BACKGROUND: On February 18, 2000, Iran held elections for the Majles (parliament), the sixth since the 1979 revolution overthrew Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and established an Islamic Republic. Since the late 1980s, when the Iran-Iraq war ended and Ayatollah Khomeini died, a reform movement has emerged in Iran, challenging the dominance of hard line conservatives and clerics and pressing for greater freedom of expression, government accountability, rule of law, and expanded personal liberty. This movement has gained enormous momentum since the landslide election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997.
In the recent vote, 74 percent of Iran’s 39 million voters delivered a crushing blow to the old power structure. Three out of every four incumbents (predominantly conservatives) lost their seats. Two-thirds of the newly elected members are reformists, many of them entering national political life for the first time. There were scattered charges of irregularities, but for the most part the election appeared to be peaceful, fair and accepted by all factions. The outcome, however, is far from certain. In the past, rogue elements, possibly with tacit support of conservative factions, have resorted to assassination and physical intimidation to resist change away from Islamic orthodoxy. These tactics have tended to backfire, however, undermining the credibility of the conservatives.
The current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, represents the traditional elements of the business community and religious establishment. He maintains direct control over the judiciary, the military, security services, and revolutionary institutions such as the Guardian Council that must approve any legislative changes. Although Khamenei and the conservative establishment have demonstrated sensitivity to the popular will, as expressed in the latest series of elections, they will resist any effort to change what they regard as the fundamental bases of the original revolution.
IMPLICATIONS: The February elections are not a second Iranian revolution. They were conducted entirely within the existing political structure and according to the 1979 constitution. The constitution, however, is ambiguous. For example, in this Islamic Republic, should emphasis be placed on "Islamic" or "Republic"? For most of the past 20 years, interpretations of law, politics, media, the arts and personal life styles have emphasized Islam above democratic forms. But the new reform movement is shifting the emphasis toward greater popular participation and individual liberty in all aspects of the country’s life.
The reformers have two important instruments at their disposal: a daring and vigorous press that refuses to be silenced and a nascent party structure that is increasingly able to mobilize public opinion. And, unlike Turkey or Pakistan, there is no tradition of military intervention in Iranian politics. So the struggle is likely to be conducted largely as a public debate over the "real" meaning of the 1979 revolution, punctuated perhaps by outbursts of vigilantism and street violence.
Iran’s politics have been skewed in favor of the "insiders," the elite that took power in 1979. Now the "outsiders" reflecting the interests of younger people, women, technocrats and others ignored by the old system, have taken over the executive branch and the legislature. Should they attempt to challenge the vested interests of the old guard they will certainly meet with fierce resistance. Whatever the changes to come in the future, Iran will not relinquish its hard-won independence from external political intervention, will not renounce its distinctive Islamic character, and will continue to insist on what it sees as its rightful position as a major player in regional politics and security.
CONCLUSIONS: Iran is engaged in an extraordinary effort to introduce democratic forms into a revolutionary Islamist state. The Iranians, however, have no desire to launch another revolution. For them, one revolution has been enough and they would not like to repeat the experience. Ayatollah Khomeini once remarked that the revolution was not about the price of melons. Most of the debate thus far has centered on issues of social justice, rather than the economy. This is largely because the conservatives have no persuasive remedies for Iran’s ailing economy. But the reformers will increasingly have to deal with such mundane concerns as job creation and address the potentially explosive issues of foreign investment and globalization.
The very survival of the Islamic Republic may hinge on its ability to respond to the needs of a youthful and relatively well educated population that cares more about jobs and housing than about the fiery slogans of the past. That means that Iran will be more preoccupied with markets than with export of the revolution, more interested in foreign investment than in denunciations of world arrogance, and more interested in promoting its economic interests than in leading quixotic crusades. If the reform program succeeds, the Iranian "threat" to its neighbors will be a subtle model of a democratizing Islamic state where rulers cannot ignore their own people. In Iran’s neighborhood, that could be truly revolutionary.
AUTHOR BIO: Gary G. Sick is Senior Research Scholar and Director of the Gulf/2000 Project at Columbia University (http://gulf2000.columbia.edu). He was a former member of the National Security Council staff for Persian Gulf affairs under presidents Ford, Carter and Reagan.
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