By Aleksandar Ivanović 

On October 10, 2025, the CIS heads of state summit was held in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The leaders established the “Commonwealth of Independent States Plus” (CIS+) format, further integrating external partners in CIS initiatives. Turkmenistan was chosen to chair next year’s summit in October. Multiple packages of documents were signed, targeting trade, crime, and most importantly, security. Security challenges from Afghanistan, including extremism and border conflicts, have continued since the Taliban takeover, and these recent agreements make up another component of Central Asia’s lengthy efforts to reduce the recurring concerns that can potentially spill over into their territories.

                                                                        Credit: Wikimedia Commons

BACKGROUND: As Tajikistan’s President Emomali Rahmon hosts high-ranking representatives from Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Belarus in Dushanbe for this year’s CIS Heads of State Summit, their annual tradition marks another year of important security partnerships.

The leaders signed multiple packages of documents, including the decision “on the Program of cooperation of the member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States in the field of countering terrorism and extremism for 2026-2028, strengthening border security at external borders for 2026-2030,” and military cooperation until 2030.

Russian President Vladimir Putin affirmed Russia’s open support for the signed proposals, stating that “an important area of joint work among the CIS states is the fight against terrorism, extremism, corruption, and so on.” Russia has been a victim of terrorism in the past, most notably in March 2024 when a bomb detonated in a Moscow concert hall killed 144 and wounded more than 500. The attack was carried out by ISIS-recruited Tajiks from both sides of the Afghan border, demonstrating how Afghanistan-based extremism can strike major regional powers.

The summit occurs at a critical juncture where the regional balance of power undergoes an increasingly global shift. Russia and China have taken significant actions to cooperate with Afghanistan, where the now-Taliban run state poses a greater challenge to regional security. China has offered economic-based strategies, accelerating infrastructure investments like its copper mining project at Mes Aynak, which is possibly the world’s second-biggest copper deposit. Russia, taking a more political route, formally recognized the Taliban government in July 2025, becoming the first country to do so.

The recent moves from external powers have complicated Central Asia’s own efforts to manage threats relating to Afghanistan. However, its leaders were also eager to comment on how to address security while pursuing economic opportunities with the Taliban. In his remarks, Uzbekistan’s President Shavkat Mirziyoyev outlined his interest in developing economic partnerships in Afghanistan, mentioning “joint participation in the implementation of major investment and infrastructure,” and stating that “Uzbekistan is resolutely committed to ensuring long-term peace, stability, and sustainable development in Afghanistan.” Despite its relatively small border, Uzbekistan is in a constant battle with extremist activity and border conflicts coming from its unstable southern neighbor. As a result, Tashkent has approached the Taliban government with a more open-minded attitude compared to its Central Asian counterparts to support the Afghan economy and infrastructure, hoping to address poor economic indicators that instigate external threats including extremism.

IMPLICATIONS: The documents signed in Dushanbe mark another example of Central Asian resilience and solidarity in assuring regional security, and for dealing with Afghanistan in the future. Central Asian states have already grappled with these efforts since 2021 and have collectively reflected on Afghanistan on multiple occasions. In August in Tashkent, special representatives of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan stressed the importance of fighting threats emanating in Afghanistan, highlighting extremism, terrorism, drug trafficking, and cross-border crime.

Extremism stemming from Afghanistan has most significantly been propagated by ISIS-K, the Islamic State’s branch in the historic Khorasan region. It mostly consists of non-Pashtun minority ethnic groups living in the northern region of Afghanistan, including Uzbeks and Tajiks. A portion of their fighters also include extremists or government dissidents in Central Asia, who go to Afghanistan and join their cause. ISIS-K seeks to radicalize and recruit young men from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, and spread propaganda through media to appeal to extremists and those dissatisfied with their governments. Major campaigns include criticizing governments for poor economic conditions in their respective countries, and the Taliban, a majority-Pashtun group and adversary that has undermined the presence of ethnic minorities like Uzbeks and Tajiks in Northern Afghanistan. President Rahmon has publicly acknowledged the issue, and has deemed ISIS-K a “plague,” and that “hell awaits” any Tajik that joins ISIS.

In addition to its media strategy, the group also actively works against the Taliban’s effort to build partnerships and expand security efforts in Central Asia. A notable example was when Uzbekistan, which holds the most cooperative relationship with the Taliban, was attacked in its border region by ISIS-K missiles in 2022, a strike aiming to undermine the Taliban’s legitimacy and security assurances to Central Asian governments.

Collective efforts with Afghanistan to combat extremism have not been substantial. With an already strengthened regional presence of ISIS-K, the Taliban’s internal power dynamics further complicate security assurances to Central Asia. The tension between Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada in the southern city of Kandahar and the more accessible and pragmatic Sirajuddin Haqqani in Kabul creates uncertainty about whether commitments to suppress extremist groups will be honored consistently across Afghan territory.

Central Asian states have mostly conducted autonomous campaigns to limit the spread of extremist groups and their potential influence. In February 2024, the National Security Committee of Kazakhstan neutralized multiple extremist groups and detained 23 individuals, including adherents of destructive religious movements, in 8 regions of Kazakhstan for promoting terrorism. Tajik forces similarly followed three months later, raiding villages in its Eastern region to arrest 30 people for connections to their terrorist group Jamaat Ansarullah, Tajik extremist allies of the Taliban.

Tajikistan, the most vocal state, was the only Central Asian government to call out the Taliban and categorize it as purely a threat. Dushanbe refused to send a diplomatic mission after the Taliban seized political power and has demonstrated security concerns through conducting multiple military drills along the Afghan border, some in cooperation with the Uzbek military. In a June 2024 session of the CSTO Parliament Assembly in Almaty, Rustom Emomali, son of the Tajik president, declared Afghanistan a “breeding ground of terrorism.” The Taliban has repeatedly assured Central Asian governments that it will not allow its territory to serve as a platform for extremist groups to strike its neighbors. However, this assurance has lately been viewed more as a desperate plea for legitimacy rather than a valid promise, as hostile attacks by ISIS-K and the presence of other terrorist groups like Jamaat Ansarullah continue.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have pursued a dual-track approach, recognizing that economic engagement may prove more effective than isolation. Both countries expect to conduct US$ 3 billion worth of trade with Taliban-ruled Afghanistan in 2025, viewing the country as their most important underdeveloped economic opportunity. They also seek to revitalize the historic Great India Road trade corridor which runs through Afghanistan, and it remains their highest priority for reducing dependence on northern routes through Russia. However, this strategy requires delicate balancing – economic ties that could reduce the sources of extremism must not legitimize a regime that harbors terrorist groups.

CONCLUSIONS: The past four years have demonstrated that Central Asian states face a complex trilemma: they must counter immediate security threats from Afghanistan, pursue long-term economic integration through Afghan territory, and navigate the competing interests of Russia and China – both now deeply engaging with Kabul.

The CIS summit’s security packages represent one pillar of this strategy, but they can only succeed through continued economic and diplomatic initiatives. What defines this unique current moment in Afghanistan is the erosion of Western engagement following the near-complete cessation of U.S. humanitarian assistance under the Trump administration. This vacuum has allowed Russia and China to position themselves as Afghanistan’s primary external partners, potentially foreclosing Central Asian hopes for a more balanced regional order. The next couple of years will test whether Central Asian solidarity, as demonstrated in Dushanbe, can effectively manage Afghan challenges without becoming dependent on their northern and eastern neighbors. How these dynamics unfold will indeed remain an essential conversation in Turkmenistan next year.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Aleksandar Ivanović is a researcher at the American Foreign Policy Council
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