BACKGROUND: Since independence in 1991, the regime of Islam Karimov has maintained a steadfast campaign against political opponents, particularly those seeking legitimacy or consensus via Islam. Even before complete Soviet collapse, the organizational meeting of the Islamic Revival Party in early 1990 was broken up by government forces, and throughout the last decade, the threat of an alleged "Wahhabist" movement in the Fergana Valley has provided the rationale for a consistent campaign of intimidation and arrest. Rather than secure religious freedom, a new statute on religion passed in 1998 gave the government sweeping powers to crush any "unsanctioned" religious activity.
The last eighteen months have witnessed an escalation of violence in Central Asia, initiated by the Tashkent bombings of February 1999, and continuing with a series of gun battles and small-scale invasions, the latter directed against Uzbekistan from surrounding states. In August of 1999, two waves of Uzbek insurgents attempted to enter Uzbekistan via the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan. The invaders were allegedly supporters of the outlawed Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, led by the dissidents Juma Namangani and Takhir Yuldash. The effort quickly stalled, with the rebels eventually withdrawing and releasing several hostages they had taken. Both the Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan governments alleged that these "Islamic terrorists" had used Tajikistan as a staging point, and may have been trained and equipped in Afghanistan.
On August 6 of this year, another force numbering between 50 and 100 fighters entered Surkhandarya in southern Uzbekistan. Once again the "Islamic militants"appear to have come from Tajikistan, although Tajik officials denied that any such force had crossed the Uzbek-Tajik border, or had entered Tajikistan from Afghanistan. Reportedly armed with sophisticated equipment, the insurgents killed a dozen Uzbek soldiers, and were in radio contact with bases in Afghanistan, according to the Uzbek Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov. Heavy fighting eventually dispersed the guerillas, with some attempting to flee into neighboring Kyrgyzstan. The Uzbek media, along with the Russian daily Nezavisimaya Gazeta, reported that the "Islamists" are followers of Namangani and Yuldash. Both men, previously reviled as "Wahhabis" in the Uzbek press, are believed to be hiding in northern Tajikistan.
IMPLICATIONS: The recent fighting has little military or strategic importance, at least in terms of unseating Karimov or spreading "Islamic fundamentalism." Were the insurgents twenty times more numerous than reported, they would still be no match for the Uzbek military, the region’s largest and best-equipped. The absence of meaningful political reform, coupled with severe violations of civil and human rights by the regime, has rendered lasting stability in Uzbekistan a distant, if not unattainable goal. This, along with a worsening economic situation, may serve to swell the ranks of those violently opposed to the Karimov regime, and lead to additional "invasions." The major significance of the clash lies in its symbolic value for both sides.
For the insurgents, such actions serve to remind potential supporters in Uzbekistan of two essential aspects of their struggle. First, they have now proven that they possess the ability to harass the Uzbek regime and force it to commit sizable military resources against them, ultimately perhaps pushing Karimov to grant at least limited political pluralism. In addition, the raid has shown that bombing of rebel bases in northern Tajikistan by the Uzbek Air Force in August of 1999 had little effect on the group’s ability to conduct cross-border operations. Secondly, and more importantly in a symbolic sense, the rebels are attempting to cast themselves in the minds of disaffected Uzbeks as the post-Soviet reincarnation of the Basmachi, anti-Bolshevik guerillas who carried on a decades-long struggle against the superior force of the Soviet Army in Central Asia.
For the Uzbek government, this recent episode against the forces of "fundamentalism" provides tangible evidence that U.S. and Russian faith in Uzbekistan as a firebreak, prohibiting the northward movement of radical Islam, has not been misplaced. Such faith was underscored by the promise of more than $32 million in U.S. military aid last February. Russia has also promised military aid, including advanced surface-to-air missile batteries—weaponry that would seem to have quite limited utility against small units of guerilla fighters. Symbolically, the incursion strengthens Karimov’s credentials in Moscow and Washington as an authoritarian leader who nevertheless is preferable to the perceive alternative of a radical Islamic theocracy striving to undermine the entire region’s stability and eventually inciting the unruly Islamic residents of southern Russia and western China.
CONCLUSIONS: The Uzbek government’s failure to enact democratic and economic reforms, as well as its continued authoritarian approach towards opponents, particularly those organized around Islam, has radicalized the opposition. As those excluded from the political process turn to increasingly desperate and violent actions in an effort to force the government’s hand, they inadvertently provide the regime with the rationale for further crackdowns and militarization of the region. The cycle of violence serves to strengthen the self-portrait so carefully cultivated by Karimov since independence: that of a post-modern Ataturk, committed to battling the atavistic forces of reactionary mullahs, while striving to firmly tether Uzbekistan to the West.
Such an image has played well in Moscow and Washington over the last decade, but ultimately may be self-defeating. Even if Karimov is able to retain power for years without granting the opposition, including Islamic groups, a larger voice in the political process, periodic violence and instability will continue to plague the region. This in turn will damage Uzbekistan’s position of regional leadership and severely curtail badly needed foreign investment and tourism, and require ever-larger military budgets. Ultimately, a critical mass may be reached that engenders the trans-regional instability the West and Russia both seek to avoid.
AUTHOR BIO: Dr. Reuel Hanks is Assistant Professor in the Department of Geography at Oklahoma State University, and Editor of the Journal of Central Asian Studies. His interests in Central Asia include national identity, the influence of Islam in politics and society, and economic development.
Copyright 2000 The Analyst All rights reserved.