IMPLICATIONS: Islamabad\'s decision to send troops to the tribal areas betrayed an anxiety on its part to not only address the concerns of the U.S. government but also to prepare its soldiers for any eventuality on its Western border with Afghanistan. The fact that the Pakistan Army’s elite commandoes conducted a major military operation on the eve of the second anniversary of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the U.S. also showed that the effort was intended to tell the Americans in particular and the international community in general that Islamabad was committed to the so-called war on terror. The recent border dispute with Afghanistan has rendered Pakistan’s western borders insecure and created a nightmare for its armed forces already confronted with a hostile India on the eastern border. This was a situation that Pakistan had sought to avoid all these years by seeking \"strategic depth\" in a friendly Afghanistan. The military raids in the tribal areas also stirred opposition among the fiercely independent tribal Pashtuns. There were protests against the raids in and outside the tribal areas and criticism was also recorded in the Parliament and the provincial assembly of the NWFP. The pro-Islamic MMA government in the NWFP complained that it wasn\'t consulted before sending troops to the area. Some of the religious leaders went to the extent to term the killed al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects as martyrs. By the same yardstick, they urged the faithful not to offer funeral prayers for the Pakistani soldiers killed in the operation because they took up arms against fellow Muslims. They said deployment of troops that served the interest of the U.S. and compromised Pakistan’s sovereignty was unacceptable. The military operations in the tribal areas hence contributed to the political polarization in the country. Lukewarm U.S. support for Pakistan’s stance on the Kashmir dispute and its below-expectation economic assistance to Islamabad made it difficult for President General Pervez Musharraf to justify his pro-Washington policies. Growing U.S. ties with India and the emergence of the so-called India-Israel-U.S. axis also weakened Musharraf’s hand and provided ammunition to his opponents at home to criticize him. The U.S. is seen as having little time for the concerns and needs of smaller countries like Pakistan. Moreover, an increasingly strong constituency points out that no amount of cooperation by Islamabad in netting al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects will satisfy the U.S.. Rather, it would whet America’s appetite to demand tougher action by Pakistan to kill or capture anyone remotely connected to al-Qaeda.
CONCLUSIONS: In the wake of the army’s operations in North and South Waziristan, many questions concerning the hunt for bin Laden and his lieutenants in the tribal areas remain unanswered. The U.S. failure to capture or kill bin Laden has led to frustration in Washington and prompted calls on Pakistan to do more in the search for the world’s most wanted man. America’ s war on terror will be deemed a failure until bin Laden is caught or eliminated. Having captured and delivered about 500 suspected al-Qaeda members to the U.S. during the past two years, Islamabad is being asked to net all those who might still be hiding in Pakistan. The biggest catch of them no doubt is going to be bin Laden. But his capture or death would also have political repercussions with Bush benefiting the most, and Musharraf possibly facing a backlash if bin Laden is killed or captured by Pakistani troops. This is a catch-22 situation with nerve-shattering outcomes.
AUTHOR’S BIO: Rahimullah Yusufzai is an executive editor of The News International, Pakistan. He is based in Peshawar, North-West Frontier Province, and is also a correspondent for the BBC, ABC News and Time magazine.