RUSSIA’S STRATEGIC CHALLENGES IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: AZERBAIJAN MOVES CENTER STAGE
Russia has emerged from the war with Georgia in August 2008 with considerable long term strategic challenges, both within the South Caucasus and in its dealings with the United States. Whilst Moscow indulges in self congratulation over the failure of Georgia and Ukraine to secure a timetable for NATO membership, believing it has gained a victory over a divided and weakened Alliance and President Dmitry Medvedev expresses his hope that the new Obama administration in Washington will presage compromise over missile defence, Russia will face growing problems in reconciling its self-generated image of resurgence with economic downturn and lack of support from close allies in the CIS.
BACKGROUND: Moscow’s wider diplomatic efforts in the South Caucasus have yielded mixed results. The declaration on the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution which was signed by the Azerbaijani, Armenian and Russian presidents on November 2 urges a political solution to the conflict. In Moscow, this was portrayed as a diplomatic triumph partly connected with its victory in August and its newfound penchant to promote peaceful conflict resolution. Amongst its neighbours in the South Caucasus, these views are less credible. Azerbaijani President Aliyev, for instance, according to Azad Azarbaycan TV believes the document showed that the conflicting parties are Armenia and Azerbaijan: an important concession, since Yerevan has maintained that it is an issue between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh.
Moreover, interviewed on Italy's Rai International TV channel on November 27, Aliyev said that despite the Moscow agreement, Azerbaijan reserves the right to resolve the dispute by force, if necessary. “No one can find in that (Azerbaijani-Armenian-Russian) declaration a commitment by Azerbaijan to refrain from a military option (of resolving the conflict). The fact that it says that we think a political settlement must be in place does not mean that we refuse our fundamental rights,” Aliyev explained. In fact, he used the opportunity to highlight the fragility of peace in the South Caucasus, which had been underscored as a result of the war in Georgia last August, though he expressed his preference to see a political solution, questioning the international community’s intentions or interest in this. “Armenia has been violating the Azerbaijani people's fundamental rights for over two decades and nothing is happening. We hope that attention to the issue will increase, especially after the latest developments in the Caucasus which showed how fragile peace is,” Aliyev said. Despite Russian protestations otherwise, the South Caucasus is no less volatile after the Georgia conflict.
The transit of military cargoes to Armenia, which has used Georgian territory to do this since 1994, has been made more complex in the aftermath of the August conflict. This not only has implications for the transit of Russian military hardware and supplies for Russia’s base in Armenia, since Georgia will not permit this to occur using its territory, it also affects Yerevan’s procurement options. For example, should Armenia purchase tanks from Ukraine, these would now be subject to Armenia-Georgia bilateral cooperation, as the tanks would be shipped to the Georgian port of Poti and then by rail to Armenia. In this sense, Russia has inadvertently boosted the strategic importance of Georgia within the region. The alternative supply route is through Azerbaijan, but this is subject to longer term fluctuations, and of course Baku can monitor the exact nature of all Russian military cargoes to the base in Armenia. This will remain problematic for Russia’s MoD.
IMPLICATIONS: In late November, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Ministry raised serious reservations over a recent bilateral defence cooperation agreement reached between Armenia and Georgia. The terms of that agreement appear to give Armenia transit rights through Georgia’s territory for non-Russian military cargo. Additionally, the agreement foresees Armenia sending its tanks for maintenance to the Tbilisi tank repair facility, something Baku considers could be a potential security concern for Azerbaijan. While this situation remained unresolved, Tbilisi, buoyed by the reaffirmation of NATOs support for its eventual membership of the Alliance in the aftermath of the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels 2-3 December 2008, carried out a government reshuffle designed to bring more experienced politicians into the Georgian government. Baku has also stressed its strategic partnership with Tbilisi as a way of ensuring a favourable resolution of concerns over the Armenia-Georgia defence cooperation agreement. Tbilisi, on the other hand, has positioned itself well to raise its own objections about Azerbaijani territory being used as a transit route for Russian military cargo at a time when Russia is an occupying power on Georgian territory. Moscow has limited leverage in these issues.
Similarly, NATO’s role may be changing in the South Caucasus, but it has hardly relinquished its interests as the Kremlin would like to see happen. Turkey’s embassy in Baku organized meetings at NATO headquarters on November 17-18 2008, attended by delegations from Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia. Although a wide range of issues were discussed, the central focus was how to improve the delivery of NATOs Individual Partnership Action Plans (IPAP). This presaged the mooting of the idea at the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in December to develop annual action plans, rather than concentrating on the more controversial Membership Action Plans (MAP), which were denied to Georgia and Ukraine. Moscow, contrary to the statements made by its political leadership on the issue of NATO ‘backing down’ on the MAP issue for Georgia and Ukraine, is in reality powerless to prevent the Alliance from developing more targeted and systemic assistance for its partners in the South Caucasus.
Azerbaijan’s first phase of IPAP, endorsed in April 2005, was completed in January 2008. Since April 2008, talks have centered on moving the second phase IPAP beyond its current draft stage. NATO would like to have the new IPAP agreement with Baku published in full in order to promote transparency and defuse unnecessary speculation on Alliance assistance to Azerbaijan’s armed forces. NATO wants to further support the transformation of the Azerbaijani military education system and strengthen the professionalism of sergeants amongst other tasks in order to help promote bringing military training and standards into line with NATO standards.
NATO has pressed for the formation of a joint headquarters in Azerbaijan’s military structures, which Baku has agreed to implement by late 2009 or early 2010. These advances combined with an undoubted interest in further modifying IPAP to suit its needs, suggest that Baku is open to closer cooperation with the Alliance. Baku needs assistance in strengthening these aspects of its armed forces, which NATO members are able to provide. NATO is encountering an appetite for ‘graduated relations’ with the Alliance amongst its partners in the South Caucasus.
CONCLUSIONS: Russia is subject to the impact of the global financial crisis, shoring up the ruble, flight of foreign capital since the war in August, and faces the prospect of a continued slide of world oil prices. It has committed to building new military bases in Abkhazia and South Ossetia which will be expensive and an additional security and financial drain on the Russian state. Equally, its recognition of the ‘independence’ of the two breakaway regions in Georgia has not elicited any support from its CIS neighbors. NATO’s cooperation with Azerbaijan and Georgia – far from being minimized – is likely to witness deeper assistance individually tailored to the host country needs and promoting defense and security sector reform, while stimulating further Euro-Atlantic integration. Russian power, after the war in Georgia, may be more illusory than real.
AUTHORS’ BIO: Roger N McDermott is a an Honorary Senior Research Fellow, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent at Canterbury (UK) and Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC. He specializes in the militaries and security issues in Russia, Central Asia and the South Caucasus.
