

Building on the comprehensive framework of the AA/DCFTA, Georgian citizens also gained one of the most tangible benefits of EU integration: visa-free access to the Schengen Area in March 2017. This milestone held both symbolic and practical significance, allowing Georgian nationals to travel for up to 90 days without a visa. It was widely seen as a reward for the country’s reform efforts and remains one of the most tangible benefits delivered to the Georgian public as part of the European integration process.

The geopolitical landscape shifted again in 2022 with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, prompting the EU to reassess its enlargement policy towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. In this context, Georgia was granted EU candidate status in 2023 recognizing Georgia’s European aspirations and progress in the AA implementation.

However, shortly after gaining EU candidate status, internal challenges in Georgia, including political polarization and pressure on the judiciary, raised concerns about the country’s adherence to EU norms. This led to a major turning point on 28 November 2024, when Georgia’s ruling party declared that it would not place the issue of opening EU accession talks on the national agenda until the end of 2028.

In reaction to these developments, the EU has taken concrete steps, including suspending high-level political dialogue with Georgia. The European Council suspended visa facilitation privileges for holders of Georgian diplomatic and service passports as an initial step toward broader restrictions. Following the EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting on July 15, 2025, Georgia was given a deadline to implement 8 key recommendations by August 31. Failure to comply could lead to the suspension of the visa-free regime for all Georgian citizens and potentially a review or suspension of specific AA/DCFTA provisions. 

Meanwhile, several EU member states are keen to impose personal sanctions asset freezes and travel bans on Georgian officials but are constrained by the lack of unanimity among EU members. Past instances, such as Hungary and Slovakia blocking personal sanctions against Georgia illustrate the complexity of achieving full consent.

Alongside political developments, Georgia’s economic integration with the EU has delivered measurable results. Since the 2014 signing of the EU–Georgia AA/DCFTA, exports to the EU have grown about 17 percent, expanding beyond wine, mineral water, and hazelnuts to include kiwifruit, blueberries, berries, organic honey, essential oils, dried and processed fruits, and, since 2022, snails. Export activity is strongest in Kakheti (wine and agriculture), Imereti (food processing), and Adjara, which benefits from its Black Sea access facilitating trade. Shida Kartli, bordering Russia, remains less export-oriented due to geopolitical challenges and limited market access. 

Complementing trade growth, visa-free travel has expanded opportunities for tourism, business, education, and family ties, while significantly increasing remittances from EU countries. Since its introduction in 2017, over 500,000 Georgian citizens have benefited, making more than 1 million visits to Schengen Area countries. Starting at around US$ 414 million in 2017, EU-origin remittances more than tripled to approximately US$ 1.4 billion by 2024, reflecting a 238 percent increase. On the contrary, remittances from Russia started at approximately US$ 380 million in 2017 but grew only modestly to around US$ 420 million by 2024. Consequently, the EU now accounts for roughly 44 percent of Georgia’s total remittances, overshadowing Russia’s declining share.

IMPLICATIONS: The DCFTA plays a critical role in Georgia’s economic interests. Its suspension would have serious consequences, threatening jobs, competitiveness, and rural development. For years, it has provided Georgian producers, farmers, and entrepreneurs with tariff-free access to the EU market. Its suspension would damage the economy, erode public trust, and increase social vulnerability. 

In contrast to the gradual economic impact of the DCFTA, the suspension of visa-free travel would hit ordinary Georgians immediately, undermining free mobility. Thousands rely on it for tourism, personal matters, and medical access to EU clinics. Students, entrepreneurs, and families would face new bureaucratic obstacles. Restrictions would hinder Georgian entrepreneurs from attending EU exhibitions and forums, limiting partnerships and market growth, while reduced EU access could deepen reliance on Russia and China, both visa-free partners. 

This impact would be compounded by low-cost airlines, particularly WizzAir, which could reduce routes or raise fares. WizzAir, operating in both Georgia and Armenia, may even close its Georgian operations entirely and shift all flights to Armenia if the EU suspends visa-free travel for Georgians, especially given the prospect that Armenia could gain visa-free access in the coming years. Such a shift would make flights from and to Georgia more expensive and less accessible, further reducing European tourist arrivals. Meanwhile, flights from Russia have risen sharply in recent years, increasing the risk of greater reliance on Russian tourists if European arrivals decline due to fewer low-cost flights. 

The economic consequences would not be limited to tourism. Suspension of visa-free travel would also negatively affect household incomes derived from remittances, underscoring the EU’s crucial role in supporting Georgia’s economic development through these flows. Many Georgians working in the EU without proper permits—often in informal sectors such as caregiving or domestic work—would no longer be able to sustain these livelihoods. Currently, they avoid breaching the 90-day visa-free limit by rotating their stays among friends and relatives, a practice that complies with entry rules while significantly contributing to remittance inflows. This informal mobility has provided a vital boost to Georgia’s economy.

Beyond economic costs, the suspension would deal a profound emotional blow to pro-European Georgians, deepening frustration and a sense of isolation. It would be perceived not merely as a bureaucratic measure but as a symbolic break - a clear signal that the country’s European path is no longer guaranteed.

Domestically, the suspension would likely be attributed to the government’s democratic backsliding rather than external pressures. Attempts by authorities to deflect responsibility onto the opposition, civil society, or the EU are unlikely to convince the pro-European majority. This could heighten polarization and, with local elections on 4 October 2025, trigger protests and increase pressure on the ruling party.

From a legal and procedural perspective, suspending parts of the AA/DCFTA is highly complex, requiring unanimity among all 27 member states. Therefore, suspension of the AA/DCFTA is unlikely, while in contrast, suspending the visa-free regime requires only a qualified majority of 15 member states, making it a more feasible short-term option if Georgia fails to meet EU benchmarks.

Despite these considerations, the EU remains cautious about measures that could directly harm ordinary Georgian citizens, especially given the 86 percent public support for EU membership. However, internal divisions over targeted personal sanctions have increased the likelihood of collective measures, including suspending visa-free travel. While affecting ordinary Georgians, this step may be the EU’s only remaining leverage if the government continues undermining democratic norms and fails to implement the recommended reforms by the end of August.

CONCLUSION: In the absence of a unified position towards the Georgian government, the EU currently has only a limited set of sanctions, which primarily target the local population rather than key representatives of the ruling party and business circles close to it. The ability of these tools to change the Georgian government’s position is likely limited. Moreover, both the suspension of visa liberalization and the less likely suspension of parts of the AA/DCFTA may be double-edged in the medium term, as they could increase the dependence of the Georgian economy and business on Russia and China.  

Even if the current status quo with Georgia remains, while Ukraine and Moldova continue advancing towards EU membership, freezing Georgia’s accession process would create a damaging gap in EU enlargement policy. This could result in a ‘Turkey-style’ scenario, where candidate status is maintained in name but the accession perspective is practically frozen.

AUTHOR’S BIOS: David Bujiashvili is a Georgian diplomat and expert in European integration with over 26 years of experience in EU Affairs. He has held senior government positions, coordinated the implementation of the EU–Georgia Association Agreement, visa liberalization, and EU assistance to Georgia, and served as Chief Coordinator of Georgia’s EU Accession Questionnaire (2021–2022), directly contributing to Georgia’s EU candidate status. He is also an Associate Professor at ALTE University of Georgia and author of the book Steps for Comprehending the European Union and 12 academic publications on EU Affairs.

Tomáš Baranec is the Founder and Executive Director of the Centre for Black Sea Studies as well as a Research Fellow and Head of the Caucasus Program of the Slovak think tank Strategic Analysis. He currently works as a field researcher on the Georgian-Ossetian ABL. Tomas studied Balkan, Central European and Eurasian Studies at Charles University in Prague.

By Emil Avdaliani

Although the Middle Corridor, connecting the EU and China via the Black Sea and Central Asia, has witnessed notable development in recent years, its swift expansion is constrained by both geographical barriers and the political complexities prevalent along the route. The Northern Corridor through Russia would be further consolidated should Russia achieve a favorable resolution to its war in Ukraine. While the Middle Corridor serves as a dependable link between Central Asia and the EU, it is likely to remain a complementary route to the northern Eurasian commercial highway.

Photo source: Tanvir Anjum Adib

BACKGROUND: The Middle Corridor, also known as the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, extending from the Black Sea to Central Asia and western China, has gained prominence since 2022 following the onset of the war in Ukraine. Although the route had existed in practice since the 1990s and was formally inaugurated in the early 2000s, its scope remained limited due to inadequate infrastructure, geopolitical instability in the South Caucasus, and, more significantly, the appeal of the Russian route, which had facilitated trade between China and the EU. Compounding these challenges is the corridor’s multimodal nature—comprising both land and sea segments—which, despite making it the shortest geographical path between China and the EU, has ultimately rendered its operation economically unviable.

Indeed, data from the period prior to 2022 highlights this unfavorable reality: merely 2–3 percent of overland containerized freight traversed the Middle Corridor. This dynamic shifted following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, as the route became increasingly associated with geopolitical volatility, the unpredictability of Moscow, and the risk of financial loss for both the EU and China. In addition, the European Union’s imposition of extensive sanctions on Russia has further incentivized the pursuit of alternative transport corridors.

Overall, cargo traffic along the Middle Corridor increased in 2024 for railway operators in Georgia, Turkey, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. For example, Azerbaijani authorities reported transporting over 18.5 million tons of goods in 2024, representing a 5.7 percent increase compared to 2023. In the case of Kazakhstan’s railways, the volume of freight carried via the corridor grew by 63 percent, reaching 4.1 million tons in 2024. Turkish and Georgian railway companies likewise experienced a rise in cargo throughput during the same year.

In late 2024, Kazakhstan unveiled plans to finance the construction of a new terminal at Azerbaijan’s Alat port. Concurrently, Astana is undertaking development efforts at the Aktau port, with authorities aiming to triple container throughput by the end of the decade. Additional recent developments similarly suggest a significant reorientation of strategic focus toward the corridor. Notably, in March, Azerbaijan hosted 24 companies for the General Assembly of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route International Association (TITR IA) Legal Entities Union. The objective of the assembly was to raise cargo volumes along the Middle Corridor to 96,000 twenty-foot equivalent units (TEUs). 

IMPLICATIONS: Thus far, the outlook for the Middle Corridor has appeared favorable. Major powers are increasingly expressing interest in the corridor’s development. In early April, the inaugural Central Asia–EU Summit was convened in Samarkand, Uzbekistan. The event was viewed as an effort to enhance the European Union’s presence in the region amid intensifying great power rivalry over Eurasian connectivity. The EU pledged a €12 billion assistance package, of which €3 billion will be allocated to the transport sector. Central Asia holds strategic significance for the EU, particularly considering the Middle Corridor’s advancement within the scope of Brussels’ Global Gateway initiative—a rival to China’s expansive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). With improved transport infrastructure, cargo delivery times between Europe and Central Asia are projected to be halved, reaching approximately 15 days.

China is another major stakeholder, whose growing interest in the Middle Corridor is evident through both political engagement and investment initiatives. A Chinese firm is currently constructing a deep-sea port in Anaklia on Georgia’s Black Sea coast, a development that may prove instrumental in achieving the goal of capturing a 20 percent share of EU–China maritime trade by 2035. Previous efforts to build the port were hindered by domestic political disputes, but the present geopolitical environment differs, with China now actively supporting the project. Beijing has also sought to strengthen its political relationship with Georgia, culminating in the signing of a strategic partnership agreement in 2023. A similar agreement was concluded with Azerbaijan in 2024, with an upgraded version on April 23, 2025, in which China committed to enhancing the country’s Caspian Sea ports and advancing the long-delayed China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway. These developments collectively signal the emergence of a near-continuous corridor stretching from China’s western frontier to the Black Sea.

However, given the evolving geopolitical dynamics surrounding Ukraine—particularly the ongoing negotiations between Russia and the U.S.—the Middle Corridor may face adverse consequences. Should Russia secure substantial gains in Ukraine, its strategic influence in the South Caucasus is likely to be enhanced. This could result in the consolidation of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan within Moscow’s sphere of influence, thereby empowering Russia to obstruct the functioning of a transit route that circumvents its territory from the south and facilitates access for rival powers into Central Asia. Potential measures at Russia’s disposal span from overt military actions to more subtle strategies, including embedding itself economically through infrastructure investments in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.

Moreover, despite the war in Ukraine entering its fourth consecutive year, this has not signaled the complete demise of the Russian route. Indeed, between 2022 and 2024, the northern corridor has continued to function as a major conduit between China and the EU. While the volume of freight transported along this route has fluctuated, it has nonetheless persisted as a vital commercial artery. Consequently, the Middle Corridor has continued to serve in a primarily complementary capacity.

This underscores the enduring viability of the northern route and should Russia–U.S. relations experience a substantial improvement; major enterprises may increasingly favor the well-established northern corridor. In contrast, the Middle Corridor continues to face constraints arising from both geographic challenges and the involvement of multiple stakeholders along its path. Infrastructure remains underdeveloped, and while intergovernmental cooperation is progressing, it still falls short of what is necessary. The true potential of the Middle Corridor is projected to reach up to 20 percent of overland containerized trade between China and the EU. However, this estimate is conditional upon several factors, including the successful completion of the Anaklia port and the expansion of the railway network across the South Caucasus.

CONCLUSION: Although the Middle Corridor has experienced considerable growth in recent years, its overall potential remains constrained. Geographic limitations, combined with persistent political complexities along the route, continue to impede rapid development. However, broader shifts in Eurasian geopolitics pose even greater challenges—should Russia succeed in concluding the war in Ukraine favorably and reconciling with the U.S., the corridor traversing Russian territory would be further solidified. This scenario does not imply that the Middle Corridor will cease to evolve. Rather, it is expected to continue expanding while remaining complementary to the northern Eurasian trade axis and functioning as a reliable conduit between Central Asia and the EU.

AUTHOR BIO: Emil Avdaliani is a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia, and a scholar of Silk Roads. He can be reached on Twitter/X at @emilavdaliani.

By Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu

The first EU–Central Asia Summit took place amid intensifying global competition, emphasizing the EU’s efforts to strengthen ties through connectivity, economic diversification and access to critical raw materials. Key regional concerns—including migration, sanctions circumvention, and infrastructure gaps—were also addressed. There is growing anticipation that the EU will adopt a more holistic and regionally attuned strategy, moving beyond great power rivalry to foster inclusive, long-term partnerships. Such an approach would bolster the EU’s credibility as a constructive and complementary actor in Central Asia’s evolving geopolitical landscape. Instead of competing against Russia and China, the EU can play more effective role as a reliable partner.

Photo source: Framalicious

BACKGROUND: The first EU–Central Asia Summit was held in Uzbekistan on April 4, 2025, in Uzbekistan. The EU was represented by President of the European Council António Costa and Head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen. During the summit, multilateral relations were addressed in a comprehensive and multidimensional manner. The parties discussed various areas of cooperation, including security challenges, economic collaboration, connectivity under the Global Gateway framework and people-to-people ties.

The EU holds a distinct position in the region, being Central Asia’s second-largest trading partner and its largest investor, accounting for 22.6 percent of the region’s foreign trade and 40 percent of foreign investments. In particular, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have expressed their intention to further develop trade relations with Europe under the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP), which facilitates more favorable access to the EU market.

This summit is also significant given its timing—coinciding with a period in which the U.S., alongside Russia and China, has emerged as a competitor to the EU in the region. In this new geopolitical landscape, strengthening relations with alternative markets has become a strategic objective for all major actors. However, the EU is expected to adopt a clearer stance on key issues in its evolving engagement with Central Asia. There are growing expectations that the EU will address the unintended negative impacts of its sanctions on Russia, which have also affected the region. Additionally, greater emphasis is expected on areas that align more closely with the region’s pressing needs—such as agricultural development and connectivity infrastructure—rather than focusing narrowly on selected industries or geopolitical competition. 

IMPLICATIONS: The EU’s timely convening of the Central Asia Summit coincided with a period in which global developments are compelling all countries to make new strategic choices. Actors affected by the protectionist U.S. economic policies, Russia’s war in Ukraine, and China’s rapid and seemingly unstoppable economic expansion are increasingly seeking new avenues for cooperation. While the EU already maintains a satisfactory level of economic engagement with the region, this new initiative signals an ambition to address more niche and forward-looking areas. These include specific areas such as geographical and digital connectivity, the green economy, critical raw materials and water management.

Within the Global Gateway initiative, the EU has sought to engage with the region primarily through infrastructure projects, allocating a budget of €300 million for this purpose. Although the EU’s initial intention was, to some extent, to compete with China, it has opted for a more nuanced and tempered approach in recent years. As Dr. Stefan Meister from the German Council on Foreign Relations explains, “EU is not about seriously challenging China and Russia, but rather about offering some alternatives in some sectors, competing in some sectors—especially on raw materials and on connectivity.” This perspective reflects the EU’s new approach of pragmatic engagement rather than direct confrontation, seeking to expand its influence through sector-specific cooperation and strategic investments.

Given China’s geographical proximity and economic leverage, it has become clear that directly confronting Beijing’s dominant position in Central Asia would yield little benefit for any actor involved. Instead, the EU has pursued a strategy of complementarity rather than rivalry. Central Asian countries, positioned to benefit from this geopolitical pragmatism, stand to gain significantly—particularly through the further development of the Trans-Caspian Transport Corridor, which promises to enhance regional connectivity, linking the EU and Central Asia within 15 days and expanding their access to diversified markets.

In addition, the issue of critical minerals is also of great importance in the new period. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act, proposed in March 2023, aims to ensure a secure, sustainable and diversified supply of critical raw materials essential for strategic sectors. As demand for materials like rare earths and especially lithium is projected to increase up to twelvefold by 2030, the EU seeks to reduce its overreliance on single third-country suppliers. The Act sets specific targets: at least 10 percent of the EU’s annual consumption should be extracted within Europe, 40 percent processed, and 25 percent recycled, with no more than 65 percent of any strategic raw material imported from a single external source. These measures are central to the EU’s efforts to diverse partnerships with Central Asia.

Kazakhstan’s substantial uranium reserves and its role as a producer of 19 critical raw materials essential to the EU make it a strategically important partner. Additionally, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan possess reserves of 43, 17, and 71 critical minerals respectively, further enhancing the region’s value from the EU’s perspective. However, despite this resource richness, the region’s transport connectivity remains heavily influenced by Russia and China—posing a significant challenge for the EU as it seeks to establish independent and secure supply routes.

Migration constitutes a growing challenge in EU–Central Asia relations in addition to the risk of sanctions circumvention and agriculture development limitations. The EU has expressed increasing concern over migration flows originating from or transiting through the region—particularly given instability in Afghanistan and broader socioeconomic pressures within Central Asia. Despite this pragmatic exchange, questions remain about the long-term sustainability and oversight of such processes.

On the other hand, an increasing number of Russian companies are reportedly using Central Asia to circumvent Western sanctions, raising concern within the EU. Russian-affiliated businessmen have begun relocating portions of their assets to countries in the region to shield them from asset freezes, a development the EU views unfavorably. In 2024, several companies were added to the U.S. sanctions list. Additionally, remittances from Russia remain a vital source of income for countries like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. However, since the imposition of sanctions, this financial flow has become unstable, posing significant challenges to the economic stability of these remittance-dependent economies. The EU needs to address this issue in the future since there is no specifically designed policy to resolve it.

Lastly, the EU has been slow to support the broader economic development of Central Asia. According to World Bank data, the agriculture sector remains a weak component of total GDP in the region: 4 percent in Kazakhstan, 9 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 11 percent in Turkmenistan, 20 percent in Uzbekistan and 22 percent in Tajikistan. The service sector dominates these economies, accounting for 56 percent in Kazakhstan, 52 percent in Kyrgyzstan, 45 percent in Turkmenistan, 43 percent in Uzbekistan, and 35 percent in Tajikistan. Under these conditions, the EU needs to play an effective role in strengthening the region’s capacity for industrial production and economic diversification. A narrowly focused strategy centered solely on gas, oil, and critical raw materials risks undermining the long-term goals of sustainable and inclusive cooperation.

CONCLUSION: Although EU policy frameworks are often presented with ambitious and appealing labels, critical areas remain that require greater attention in Central Asia. Rather than pursuing selective economic cooperation, the EU should prioritize agricultural development, the diversification of industrial sectors and the provision of sufficient infrastructure support. Moreover, a clear and coherent stance on the indirect impact of sanctions against Russia in the region is urgently needed. These ongoing uncertainties and regional expectations will play a defining role in shaping the future trajectory of EU–Central Asia relations.

On the other hand, framing cooperation with Central Asia solely as a tool for competing with Russia and China is unlikely to yield meaningful benefits for either the EU or the region. A more constructive approach would involve the EU positioning itself as a complementary partner, offering alternatives rather than rivalry. This strategy not only fosters regional stability but also helps mitigate the negative effects of U.S. protectionist tendencies, thereby strengthening the EU’s credibility as a balanced and reliable actor in Central Asia.

AUTHOR BIO: Dr Mehmet Fatih Oztarsu is Assistant Professor at Joongbu University and Senior Researcher at the Institute of EU Studies at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies. He studied and worked in Baku, Yerevan, Tbilisi, and Seoul as an academic and journalist. He is the author of numerous articles and books on South Caucasus and Central Asian affairs.