ASHINGTON

Although a great majority of voters yesterday at the loya jirga in Kabul elected Hamid Karzai to be president, elation over the prospect of democracy's rebirth in Afghanistan may be short-lived. The loya jirga offered Afghans a chance to overcome the grave defect of the interim administration Mr. Karzai has headed since talks in Bonn six months ago: dominance by a former Northern Alliance clique of ethnic Tajiks from the Panjshir Valley (population 300,000).

These Panjshiris defied the Bush administration in taking over Kabul last year. In Bonn, they kept for themselves the most powerful ministries: defense, interior and foreign affairs. This power grab delegitimized the Karzai government for most Afghans. The loya jirga process should have enabled all Afghans to assert their right to govern themselves, but dominance by the Panjshiris and various warlords may survive into Mr. Karzai's new, 18-month transition government, with grave consequences for Afghanistan and the region.

The process of selecting representatives to the loya jirga went better than expected. There were gerrymandering, bribery and armed intimidation, including the killing of a dozen delegates. Some warlords exploited their local power to become delegates — a last-minute concession made by the United Nations envoy, Lakhdar Brahimi, and approved by the Bush administration's representative, Zalmay Khalilzad, who cited the need for "difficult compromises." Yet, in the end, all the main groups felt they would be heard in an admittedly rough-and-ready exercise in democracy.

Many Afghans saw the involvement of the former king, Zahir Shah, as a guarantee that the Panjshiris would not dominate the internationally connected, but otherwise weak, Mr. Karzai. The former king's appeal is rooted in Afghan society. Especially among Pashtuns — by far the largest Afghan group and the one most wary of the Panjshiris — Zahir Shah is still viewed as a figure to whom one can be subordinate without losing honor. Many Afghans view his long reign as a time of peace and the king as a symbol of unity and civility. Every government that followed his, from leftist dictatorship through the Taliban, made his rule seem like a golden era.

Upon arrival in Kabul, more than 800 loya jirga delegates, out of little more than 1,500, quickly signed a petition urging nomination of the king as head of state — not necessarily as an American-style president, but as more than a figurehead. His selection would have foreshadowed an end to Panjshiri dominance in Kabul. To save their position, the Panjshiris threw their support behind Mr. Karzai as head of state. To sweeten the deal, their nominal leader, Burhanuddin Rabbani, withdrew himself from consideration, and they jettisoned their interior minister, Yunus Qanooni. Significantly, they did not offer to give up control over the armed forces, security services or foreign affairs.

At this crucial moment American and United Nations representatives in Kabul made three serious mistakes. America's envoys pressed the king to withdraw himself from consideration, in effect pre-empting the loya jirga from selecting the nation's leader by itself. The leading American envoy, Mr. Khalilzad, then called a press conference to announce that the king would not accept appointment, thereby tainting the new government as a creation of foreign powers and causing delegates to lose face. Each would now return home without having had meaningful input into the crucial question facing the nation.

Finally, Mr. Brahimi gave the feared National Security Directorate, also controlled by the Panjshiris, free access to the loya jirga.

Together, these actions convinced many that the loya jirga is a puppet of Panjshiris and foreigners, and that the Bush administration is not willing to let Afghans engage in any democratic debate that might contradict American views. The administration's close relationship to the Panjshiris began when the Pentagon deputized the Northern Alliance in the war against the Taliban. They are the people the Bush administration has grown accustomed to and whom it refuses to face down in the present crisis.

Over the past six months the thing preventing Pashtuns, Hazaras and other groups from resisting the Kabul government has been the hope that the loya jirga would take corrective action against Panjshiri power. Dashing that hope could let loose the frustrations of those who feel excluded, a category that may include a majority of Afghans. If they cannot view the Kabul government as their own, they will embrace warlords who champion their cause — bearing in mind that the Panjshiris and some of the politicians with whom they may make common cause, like the Uzbek leader Abdul Rashid Dostum, are themselves basically warlords. In short, the new Kabul government as it appears to be taking shape may elevate another set of foreign-backed warlords for other Afghans to rebel against. This time, they would also be rebelling against the United States and, in some sense, the United Nations.
 
Lest it be further blamed, America should instantly indicate it will respect the decisions of the loya jirga on all matters, including removal of Panjshiris from key ministries. Beyond the loya jirga, a secondary problem of gross imbalance remains: ministry staffs are now dominated by Northern Alliance or former Communist personnel.

At this point it is up to Mr. Karzai to replace these appointees with ethnically diverse and professional personnel, particularly in the key ministries and the National Security Directorate. As he considers this step, he should know that the United States will provide strong support for his new staff — and that longer-term development assistance will depend on his readiness to face this challenge.

S. Frederick Starr is chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute at Johns Hopkins University. Marin J. Strmecki writes frequently about Afghanistan and is vice president of the Smith Richardson Foundation.